THE UNITED STATES AND TOMORROW'S WORLD

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My thesis is that in tomorrow's world policy and performance will both require more subtlety and sophistication than heretofore.

Stress upon subtlety and sophistication arises from no significant change in human relations. The basic factors in man's relationship to himself and to other men have not altered radically. When we think and speak of a new world, or use any other of the many current expressions, we bring more confusion than clarity to thought. Many physical changes in the world deeply affect our foreign relations, but there are equally vital elements of continuity--things which change not at all or very slowly. Science and technology have altered much of our environment, but they have not remade the human mind or spirit.

The charter of UNESCO asserts that wars begin in the minds of men. It should remind us that mental processes have not changed radically in more than two thousand years. Ancient Greeks still supply models of clarity and acuity of thought and expression.

But the statement in the UNESCO Charter is not accurate. Many of the things for which men have fought lie deep beneath thought processes; they are not rational at all. A more accurate statement would have been: wars begin in the hearts of men. "Hearts" is used in the old-fashioned sense, meaning the passions, the will, the drives, the sub-conscious, the unconscious--all those forces of which psychoanalysis has made so much and for which it has devised so many terms. The word heart is so employed in the Scriptures over five hundred times. UNESCO might have used part of Verse 21, Chapter VII of the Gospel according to Mark: "For from within,
out of the heart of men, proceed evil thoughts...covetousness, wickedness, deceit...pride, foolishness."

The things men have feared and hated most ardently have changed from time to time and place to place. But of the reality and power of these basic drives in the new age, as in the old, there can be no question.

The first step—and it is a long one—in a more sophisticated approach to tomorrow's world is to recognize these hidden intangibles as continuing and often decisive factors in international relations.

We have no Geiger counters with which to measure the intensity of these forces. No one has yet discovered a reliable test of the will; we have no gauge to tell us at what point courage will falter. From our own experience, we know that these traits are not fixed in either quantity or quality; they vary with a multitude of circumstances and moods. Anyone who candidly examines why even a single individual chooses to do one thing instead of another finds himself in a vast mixture of interests and motives. Only with difficulty—and with a wide margin of error—do psychoanalysts discover them in individuals even when aided by willing cooperation.

With nations, the difficulty of finding simple explanations is raised to the Nth power. No couch is large enough for a whole nation, no questions perceptive enough—and willing cooperation is conspicuously absent. Indeed the political structure is the very center of secrecy, for often fear is concealed behind bluster, envy behind denunciation. Whenever we make naive assumptions regarding these vital matters, we can throw policy fatally out of proper direction.
The second step toward greater sophistication is to appreciate the effect of this reality upon our power of prediction. Forecasting the future has been one of man's most persistent preoccupations. Almost from the beginning of recorded history seers and prophets, kings and potentates have proclaimed new eras in the history of mankind.

That each age is unlike those which preceded and those which followed it is undeniable. But contemporaries almost never accurately identified the dominant elements of their own time. Things which seemed decisive to them proved in the long run to be transient or of relatively little significance. Changes which passed all but unnoticed by the men on the scene came, in the perspective of history, to be regarded as vital.

Thus the proclamations of Wilson--a war to end war, a world safe for democracy--were wide of the mark. So, also, were those of Franklin Roosevelt--"Our industrial plant is built." So likewise were those of Mussolini, Hitler, Churchill and Stalin.

The definition of an age is one of the most imprecise concepts imaginable. During my own lifetime I have lived in the steel age, the air age, the age of science, the age of technology, the atomic age, the space age, or on different levels the age of democracy, the age of the totalitarians, the age of capitalism, the age of communism, the age of peace and the age of war. For one lifetime that is shooting ages by at a rapid clip.

Ages usually get their accepted names long after they are past. Even then the concept is imprecise. If historians can agree upon a name--say
the Renaissance—the dates assigned to its onset and its passing will vary a century or more at either end, or both.

The relevancy of these observations to our topic is clear. If great leaders cannot "discern the signs of the times," that is, if they cannot define current trends, then predictions based on alleged trends are unreliable. In any event, dependence upon the persistence of trends is based on a fallacy. It rests upon a false analogy with extrapolations in statistics and engineering. Even those extrapolations, useful as they are, are fairly crude instruments. A scatter chart of assembled data reveals clusters which appear to form some sort of pattern. A curve is drawn along the mean among the clustered data, neglecting those which deviate too far from the observed pattern. I forbear to press the embarrassing and unanswerable question: how far is too far? When the curve is drawn as far as the data in hand permit, it is projected forward upon the assumption that the pattern of the past supplies a probable pattern of the future.

