It is extraordinary how some bits and pieces stick in one's mind. Most of what I learned in college was either digested and entered into my mer bloodstream or was wasted and forgotten. Strangely enough, a few items took neither course. I took logic from a professor of psychology 51 years ago and psychology from a professor of philosophy; the inversion was due to one of those faculty quarrels which, of course, never occur in modern times. From logic comes the phrase which stuck in my mind. It was the definition of a definition and ran as follows: "A definition is the proximate genus and difference." Incidentally, I cannot forbear to comment upon the elegant precision of the statement as well as upon the extraordinary economy of language—not a word is wasted.

In talking about a Foreign Service for the United States I will discuss first its proximate genus, namely the characteristic diplomatic corps which appears in all nations throughout the world. I will then proceed to the other half of the definition—the difference; that is, what does, and what should, set our diplomatic service apart from the rest of the world.

Diplomacy has always seemed to have a somewhat esoteric quality. This arises from its royal origins, from its aristocratic traditions, and from the elegant jargon in which it has been traditionally encased. Always and everywhere there is a suspicion that it is not quite loyal. It is a mark of an almost pathological egocentricity that we think our Foreign Service is more unpopular than others elsewhere.
Always diplomats have been, and still are, held suspect in the lands to which they are sent. They are aliens; that is one strike. They are gathering "intelligence"; strike two. They represent adverse interests even though the country from which they come is classed as friendly or even an ally; strike three! At home they are also suspect: they speak in strange tongues—such as French. Moreover, even when diplomats speak in their native tongue, it is in a strange argot of stilted diplomacy. While they no longer finish their communications with "Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my most distinguished consideration, and believe me, Sir, your most humble and obedient servant," they appear, nevertheless, far too polite and urbane in dealing with people who clearly should not be trusted.

They consort with persons who represent adverse interests. They are always pictured in the newspapers as smiling, as though in total agreement with people whom the public regards with suspicion, distrust and often hostility. News photographers are in a conspiracy to misrepresent the diplomat. When Rusk is talking to Gromyko the sober Secretary and the Soviet basilisk are told to say "cheese" and act as though they were boon companions rather than adversaries. The trusting public regards the smiles as real rather than synthetic.

Niggardly support is a universal complaint of diplomats around the world. Partly for this reason diplomacy long fell into the hands of people with independent means and, in many countries, with titles. These facts aroused envy; there remains a suspicion that they still represent some mysterious "Establishment" inappropriate to a sincere democracy.

As these tendencies appear everywhere, there should be no surprise that the American Foreign Service and the Department of State are not held in high regard by the public here and are regarded as somehow peculiar, and
not like other government departments, such as the Treasury, Defense, Commerce, etc. This "difference" is observed by its own practitioners, by members of the public, and by Congress. It seems to exert a somewhat awe-inspiring influence even upon those who study it, and they tend to react—as one is likely to do in a field he does not really understand—with irritation. The number of commentators on our diplomats who sound like common scolds is striking.

Those who enter diplomacy as a profession inevitably take their color from the traditions of diplomacy. Nearly everyone has some concept of what is meant by "the military mind," as distinguished from the civilian outlook. Tensions in the Pentagon in recent years have highlighted those differences and called them sharply to public notice. Diplomacy, likewise, has its characteristic discipline, not so conspicuous, but just as real as that of the military regimen. Its practitioners, from whatever country, develop striking similarities.

After the United States became in some respects the premier power and deeply involved in all parts of the world, we lost the cockiness and self-assurance which had marked Daniel Webster, Richard Olney, Theodore Roosevelt and others. Instead we tended to be severely self-critical and manifested a belief that the British, French, or even the Russians are "better" at diplomacy. It is said: "They have been at it longer"; or "their services have better morale," or they are "dedicated." Not enough account has been taken of the actual record which shows that most diplomats have suffered from the same criticisms as our own Foreign Service.
Let us start with Britain. It is the oldest, often thought to be the most sophisticated and subtle in its operations. Yet there was a period between the two world wars when the British Foreign Office was virtually in eclipse. The Marquess of Londonderry said in 1944 in the House of Lords: "The Foreign Office is the pivot of the government, and the Foreign Secretary should be the most dominant personality in the Cabinet after the Prime Minister...it may be a harsh thing to say that the Foreign Office has not existed since the days of Sir Edward Grey."

In point of fact the British Foreign Office suffered most of the disabilities that then afflicted the Department of State—the Prime Minister, like the President, went his own way, was advised by his own staff, ignored the professionals and even his Cabinet colleagues. Lloyd George was as impatient as Woodrow Wilson: "Diplomats," he said, "were invented simply to waste time." The era of personal diplomacy by chiefs of government had dawned. Moreover, large elements of policy were effectively taken over by the military branches. A Commercial Diplomatic Service was established and made primarily responsible to the Board of Trade rather than the Foreign Secretary; only last month was it proposed to unite the two—an event which occurred in the United States in 1939. Moreover, in Britain there was the same expression of public suspicion and dislike of professional diplomats, and a hope that in the "new age" no such organization of stuffy professionals would be needed.

In an effort to increase efficiency, the British passed the Foreign Service Act of 1943. Partly out of a desire to "democratize" the Foreign Office, it amalgamated the diplomatic and consular services and abolished regional services. Since then the governing idea has been that Foreign Service officers must be interchangeable, ready to go anywhere or do anything.
and fill all the posts in the embassies. Inevitably there were some ill-effects, such as the loss of some expertness; on the other hand, before the reform the specialized services were sometimes so narrowly specialized that they each regarded their own bailiwick as "the most important," and failed to keep policy in perspective.

Even as late as the mid-fifties, the Manchester Guardian reported that "the Foreign Service has believed itself suspected by a large part of the public. It knows that it is often represented as a service inefficient and overpaid, divided into cliques, out of touch with the times, ignorant of the countries with which it is supposed to deal, spending its time at cocktail parties, meeting the wrong people, obsessed with pension prospects, its members bound together in a trade union whose main rule is that all should stand defensively together against the public and that the inefficient and unworthy should never be heavily penalized." The service "gives the impression of being a rather unhappy one because, among other reasons, it does not like being the target of jokes and irresponsible condemnations." If I had not identified the source of the quotation it could easily be mistaken for an American comment upon our own diplomats.

As in the United States, members of the British service found unsettling the oscillation between the higher style of living abroad and the less comfortable life at home. Officers sometimes strained every nerve to serve as much time as possible overseas because home assignments did not carry equivalent benefits.

The British Foreign Office, moreover, often finds that it does not completely control policy. Sometimes the Foreign Office has to act, in effect, for an inter-departmental committee, whose chairman and secretary may be drawn from the Treasury or some other Whitehall Department. All
telegrams about the negotiations are drafted as the result of the committee's meetings. Moreover, the Manchester Guardian found that the larger Embassies contain specialists appointed from outside the Foreign Service; thus a large Embassy, like the one in Washington, tends to be a microcosm of Whitehall. The Ministry of Labour and the Board of Trade have maintained something like their own Foreign Services.

We are well aware that there was sharp criticism of American diplomats in Cuba; The Economist of London was equally censorious in January of 1959: "Our men in Havana failed to notice that a civil war was going on until the fighting was pretty well all over bar the shooting of the losers... Our diplomats did not have to slink in Haroun al Rashid's tracks through the bazaars, or steal the saddlebags containing The Papers, or smuggle beautiful temptresses...They had only to read reports published in papers as reliable as (and including) The New York Times, and to keep in touch with equally respectable, though admittedly unofficial, persons who were fully alive to the way things were going...They could have got their information without even having to wrestle with such notoriously exotic languages as French, Spanish or Arabic."

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Perhaps it may be thought that the French have done better. On the contrary, its diplomats had the same kind of troubles. As our State Department was separate from the Foreign Service, so in France the split between the Quai d'Orsay and the diplomats in the field was wide and deep. A French Parliamentary Inquiry stated in 1947 that before the war the French diplomatic service, though unified in theory, was in fact divided into two distinctly different groups hostile to each other: there were
the agents of the external Service that followed La Carrière abroad and the agents of the "sedentary" service that followed "their" career in a closed mandarin system in Paris, responsible to no one outside their own hierarchy. This closed system caused the diplomatic machine to function in two almost watertight compartments.