When applied to questions of national policy, extrapolation breaks down at three points. First the scatter chart of data is not the closely defined sort that statisticians and engineers use. The data are disparate, not to say heterogeneous. The data would be more scattered than on an engineer's chart, and the curve along the mean would be much less reliable as an indication of a past trend; and its reliability as prediction even more speculative.

It is impossible, even with modern computing, to put down all data which are in number as the sands of the seas. You must select some and neglect others. No two equally competent people would make the same selection as to what to include and what to omit. Two scatter charts based on different sets of data show quite different patterns.
Extrapolation of trends is obviously a reference to using history as a basis of prediction. As a professional historian I naturally think history has much to teach us. But if we are usefully to exploit what it tells, it is necessary to recognize its limitations.

The startling fact is that most history has never been written, simply because no one was interested enough to tackle it. We can never know answers to questions we do not ask. Each generation tends to write about what interests it, which may or may not be what was of great importance in our past, or will be in our future.

Furthermore, history has a built-in bias. It deals with what was done, and what was said by those who did it. It gives short shrift to alternatives that were not acted upon, and even less attention to those whose proposals failed to be adopted. But the side which prevailed often did so by a very narrow margin, and only bad luck prevented those who supported different ideas from succeeding.

Since, however, history pays so little heed to what did not happen, there is an illusion that what happened not only was deliberate, but had some element of inevitability. This leaves the impression that our times have a greater confusion of tongues than earlier eras. Yet an examination of the record makes clear that dissent has always been present, has often been strident, and sometimes came within an ace of success.

The factors involved in any historical event are so numerous and confused that any explanation, however detailed, is an oversimplification. Oversimplification is often so great as to be seriously misleading. The Senate investigating committee that took its name from its chairman, the late Senator Gerald Nye of North Dakota, assigned armament makers a major responsibility for World War I. It was an oversimplification so great as
to constitute gross error. Yet for several years it had a marked influence upon public opinion and on actions of Congress.

These observations upon history make clear why I asserted that extrapolations fail, in the first place, because the scatter chart of data cannot be composed of the closely defined sort that engineers use.

Second, extrapolations fail because of unforeseen physical changes. I was taught in college that by 1950 coal would be virtually exhausted; depletion would have made oil a scarce commodity. I was threatened with a chilly old age for want of fuel, and a dark one for without fuel electricity could not be produced, since waterpower was inadequate. The population of France was declining: that would continue, and the factors which had led to the French decline would operate to stabilize the population of the United States at 150,000,000 by mid-century—with a declining trend thereafter.

These and many other misleading "facts" about the future (which is now past!) were fairly representative of the consensus among scholars of that day. They took form before Henry Ford made the automobile ubiquitous; just after the Wright brothers had lifted their frail powered kite off Kitty Hawk to which, incidentally, contemporaries paid little heed; before oil and gas exploration had really started, long before atomic energy was even a fancy, before radio, television and the rest of the technological explosion.

It is easy to assume that techniques have been so improved that no such erroneous material could be taught today. Yet we are often given rather precise figures regarding the population of Red China in the year 2000, though no one knows within 100,000,000 what it is today. Review in your minds, also, the statistical nonsense that was visited upon us in 6.
the years of the "great leap forward" when every family in China was supposed to make iron in the backyard. Now other statisticians have famine as a permanent characteristic of the regime.

The projection of trends into the future is more dangerous than helpful in a third decisive way. The human factors are so different from physical data that the assumption that a course will follow a "normal" extrapolation is incredible.

So variable, so complex are the human factors that in deeply significant political matters the theory of probability breaks down. Who will be so bold as to foretell what will happen to the structure of French politics and government with the disappearance of De Gaulle; when so dominant a figure disappears all is at hazard. On what foundation could one predict the decade of the seventies for Mexico, Brazil, Argentina? What is the future of Red China?

A sophisticated approach to tomorrow's world will give little heed to over-confident predictions. The late Carl Becker—a historian of rare perception—summed up the reality in a single sentence: "In human affairs nothing is predetermined until after it has occurred." His statement is what we used to call an Irish bull, but it is nonetheless an acute observation.

We must reject all temptations to determinism, which is the deadly enemy of our political philosophy. Instead we must remember that while the passions, the drives, are fundamental and continuous, their direction, their intensity vary not only from time to time but from moment to moment and man to man. That is why American faith in Manifest Destiny is dead, why Hitler's Wave of the Future has been broken, why historical inevitability is nonsense.

7.
The third more subtle and sophisticated step is to stop feeling sorry for ourselves because our difficulties are so great. Historically two sorts of people have always been--and still are--excessively vocal. One group looks to the past and laments a golden age now lost; the other looks to the future and promises a brave new world tomorrow. Both groups have always agreed upon one thing, that their own times were out of joint.

These traits are old. In the sixth chapter of Genesis, no less, is the phrase, "There were giants in the earth in those days." Four hundred years before the Christian era one of the Greek dramatists wrote of earlier times: "Fortunate were they who lived then with our ancestors." The Utopians have been just as vocal, just as persistent, and just as wrong.

The world has always had troubles. Most major problems are as old as the hills. The basic quest for peace is coterminous with human history. In the latest issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Senator Fulbright called for a concept of Free Nations. Cardinal Wolsey thought he had such a concert of Europe for peace in the Treaty of 1518. The pressure of population distressed men long before Malthus. Taxes--how to pay the costs of government--have been the subject of bitter complaint for many centuries. The destructive power of successive new weapons has frightened many generations. The list could be extended almost indefinitely. Failure to appreciate the antiquity of urgent issues is simply the measure of our ignorance of the past. Any era studied intensively would reveal periods of crisis, wars and rumors of wars, famine, pestilence, tyranny, slavery and a host of ills, most of which are forgotten.
Beyond ignorance of the past there are four other reasons why we are so acutely aware of crisis. The first can be dealt with in a sentence. Weapons have attained a deadliness and a pace so great as to make war, always terrible, and long since a poor instrument of policy, seem conceivable only as a last resort--and a desperate one.

The second new reason for the sense of crisis is that we have greater sensitiveness to poverty, unemployment and ill health. Trespasses upon the individual to which the world was callous now evoke outrage. The passing of colonialism is a manifestation of respect for the rights of man; one group dominating another involves an abuse that we no longer wish to tolerate. It is true that the Communists with cynical illogic denounce colonialism and practice imperialism. But that is simply added evidence of moral deficiencies from which, with all our faults, we have emerged.

The third fresh reason why modern troubles seem more acute is because the miracles of communication make us constantly aware of them. Every hour on the hour ills of the world of which our fathers were ignorant are piled on our doorstep. Fourthly, we have had so many successes--the conquest of tuberculosis and polio, famine and poverty (for even our destitute are well-off compared with the poor of Asia) that we feel frustrated if we cannot find a prompt remedy for every ill.

We must always remember, however, that as the scale of our difficulties appears to have risen, the resources available to meet them have also increased enormously. It is because we are rich and powerful, with world-wide interests that the troubles of Southeast Asia, for example, bedevil us. But who would go back to the days of our poverty and isolation in order to escape the cares that now concern us?
That suggests a fourth aspect of a more sophisticated approach to the world. For more than two centuries after the colonization of this continent we paid little attention to far away lands and strange people. Subduing this continent was enough to occupy most of our energies. Nevertheless individuals ventured afar; whalers and traders made contacts. They expanded their activities for many years before the government took action in their support.

In 1832 a New Hampshire sea captain, familiar with the perils of American shipping in Asiatic waters, persuaded the State Department that we should have treaties of friendship and commerce so that the crews of wrecked vessels, and other Americans who fell upon misfortune, should not be abused. So he was sent out with a stipend of six dollars a day, furnished with some passports and a sheaf of letters of credence and full powers to negotiate such treaties. The names of the "countries" to which he was to go and the names and titles of their rulers were left blank. He was to fill them in himself. The reason was stated with refreshing candor: "the titles appertaining to their majesties are unknown here."