The system has been criticized for "constituting a professional, expert bureaucracy, resisting subtly but often effectively all efforts of politicians or parliamentarians to adopt new courses towards new destinations." The members of the Service were, in fact, in a position to bring pressure to bear on the temporary Minister, especially in view of the frequent changes in the Cabinet. The Secretary General of the Department was dominant and surrounded by lackeys; the Minister all too frequently reigned but did not rule.

Jean Dobler, who held the title of Consul General in Cologne, though he was really the chief French observer of German behavior in Hitler's day, testified before the parliamentary inquiry that "the sedentary agents, in effect, in an effort to give us (external agents) the least credit and relegate us as much to the background as possible, gave preference to the information received from diplomats accredited to Paris from other countries, by-passing that which we ourselves sent from our posts...After all they were the representatives of their governments were they not?"

Deficient use of information from the Foreign Service promoted the inaction of the French Government with regard to German occupation of the Rhineland. In the course of the inquiry M. Dobler was asked to name the French Foreign Minister who had accorded him an interview after repeated requests. M. Dobler testified that it was M. Flandin and that he had requested the interview in order to request transfer from Cologne following the German reoccupation of the Rhineland. As M. Flandin seemed to know 7.
nothing of the activities there, M. Dobler asked him if he had seen any of his telegrams, to which M. Flandin replied: "Oh, there were so many!..."

The French service was disrupted by the defeat in May 1939, by the Occupation, by the Vichy government. Thus it had to be reconstructed after the war. It clearly suffered many of the difficulties common to Britain and the United States.

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The Soviets likewise had their troubles. Indeed they offer a striking manifestation of the capacity of the diplomatic career to exert its discipline over those who undertake it. After the Revolution the Bolsheviks were extremely scornful of the royal residues in diplomacy. They sought in every way to stress their breakaway from the past. They would not have a Minister of Foreign Affairs, but a People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Their diplomatic corps, if such it could be called, ostentatiously violated many of the sacred taboos of the profession.

Soon after the Revolution, Trotsky really hoped to abolish diplomacy which he considered to be part of the capitalist superstructure. In his book, Mein Leben, he is quoted to have commented with surprise: "What, are we going to have foreign relations?" He established the pattern for future Soviet foreign policy by creating twin but contradictory branches—the Narkomindel (Foreign Office) the function of which was to placate foreign nations, and the Comintern dedicated to promote their overthrow. The right hand was to deny responsibility for the left. This was to be a temporary measure, for with the disappearance of the capitalistic nation states which were locked in an imperialist war, diplomacy would no longer
be a necessary function, for the revolutionaries of all countries would know how to deal simply and honestly among themselves. Characteristically, the very first Soviet delegation (At Brest Litovsk) included a worker, a peasant, and a soldier. This was clearly a radical departure from usual practice.

The rivalry between the Narkomindel and the Comintern was not productive of effective policy. Favoritism for the Comintern was demonstrated by the low pay and long hours required of Narkomindel officials, and by the better lives enjoyed by their comrades in the Comintern. The Narkomindel had trouble with other agencies in the government and it was sometimes bypassed in international negotiations.