The naivete of such a proceeding brings a smile; nevertheless, it was adequate for its time. Sophistication was not then essential. Times have changed. Not only have our interests in the area become immensely more important, but there is a dramatic change on the other side as well. The sensitivity of the rulers in that whole region has been heightened to an astounding degree. It will no longer suffice to confess an amiable ignorance; it would now be taken as a deadly insult. It is essential to attain a sophisticated knowledge of every area.
An autobiographical analogy may make my point clearer. I spent three graduate years studying the Middle Ages. It was an exceedingly rigorous discipline. It involved the continuous use of three alien languages, Latin, French and German. Even more difficult was the effort to understand the institutions of the era. The structure of society was wholly different from our own; the relationships of person to person were based on concepts quite unlike those which govern us. The nature of political life, at every level, offered more contrasts than similarities to our time. The economic system, the presumptions upon which it rested and the mechanisms by which it operated, bore little relationship to those to which we are accustomed. Institutions operated successfully on principles we do not accept. Most difficult of all was an attempt to penetrate the medieval mind, for the intellectual processes of medieval scholars were sharply different from the modes of modern thought. Wise men then accepted as axiomatic ideas and values wholly different from ours.

I had no idea, in those days before World War I, that any of that experience would have even a remote relevance to international relations in the sixties. Yet our relationships with many cultures in Asia, Africa and Latin America require much the same sort of mental discipline. It is essential to know their languages, not with a finger in the dictionary, but so well that one can grasp nuances of meaning. Social institutions, land tenure, political presuppositions and techniques, economic concepts and structures are as alien to our way of life and thought as the Middle Ages were to me a half-century ago.

These people, however, are not mere subjects of study as were the Middle Ages: we must live and work with them. The beginning of wisdom is to free ourselves from the moral arrogance and the intellectual blindness
that leads us to suppose that our way is acceptable to others. We must
get over the notion that the path to progress for these people is to lay
aside their own cultural heritage and enter into ours. When we are
accused of imperialism we resent it, but there is a kind of unconscious
imperialism involved in the assumption that we have the answers, the
skills, the know-how and they had best imitate our ways and so enter into
the joys of our affluence.

This prescription for a more sophisticated approach would not be so
hard if only all these alien peoples shared among themselves a single way
of life and uniform mode of thought and common standards of value. But
difficult of comprehension as that kind of world would be, it would be
vastly simpler than what we actually face. For the tribesman of Africa
is as far removed from the citizen of Indonesia, for example, as either
is from us. We must have people rigorously disciplined to enter into
the mind and spirit of many peoples. That is a tremendous requirement.

Not all citizens can do that, of course. No one can be expert in
all the cultures; it is hard enough to grasp one. That does not mean,
however, that we can turn the matter over to experts and relax. All
citizens must recognize that things valid for us are not necessarily
adapted to the needs, or the mind, of others. They want desperately some
things we have. Other things we possess and hold in high regard, they
do not want at all. An effort to impose those things upon them by power,
by money, by diplomatic pressure or by any other means will merely provoke
hostility. Social, political, economic ideas and institutions of widely
varied character may seem valid to other people in different historical,
geographic, climatic, physical and spiritual environments. Until we
understand that not just superficially but deep down in our hearts, we
can never deal with these peoples successfully.
A fair estimate of the situation requires recognition of another serious difficulty. We have become, by a wide margin, the largest source of development funds for nations in a hurry to catch up. That supplies us with a leverage which we are always tempted to use more vigorously than is wise. We have been brought up on catch phrases, such as "Who pays the piper calls the tune." So we are tempted to put restrictions in our gifts and loans. Ordinary prudence makes a minimum number of such requirements necessary, but if we exact political payments, or seek to dictate basic economic organization we are asking more than money should buy. We would be naively accepting the Soviet dogma of economic determinism.

Let me make it crystal clear that in suggesting a more sophisticated approach to other nations I am not expressing any lack of faith in our own political, social and economic ideals and institutions. Far from it. In my judgment they are the best in the world. Indeed with all our well-advertised faults, I should be a lot happier about the world of tomorrow if our pattern could be repeated in most nations of the earth. But our institutions reflect the accumulated experience of social, political, economic and cultural history. Our ideas have been shaped during a long evolutionary process. Their validity and their viability rest upon that prolonged period of maturing in mutual adaptation.

With experiences sharply at variance with ours in all fields--cultural, social, political, economic--other nations cannot be expected to shuck off their traditions like a garment. Indeed, they have become enormously self-conscious, not to say over-sensitive, about their distinctive cultures. Ireland has sought to recover and restore its own language. Recently the deep cultural divisions between the Flemings and Walloons in Belgium have had dangerous manifestations. If old and stable nations show
such tendencies, we should not be surprised at evidences of strain among newer nations.