The world situation finally forced the Leninists to realize that their revolutionary instruments were inadequate at best and sometimes patent harmful to their interests, for they closed channels of information and means of maneuver. The Narkomindel, far from closing up shop, steadily expanded its activities which eventually differed radically from those of the Comintern. At last, with the failure of the "inevitable" German revolution, resort to traditional means of diplomacy was forced upon the Bolshevik leaders. Old titles and customs were adopted, and the familiar "Proletarians of all countries unite!" no longer appeared in their official inscriptions. At Genoa in April 1922 Soviet representatives appeared in frock coats and striped trousers. That was proof that the existence of capitalist governments had to be recognized, and corresponding adjustments in the ideology made by referring to "temporary capitalist encirclement." Diplomacy had to adapt itself to the "encirclement" and put the situation to the best possible use in order to accumulate power.
Now the Soviets have a Minister of Foreign Affairs; moreover, upon formal occasions their diplomats wear uniforms with plenty of gold braid and medals. Their ambassadors are as sleek and polished as any, and cannot be distinguished by any external manifestation of proletarian origin. Indeed they have learned traditional means so well that they have exalted the technique of diplomatic stalling to a high art. From their royal predecessors they also inherited the habit of endless repetition of sterile arguments. It is true that they violate, from time to time, the stilted rules of protocol, as when Khrushchev hammered upon the desk with his shoe. Nevertheless, taking it by and large, the Soviets now play the diplomatic game with a finesse they once scorned. The power of diplomacy to produce conformity in its practitioners is clearly evident in Soviet developments during the last 45 years.

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The German career service has had a checkered history. After the Empire was created Bismarck sought to establish a true German Diplomatic Service. He fought bitterly with the military for leadership over war policies. With Bismarck's eclipse the Foreign Office took a downward trend, particularly since Bismarck had been careful not to initiate the members of the Service into the over-all policies of his government while at the same time prescribing their behavior in detail in order to retain complete control over them.

Under Kaiser Wilhelm II the formulation of foreign policy lay largely in military hands and did not come under civilian supervision. Admiral von Tirpitz and General Ludendorff are prime examples of military
leaders whose advice Wilhelm II was all too willing to heed. Indeed, on
one occasion he proclaimed that "politics must keep its mouth shut during
the war until strategy allows it to talk again." It is no wonder the
Wilhelmstrasse was characterized at best by mediocrity. With Germany's
defeat, the Foreign Office was called upon to conclude an armistice agree-
ment.

During the Weimar years, the Foreign Office under Gustav Stresemann
gained primacy in foreign affairs. He reorganized the Office, merged the
political and economic divisions and consolidated the diplomatic and con-
sular services into a single service at about the time of our own Rogers
Act.

With Hitler's rise to power, German foreign policy became a mere
extension of Hitler's personal policies. The Fuehrer was undisputed head
of the Foreign Office as of all other departments. While Hitler determined
German foreign policy, its execution rested with the regular officials,
under a Minister like Ribbentrop. One historian speaks of him as "incom-
petent and lazy, hardly capable of drafting a coherent letter, and concerned
with his own advancement, hanging about Hitler's ante-room and neglecting
his office, leaving its direction and work to Weizsacher, who supplied Nazi
diplomacy with a civilized facade and a shrewder technique." (1)

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It would be possible to discuss the foreign services of Italy, Japan and other nations. But the record is clear; similarities abound in such numbers that the recital would be painfully repetitious. Clearly we are dealing with a genus which is different from other governmental departments, which has characteristics more in common with other foreign services than with the rest of the bureaucracy in its own.

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Our own record has some elements reminiscent of the Soviets. In his volume, *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method*, Harold Nicolson remarked that Americans "brought with them their dislike of European institutions, their distrust of diplomacy, and their missionary faith in the equality of man." For example, during the Pierce Administration, Secretary of State Marcy issued his famous "black coat circular." It forbade the use of diplomatic uniforms; it was designed to emphasize our democratic character and our abhorrence of regal pomp and splendor. However embarrassing this was to American diplomats who complained that at formal receptions they were mistaken for waiters, it was approved by most Americans as evidence that we were unique in our democratic simplicity!