Acute domestic difficulties in India, Ceylon, Indonesia, Malaya and many others reflect highly self-conscious cultural differences within their own borders. This should be a warning against attempts to force the pace of basic changes. Nations must adapt and adopt what they find useful, but the final judgment must be left to them. One fundamental human right of which we seldom speak— but often practice—is the right to make our own mistakes. Others also are entitled to exercise that right. Sophisticated appreciation of the fact that other nations cannot rapidly be remade in our image, therefore, neither downgrades our institutions, nor exalts theirs. It merely accepts the fact that there are historical dynamics which can be diverted and redirected only slowly—and only by the people themselves.

V

The fifth need for a more subtle and sophisticated approach is in our relationship with our allies.

The history of our attitude to alliances is instructive. At the outset of our struggle for independence we eagerly sought allies. It was one of the triumphs of Benjamin Franklin's diplomacy that he was able to exploit France's troubles with Britain and obtain a treaty of alliance with France in 1778. The declared purpose of that alliance was thus expressed: "The essential and direct end of the present defensive alliance is to maintain effectually the liberty, sovereignty, and independence absolute and unlimited, of the said United States, as well in matters of government
as of commerce." What a modern sound it has! That alliance was a vital factor in the success of the Revolution.

After the war, two things became apparent. The interests of the United States diverged from those of France. For its part, France wanted to continue to use the United States as a pawn in its power game with Britain. Before the end of Washington's first administration, Vice President John Adams wrote: "America has been long enough involved with wars of Europe. She has been a football between contending nations from the beginning, and it is easy to foresee that France and England will both endeavor to involve us in their future wars. It is our interest and duty to avoid them as much as possible, and to be completely independent, and to have nothing to do with either of them, but in commerce."

Our declaration of neutrality was issued the next year, and in 1796 came Washington's classic statement in the Farewell Address: It is "unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her (Europe's) politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities." "It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world;" "We may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies."

Circumstances were such that no further alliances were made by the men who shaped our government under the Constitution. With the passage of time two key words in Washington's statement were forgotten: he did not denounce all alliances, only permanent ones; he specifically endorsed temporary alliances. All his qualifying expressions were overlooked. Those subtleties were lost to memory; in the public mind all alliances became entangling.
Lack of participation in other alliances kept us from appreciating that our unhappy experience with France after the immediate objective had been attained was more nearly normal than unusual. We never appreciated how brittle alliances have customarily been, and how frequent have been reversals of alliances, nation's changing partners even in the midst of critical times.

The century and more of a hardening mood against any alliance in any circumstances whatever deprived the United States of an important element of flexibility in policy. We lacked experience with alliances; we failed to learn at first hand what they could do and what they could not. When, therefore, we reversed our policy and made alliances during President Truman's administration, we tended also to reverse our mood. As alliances had long seemed synonymous with evil, now they were identified with good. As before there had been extravagant fears of entanglement, there were now equally extravagant hopes of cooperation.

So far as tomorrow's world is concerned, there is urgent need for perceptive analysis of what can reasonably be expected of alliances and what cannot. Almost never do they arise from a real cohesion of common interests among nations fairly equal in power. Far more often they result from external compression arising from common danger. As a general rule, the greater the danger the firmer the alliance; but that there are exceptions to that rule is proved by the suspicion of the French toward the British in early 1940. It was epitomized by Marshall Petain: "England has got us into this position. It is our duty not to put up with it, but to get out of it."

Nearly all alliances are proclaimed as defensive; and the most successful are usually those which are truly defensive in the face of great 16.
dangers. Alliances, however, should never be sentimentalized. Washington's warning against "permanent, inveterate antipathies" and "passionate attachment of one nation for another" are still valid. Our post-war relationships with Germany and Japan illustrate his first point; we gave up a temptation to permanent antipathies. Our war and post-war contact with Russia illustrates his second principle; there never was a passionate attachment, but we must now beware of permanent antipathy which could prevent us from taking advantage of possible changes in the Soviets.

Alliances should be conceived as limited partnerships for specific purposes over a relatively short time—as short a time as the attainment of the specific objective permits. The reason can be simply stated, though operations under its trammels may be infinitely complicated. All significant international intercourse involves some surrender of freedom of action. Not only does what we do affect the outcome; the result is shaped also by what the other participant does. We may act with the wisdom of serpents, but if the other party acts foolishly the consequences may be just as disastrous for us as though we also had failed to perform wisely.

When responsibility is shared not merely bilaterally but multilaterally one nation, acting without adequate skill, may wreck the work of all the others. When that responsibility is shared not over one closely defined area of interest but over many such areas, the chances of error resulting in failure are multiplied not arithmetically but geometrically. One power can wreck many aspects of the work of many.

Moreover, the likelihood of internal strains within the alliance also advance geometrically. There is never uniformity of interest between even so few as two nations. Despite our close connection with Britain, for
example, the views of that nation with regard to Red China contrast sharply with ours. Much less is there correspondence of policy among many. There is even less uniformity of view when nations undertake to work together over a wide spectrum of policy. When several nations are in a group alliance, the tensions among conflicting interests, real or imagined, mount up rapidly.

Not only the substance of policy, but the manner of approach grows in complexity. In bilateral discussions there is a direct confrontation of views. But as discussions become multilateral there is always danger that some nation's ideas will not be heard—or at least not with enough attention to avoid wounding its amour propre. This difficulty is compounded when the alliance is between states of unequal size and resources. There is always a tendency for the great powers to be more alert to each others wishes than to give full consideration to the views of their smaller partners. But the less powerful are acutely conscious that wisdom is not distributed in direct proportion to power. Sometimes they seem to feel it is in inverse ratio! In any event, their sensitivity is great and their feelings easily wounded. Successful participation in an alliance requires self-discipline of a singularly rigorous kind; it calls for patience that ordinary intercourse does not demand. The spirit of noblesse oblige is demanded.

These considerations constitute an argument against extending alliances to more nations than is absolutely necessary; we may create more new troubles than we succeed in allaying old ones.

It is surely an argument against the feeling that the way to strengthen an alliance is to load it with new and different functions. To feel that we facilitate better relationships by adding new strains to old stresses
seems to me the height of folly. When an alliance has fulfilled its mission and rough relationships have been smoothed out, there may be reason for adding to its responsibilities. But when its objectives are still beyond present attainment and internal strains are painfully evident, it is not the best time to add new and more complex responsibilities.

VI

Many of these same considerations apply to our participation in international organizations. That is the sixth point. International organization was long equated in the public mind with alliance. The United States was a prime mover in the establishment of an international court—and then abstained from participation for many years. The United States demanded the League of Nations, and then declined to participate. The halls of Congress rang with the word entanglement.

By that act, we lost the experience in international organization that participation in the League would have supplied. We are in the United Nations. Have not the events of the last fifteen years shown that we entered that organization with expectations set higher than could be attained. As a non-participant in the League, it was easy to hold others responsible for its failure. Lacking experience, we supposed that the United Nations would do better under our leadership. It is painfully clear, in retrospect, that a key premise was false: the structure of the organization rested upon a presumption of continued unity among the victorious great powers. Events and tensions during the war should have alerted our leaders to the falsity of that hope.
As long as there was, in effect, an automatic majority for the Western position the difficulties arising from the break-up of great power cooperation were serious but not disastrous. With the admission of over fifty new nations, many totally inexperienced, and with the growth of neutralism, the complexities of utilizing the United Nations as a major instrument of policy begin to emerge. Already we have hedged our bets by setting up organizations related to the United Nations but not under its immediate control. It is now plain that our approach to world politics needs a subtlety and sophistication far beyond that envisioned at the founding of the United Nations, or even five years ago.

We encouraged another type of organization, but have not affiliated. The Coal and Steel Community and the Common Market are two illustrations. After the war the economies of Europe were in physical ruin or in a state of demoralization. The Marshall Plan gave a great thrust to their recovery. As part of our effort to get Europe on its feet, the United States pressed for the reduction of barriers to international trade, and the development of larger tariff-free markets. The Common Market advanced both aims.

The rate of economic growth in Western Europe now exceeds that of the United States and Britain. Whereas for years the world complained of a dollar gap, we now find the two principal trading currencies of the world—the dollar and the pound—under severe pressure. There is now a dollar deficiency. Moreover, competition from the Common Market countries will make cure of the dollar deficit more difficult.

The need for sophistication in this matter is great. The "traditional" way out of exchange difficulties is to resort to protectionism in one of its many forms. That was our approach in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the world of tomorrow such a course might give momentary
relief but would surely bring ultimate disaster. We have promoted the new
organizations; they have worked better than all expectation; we must now
find ways to work with them either as active partner or vigorous competitor.
The British have elected to apply for admission to the Common Market as the
least troublesome among many courses, all filled with difficulty. At the
moment such a procedure is probably not appropriate for us. But that
tomorrow will require new and imaginative policies is inevitable.