Many Americans, particularly in the Congress, long spoke with pride of "shirt-sleeves" diplomacy. One Chief of Mission as late as the Wilson administration--one of the group William Jennings Bryan called "deserving democrats"--took this description so literally that he sought to do business in the tropics in a red flannel undershirt. He had clearly carried the concept one layer too far; a presidential commission was sent to investigate and he was relieved of office. Today no such informality would be attempted by the rawest and most ignorant of political appointees.
As experience made the Russians conform, so also the discipline of diplomacy has led Americans to conform. Most people have not even heard the words "shirt-sleeves diplomacy" for more than a generation. Indeed one frequent charge against the Foreign Service is that it is more European than American in character and outlook. Identification with the classic tradition has gone so far, indeed that the Protocol Officer of the Department of State is as meticulous and often as stuffy as any of his counterparts elsewhere in the world. In that office, if anywhere, will be found the "cut-away coat, the striped trousers, and the spats" that were long supposed to symbolize the Department of State and the Foreign Service. It should be remembered that it was a professional, Hugh Gibson, who, in testimony before a Congressional committee forty years ago lampooned the spat-dusters, the cookie-pushers and the cane polishers. He was protesting the substitution of traditional trappings and procedures for the substance of diplomacy.

So great is the influence of diplomatic tradition that the professionals in diplomacy in all countries can usually be relied upon to resist sweeping reforms of the diplomatic corps. Any proposed change that goes very deep is certain to produce a strong reaction. Each change in the American diplomatic service, beginning with the basic law, the Rogers Act of 1924, led the professionals to utter loud protests that something priceless was being destroyed, and that once lost, it could never be recovered. In 1924 the men on the diplomatic side insisted that those who had been in the Consular Service could not be expected to cope with the more arcane mysteries of diplomacy.

Under Secretary Joseph C. Grew said the proposal to make consular and diplomatic officers interchangeable "will be carried out with great
discrimination and care. There will be no 'weaving back and forth' between the two branches as the Consuls wish. You can't make a carpenter out of a plumber or a sailor out of a soldier by merely labeling him as such. The two jobs are as different as that of the Army and Navy, and if you try to train a man for both he will make a success of neither." (1) It was only when the law officer of the Department said he was disobeying the law and when a Senate committee threatened to investigate that Grew complied with the intent of the Rogers Act.

There have been a number of changes since: foreign representatives of the Departments of Commerce and Agriculture were incorporated into the Foreign Service in 1939; lateral entry into the professional corps was provided by the Act of 1946; the Manpower Act of 1947 provided for a strong lateral infiltration because the whole service had been starved during the war while the needs of diplomacy had greatly expanded. The old line career men resisted each change; between 1946 and 1951 the Foreign Service received 228 applications for appointments to its ranks by lateral transfer; only 26 got through the net. When in 1954 the partial integration of the officers of the Department of State with the Foreign Service was put into effect, the prophets of disaster appeared once again.

In each successive instance time has proved the prophets of deterioration wrong. It is possible to find sardonic amusement in a boast in the volume—Department of State 1963—that one of the achievements of the new administration was a "new and vigorous lateral-entry program...under which men and women with special skills and experience can be brought into the

service in the middle and upper ranks. The new policy is designed to bring into the Foreign Service a steady flow of specialized abilities and the best talent available." They were to come "principally from among the other personnel of the Department." It would be difficult to find a more accurate and succinct description of the reforms of 1954; but in 1963 it was a "new" program--and doubtless viewed with alarm by the "old hands" who entered in 1954!

Thus far we have identified the proximate genus. Diplomacy has a fairly long history--and a stubborn, deeply rooted tradition. When we became a world power we soon began to associate ourselves with that tradition. Today our Service is one of two--the British being the other--never disrupted by war or revolution.

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II

We have seen the proximate genus of our diplomatic establishment; now for the difference.

First of all there is the sheer size of the United States. Canada, Brazil, the Soviet Union, Red China are larger in area. The last two also have larger populations. None, however, approaches the United States in gross national product. Nor do they match the diversity which marks a nation that extends from the Arctic to the tropics, with all the varieties of activity that those extremes imply—from fisheries to cattle-raising, from wheat and corn and hogs on the one hand to a highly industrialized urban society at the other extreme.

In the second place, the United States is the only first-class power of continental dimensions with a decentralized economy. A great deal of profound significance is compacted into that one brief sentence. Though the economy, as we are well aware, is far from being entirely in private hands, since the government owns TVA and much other public power and controls rivers and harbors and inland waterways; controls prices of grain and metals of various kinds, and exercises close—and bureaucratically sluggish—controls over many areas of "private" activity. Nonetheless, despite all such undoubted realities which, in sum, amount to huge totals, ours remains the most thoroughly decentralized economy of any great power.

By itself, our decentralized economy would make many of our foreign problems unique. Nearly every other great nation, and most of the smaller ones, has had socialist governments. Britain had a "socialist" government, and bids fair to have another, and even the Tories have turned to national economic planning. Indeed the United States is virtually unique in having no "plan."
In the third place, the economy of the United States is more pervasive in a world sense than any other. Our exports and imports amount to over 35 billion dollars a year. Those of the Soviet Union are only about a third as large--12 billion. It is larger than the trade of Britain which amounts to about 22 billion, or France, 14 billion. The foreign investments of the United States amount to about 20 billion--many times those of any other nation. Its sheer size is impressive; its pervasiveness is all but unique; only Britain trades in more places.

Out of the great stress on economic freedom and individual enterprise arises a demand that our representatives abroad should serve not only the government, but private citizens. If a widget-maker of Kankakee wants information on outlets for Widgets in Ruritania, he will call upon the State Department or the Commerce Department to get out a report for him, and it had better proceed to do it with some thoroughness and expeditious or it will hear from at least one Congressman and two Senators. The upshot of this is that the representatives of the United States abroad are required to do a wider range of things for more people about more subjects than other Foreign Services. To say that our representatives have not satisfied everyone would be the understatement of the year, but it must be reported that they are trying harder and doing better. If American businessmen are sometimes unhappy, they should compare notes with their foreign competitors who are equally dissatisfied with their services.

A fourth distinctive quality in our foreign relations is that despite all our experience with two world wars and the ensuing disillusionment, there still remains a residue of Messianic belief in our mission and in our power. This survived the failure of Wilson's "war to end war" his dream of a "world safe for democracy" and an effective League of Nations.
It lives in the public consciousness even though we have found out by bitter setbacks in China, Korea, Laos, Viet Nam, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and elsewhere that while we are powerful, we are not all-powerful, and that while we are omnipresent we are far from omniscient. Yet the old dream appears, for example, in the quotation from President Kennedy which was put at the head of the first chapter of the Report of the Herter Commission: "For our nation is commissioned by history to be either an observer of freedom's failure or the cause of its success."

It would be difficult to find a more sweeping declaration of our presumed power to shape the destiny of the world. It makes de Gaulle's concept of "grandeur" pale by comparison. It is as sweeping as Khrushchev's promise that our grandchildren will be communists. When it is subjected to cold analysis, needless to say it becomes perfectly clear that we cannot hope, by ourselves, to bring in an era of peace or to "cause" the success of freedom. In making the assertion, however, the President was giving voice to what a great many Americans and a great many members of Congress believe in their sub-conscious minds.

Whatever we may think, privately and as individuals of such grandiose concepts, it remains a fact not to be overlooked that our Foreign Service is supposed somehow to effectuate such dreams. By whatever measure we fall short of achieving such goals, it is said to have "failed" and the diplomat are censured for not measuring up to our expectations. I think it is fair to say that in this respect our expectations are unique; despite Khrushchev's bombastic eloquence the Russians are realists.

In the fifth place, the structure of the United States government lays a distinctive burden upon our foreign service. We have a system of separate, coequal, powers--legislative, executive, judicial. Sometimes it
seems more like checkmate than mere check; at other times more like im-
balance than balance. At best the balance is highly unstable, and the
checks operate differently at different times.

When the Department of State was established it required only one
page of legislation, which can be fairly summarized by saying the Secretary
was to do what the President assigned him to do. As time passed, however,
Congress began to legislate in ever greater detail and to exercise tight
control of the organs of administration which operate under the President.
Congress has the power to set up executive departments and assign functions
to them. It requires reports to Congress from all save the Department of
State. More than seventy years ago, in his first notable volume, Woodrow
Wilson said that the Congress seemed determined to reduce the Cabinet
officers to the status of chief clerks.