VII

One really new field in the world of today and tomorrow that simply
did not exist in yesterday's world provides the seventh, and last, illus-
tration. It is outer space. Until the first satellite was put into orbit
the dilemmas we now face were virtually non-existent. But at that moment
they became pressing.

The scientific aspects are in many respects the simplest. Much of
the theoretical structure has already been conceived. Moreover, the
scientific world is essentially non-political. It would astonish many
people to perceive how well Soviet scientists and those of the free world
work together in strictly scientific matters. When they are dealing with
topics wholly beyond the ken of politicians, they attain reasonable concert.

The technological aspect is infinitely complex, but requires only
time, skill and money to meet well-defined objectives. Here secrecy enters,
for technology, unlike science, is not a search for truth and understand-
ing, which cannot be confined behind national boundaries. It is exploitation
of scientific knowledge for specific practical purposes. Technology can
readily be made an instrument of war--hot or cold.
The legal issues are still more complicated. We tend to think of law as enactment. But only marginal matters are treated de novo by enactment. Most significant law grows over considerable periods of time with experience. Statutes are likely to be codifications—with modifications—of what has developed by usage and custom, by court decisions based on analogies that seemed to approximate new situations.

In international law, the use of enactment (through treaties) is confined within still narrower bounds, the scarcity of competent courts hinders the clarification and hardening of precedents. So unresolved questions are more numerous, more difficult—and more irritating. Thus so vital an issue as the height to which national sovereignty extends has no remotely agreed answer. The scientist can describe the layers—the atmosphere, the stratosphere, the ionosphere—and others whose names are seldom heard. But the scientists cannot answer the legal question how high sovereignty should extend. At the moment no one else can either.

But of all the issues the political are the most complicated and baffling. In the politics of outer space nations will pursue what those in control conceive to be the national interest. But in reaching that determination they do not have the experiences of their own and other nations' history to lay down useful guides. They play a kind of blind man's bluff.

In particular outer space does not, so to speak, stay put. The moon and the planets follow courses that continually change their relationships with the plot of ground we call a nation. This makes their relationships international in a unique and to an unprecedented degree. Even Antarctica, often used as the closest analogy, stays put. But if Antarctica were today close to Russia and tomorrow close to France, and soon after close to the United States the making of a treaty—finally achieved on a limited basis—would have been vastly more difficult.
Outer space is with us. We have opened Pandora's Box and there is no means by which it can be closed. Through restless pursuit of the unknown, we have brought upon ourselves a cloud of questions of a political nature all clamoring for prompt answer. If we are not to expand war into the infinity of space, the decision must be reached soon. If there are unknown assets which can be exploited for the benefit of mankind instead of for the first arrival only, the determination cannot wait that first arrival.

Here then is one genuinely new set of issues in the world of tomorrow that require a subtlety and sophistication beyond any yet imagined.

VIII

I started with the thesis that in the world of tomorrow, policy must be both more subtle and more sophisticated. That thesis could have been illustrated in many ways. I selected seven, the first being that the roots of action among men are the same yesterday and today and tomorrow.

The second was that the direction and the intensity of those acts are quite unpredictable; any form of determinism is more likely to lead us astray than to point the path of wisdom.

The third stressed the fact that most of our troubles are old and though they have increased in scope and intensity, means for dealing with many of them have also grown apace.

The fourth dealt with the new necessity for entering into the minds of alien peoples, understanding their cultures, and the need for restraint upon any attempt to recreate them in our own image.
The fifth discussed alliances—our experience with them, their nature, their strengths, their weaknesses and the inferences that we can draw regarding the future of those we now have and others into which we may be inclined to enter.

The sixth was concerned with international organizations which are growing in number, diversity and function at an extraordinary pace; analogies were drawn between participation in these and in alliances.

The seventh had to do with outer space and the novelty of many of the issues it raises.

These illustrations were selected because they are typical of others and illustrate the reasoning with which we should approach them.

The rate of physical change is still accelerating. Imagination is neither comprehensive enough nor perceptive enough to foretell future developments. We can be reasonably sure that changes will be radical, and that they will make important impacts upon the structure of policy and the modes and means of carrying it out. As for the constant, the human element, I may quote Shakespeare’s description of Cleopatra: "Age cannot wither nor custom stale her infinite variety." In this respect, Cleopatra is symbolic of all mankind.