We hear a great deal about the growth of the powers of the President,
and more particularly that he has unusual control of foreign relations.
But there is no Prime Minister or chief of government in the world who has
so many curbs upon his management of those who are responsible to him. Per-
sonnel systems of several different kinds minutely prescribed by law govern
people who must work side by side around the world. In their complexity
the laws make the management of personnel astoundingly complex and diffi-
cult. Moreover, legal restrictions make the coordination of policy among
the executive agencies difficult beyond belief.

Sometimes the President rebels. President Wilson, for example,
woke on his own typewriter a direction to the Secretary of State to dis-
regard a law of 4 March 1913 on the ground that it constituted a legislative
trespass upon executive responsibility. And President Johnson on 31
December 1963 gave what amounted to an item veto of one section of the Publi
Works Appropriations Act on the ground that "four Attorneys General have
held provisions of this nature unconstitutional." So far as I know there
is no way to test such refusals to obey legislative restrictions in the
courts, but only rarely do Presidents rebel so explicitly. In the speech
prepared for delivery on the day he was assassinated President Kennedy
besought Congress not to cripple his management of foreign affairs by
legislative strings. In his first speech to the Congress as President,
Lydon Johnson repeated the plea with great earnestness.

The structure of the federal administration has produced rivals to
the Department of State. The Defense Department makes a great deal of
policy touching such vital areas as Viet Nam, Korea and Cuba. This is not
as recent a development as some people suppose. It was the War Department
under Elihu Root which made our fundamental policy in Cuba, the Philippines
and Panama, much more than the State Department under John Hay.

The Treasury Department has been famous for making foreign policy.
During the Civil War Charles Francis Adams protested its independent activit
Secretary Hull complained bitterly of the activities of the Treasury. He
felt the Secretary of the Treasury often exercised functions which belonged
to the Secretary of State. Robert Murphy's new book tells of interference
in such detailed matters as insistence upon the dismissal of Couve de Murvil
from the administration of North Africa.

Others have not expressed themselves with so much bluntness but it
is well understood that the professional staff in the State Department has
very strong feelings that the Treasury tends to be negative in its approach
to international economic problems, and in this way can exercise an influ-
ence far beyond the power of the Secretary of State to control. Indeed
there are some legislative provisions which assign responsibilities to the
Treasury which deeply affect foreign policy. For example, by statute the Treasury holds the chairmanship of the National Advisory Council on international monetary and financial problems which is authorized to coordinate all United States agencies "to the extent that they make, or participate in the making, of foreign loans or engage in foreign financial exchange or monetary transactions." It also has a close connection with the Bureau of the Budget and independent agencies such as the Export-Import Bank, and is very close to the White House. Characteristically, it has defined "financia to cover a very broad territory.

As matters stand the Secretary of State can only attempt to coordinate the foreign activities of 30 or more departments and agencies by persuasion. As Senator Jackson's Subcommittee reported: "This role is complicated... by the jungle of interagency committees--the accustomed ground of bureaucratic warfare." (1) This task is further complicated because the Department of State has so many divisions of authority within itself and so many layers of responsibility that the Secretary must first coordinate his own Department, before he can effectively get agreement between State and its rivals.

Because of the infinite number of functions (many domestic) which affect foreign affairs, the vast size of the federal bureaucracy, the Executive department is far from being unified, and still farther from being wholly under the President's control. If the President cannot master all the agencies in the Executive departments, how much more difficult for a Secretary of State to do so as an agent of the President.

But much Congressional interference is neither so direct, not so

(1) "The Secretary of State," 88th Congress, 2nd Session, 1964, p. 7
self-conscious. The organizational structure of the Congress itself exacerbates all the divisive tendencies. A multitude of committees and sub-committees have supervision over different executive departments. As the Jackson Subcommittee reported: "The responsibilities of Congress are exercised to a large degree by individual committees in both Houses—for many purposes there is a multitude of little Congresses with which the executive agencies deal." "Program requests are presented to Congress in fragments. Congressional procedures compound the problem. The authorization process separates things that are, or should be, indivisible. At least five major Senate Committees handle pieces of national security policy. If the domestic economic implications...are taken into account, as they should be, at least seven major Senate Committees are involved. A similar situation exists in the House."

There is a natural tendency in any bureaucracy for each component element to enhance its own position as much as possible. When that is stimulated and protected by the Congressional procedures, the difficulties are manifest.

In the sixth place, the United States is unique also in the fact that a professional diplomat, if he has a normal career, must be nominated to and be approved by the Senate many times over; he has to be nominated and gain Senatorial approval when he enters the bottom class (Class 8); with each class promotion he has again to be nominated to the Senate; if he is made an Ambassador, or a Minister, Chief of Mission, he must be cleared anew by the Senate; every time he is moved from one Embassy to another as Chief of Mission or assigned an Assistant Secretaryship he must go before the Senate. Thus the "advice and consent" of the Senate to his appointment is required from eight to fourteen or more times.
Moreover, one angry Senator can put an able Foreign Service Officer in the deep-freeze. This is especially true if the Senator is powerful (even if in the minority party), and in particular if the nominee has at sometime named as his home state that of the angry senator. In one conspicuous instance, a Congressman asked an Ambassador a question about what we were fighting in Korea. He replied "aggression" with absolute accuracy, but it displeased the Congressman that the ambassador did not say "communism."

The Congressman transmitted his ire to a Senator. As a consequence, that man was not nominated for another Embassy for some years; he was given obscure posts in the Department of State in which to hide, so to speak, from the wrath of the Senator. This is by no means a unique experience, it has been repeated many times. This is one of the aspects of the "separation of powers" of which we hear very little, and it is one of the "checks and balances" which has proved over the period of time most disastrous to efficient operation.

All the problems of Washington are reflected in our Embassies abroad. The ambassador presides over a huge staff, the lines of responsibility of which run to many agencies. In an effort to achieve some coherence there have been a series of presidential Executive Orders making the ambassador head of the "country team." He is supposed to have control of all members of the embassy to whatever agency they may report and from which come their instructions. In a word, his subordinates look in every direction except the direction to which he is compelled to look--the Department of State.

In the most recent effort to ameliorate this difficulty the Department of State started some years ago to exchange officers with the Department of Commerce, then with the Pentagon, and subsequently with other agencies. The hope was to have men who knew the language of the other
departments and had some grasp of their problems and methods. It was a step in the right direction—but the steps were small and tentative, and the desired results likely to be long deferred.

Another move was made by the Herter Commission. It was a large and distinguished group, adequately financed and staffed. It proposed a "family of services" for State, USIA and AID. It did not plan a merger, but parallel services, with the same terms of employment, promotion, retirement, etc. So far as it went—3 agencies out of 30—it was good. But it has produced no action. It would require Congressional legislation unless all officers of the USIA and AID were put in the Foreign Service by the lateral entry process—a method that was approached, but failed.

Yet another proposal came from the Perkins panel, a small group of five seasoned men who had little staff, not much money and only a short time. They proposed a Foreign Service Academy, along the lines of the War Colleges. They sought to set it up outside the Department of State so that men assigned to it would not feel "captured" by State. Moreover it was sought to escape the crippling limitations upon staff salaries and benefits which have dogged the Foreign Service Institute.

If such an institution were set up the President by executive order could require all agencies, before sending a representative abroad, to assign him to the Academy for a full year. If during that time all those from all agencies were to concentrate their attention upon the basic goals and methods of American foreign policy, they would at least learn to use a common language in communicating with each other.

They would then be far better prepared to play a constructive part in the country team. The task of the ambassador, arduous at best, would be greatly simplified.
All who served with real effectiveness abroad for a period of three years should then be put in a Foreign Service of the United States (not just the Department of State) and be available for assignment to whatever department needed them. Thus we would start building a cadre of senior civil servants. They would have a background of specialized competence, but that would have been modified by the broader experience than is now available to the narrow specialists of the several departments. They could be used at home or abroad.

Sooner or later we must face this problem of competing services abroad. It is bad enough in Washington, it is absolutely intolerable abroad. The risks arising from incoherence in action are far too great.

We may applaud the tentative--not to say feeble--steps already taken, but we should make an adequate effort to move more boldly and more rapidly.

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