THE IDEOLOGY OF THE WEST

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This topic was assigned by Admiral Conolly. It proved to be difficult, and, from some points of view, it might, in the current climate of opinion, be thought dangerous. In the present tense condition of international relations there is a marked tendency for lines of opinion to harden, for concepts to become dogmas, for dissent to be branded as heresy, or worse.

That is why neutralism has degenerated from a description to an epithet. Many things which would once have been viewed with tolerance, or even amusement, are now thought of as subversive. That is why, by a kind of creeping blindness, we have come to see some of our intellectual possessions in terms of exclusiveness, and, even worse, to regard our potential opponents' ideas as exclusively his.

In our saner moments this sort of thing would be regarded as nonsense; indeed, it would be recognized as very dangerous nonsense. In discussing the ideology of the West I shall be forced to say such an attitude is madness, for if persisted in every avenue to peace would be closed. Long acquaintance and experience with military men have convinced me that they have as ardent hope for peace as civilians. Neither the A bomb nor the H bomb nor any other recent weapon has altered that fact, for while civilian will be in a less safe status than in some earlier times, the military will still occupy the post of most acute danger.

Peace, if it is ever to be more than a pious hope, or an evanescent dream, depends upon finding common ground, and then enlarging that common
ground as much and as rapidly as possible.

At the outset, therefore, I shall take my stand on an American principle so basic and so unequivocal that it should not be misunderstood—or be misunderstandable—except by deliberate purpose. "All men are created equal."

That is one of the key thoughts—many would call it "the" key assertion—of the Declaration of Independence. Jefferson, who wrote it, was not merely employing rhetoric for a propaganda purpose; he was expressing what seemed to him and to others who signed that document an axiom with moral, social, political, legal, economic, and other implications.

We must, therefore, base all our thinking about the ideology of the West upon that axiom. It says, to be explicit, that Russians, Indians, Chinese—the brown, the white, the black, and all shades and mixtures—are equal. We know that all men have certain goals in common. Among these are life, and the pursuit of happiness, and, once tasted, an insistence upon liberty. Whether or not they approximate equality, or to whatever extent they achieve it, determines the course of history. Some goals are so fundamental to life itself that however crudely or however elegantly they are expressed they are always there. We should not allow varying forms of habitual expression—whether in word or symbolic act—to conceal that reality from us.

Whether the exponent is a red Communist, a brown Nazi, a black Fascist, or a white democrat, there will always be among all men certain ideals, hopes, aims, purposes—call them what you will—in common. If it were not so, all hope of communications upon political questions would be at an end; all hope of any sort of peace save exhaustion, if you regard that as peace, would expire. To my mind the greatest danger we face today arises from wavering faith in the fundamental tenet of the Declaration of
Independence that all men are endowed with the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

Let me be perfectly explicit. While there are matters of immense significance upon which we and the Communists cannot hope to agree in any foreseeable future, there are areas of deep significance where they are virtually as orthodox (in action if not in words) as we ourselves. Any hope of peaceful coexistence, pending a reorientation of thought patterns, must be based upon that fact.

To assert, therefore, either explicitly or by inference that agreement at any point with stated objectives or ideas of the Communists is equivalent to being a Communist sympathizer is hostile not only to logic, but to our own fundamental faith and inimical to the cause of peace, with which, if we are to credit President Eisenhower, the very survival of our civilization is linked.

What I have to say is open not only to questions but to criticism. Such criticism, however, must be directed to faults in the logic, or errors of data, but not to any presumed affinity to Communism. I have always opposed Communism, not just recently, but for many years. When the Hughes policy of non-recognition of Red Russia was under fire (as is our current policy regarding Red China) I supported the Hughes modification of our classic de facto recognition policy.

It is utterly wrong to abandon sound ground because someone you dislike agrees with you. Therefore I have no temptation to surrender ideological points of view to which the West has long been committed merely because Communists, by word or act, accept those points of view. There is an old saying: the devil can quote scripture. No one suggests that it makes the true gospel false. No more does it invalidate Western ideolog
to have the Soviets pay it, in certain respects, the grudging (or even unconscious) flattery of imitation.

Perhaps this introduction seems over-long. Its length is a recognition that there is a good deal of intellectual fog, and that we must navigate with more care than usual.

The first positive statement to be made about Western ideology was that it is founded upon the concept of equality. The second point to stress is that Western ideology is structurally different from the Communist creed. The Soviets have a kind of Bible, with official commentaries upon it. Marx wrote their gospel; it has been incessantly and definitively interpreted and expounded by Lenin and Stalin.

The fact that the interpretations and expositions have not always been the same, or even consistent, does not mean that they were or are heretical. As Chief Justice Hughes remarked, with classic clarity, the Constitution is what the judges say it is (at any given moment); so Marxism was and is at any given moment what the supreme interpreter and expositor says it is.

That should not disconcert us, any more than the variant interpretations of our Constitution by successive Supreme Court decisions upset us. We know that a document, now 166 years old and in constant operation, which is appealed to every day in many thousands of different circumstances, will mean different things to different men at different times. At any given moment, therefore, it is held to mean what the final arbiters—nine justices, or rather a majority of those hearing the particular cause—say it means. Communist ideology has this, then, in common with our Constitution: it is based on a writing and a conclusive official interpretation of that writing.
Western ideology, however, has a much broader foundation than has Communism. So far as Western ideological structure is concerned the British constitution furnishes a closer analogy than our own. The British constitution consists of many legislative enactments and other documents (like Magna Charta), a vast number of judicial decisions, and an infinite number of political habits. There is no one place to which you can turn to find a manageable resume. So it is with Western ideology. You must seek knowledge of its growth in a host of writers, but also in an even larger number of expressions arising from moments of action. Moreover, there is no final arbiter who can distinguish between orthodoxy and heresy--nothing remotely resembling the Pope, or our Supreme Court, or Parliament, or the Politburo. Western ideology is a consensus, an exceedingly vague word.

So far as it is expressed in action—or is inferred from action—the variety in Western belief is even more striking. The governments of the United States, Britain, and France (to mention only three out of a much larger number) are widely different in form, method, and procedure. Yet they are each, and all, manifestations of Western ideology in action.

Our government is one of the limited powers, distributed among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. It is far from monolithic; checks and balances are of central importance. Moreover, the component states of the Union retain large areas of sovereignty, and are jealous of federal encroachment. And all these governments within the United States are subject to written constitutions, definitively interpreted in the courts. The energy to run the vast and complicated machiner, is supplied by the rivalry, the competition for public favor, of two political parties.
By contrast the British government has unlimited power; the executive is in the legislative body; there is no system of checks and balances; local government draws its authority from the central parliament. The more completely one describes the British system of government the more striking are the contrasts between that system and ours.

The French is different from both. It has, indeed, a written constitution, as do we; it has the executive within and responsible to the legislative as do the British. But it has a multiple party government rather than the two-party system. There is no orderly alternation between two parties in response to direct popular mandate through elections; instead there is an incessant grouping and regrouping of splinter parties. The upshot is incoherence within the cabinets of successive governments, and a wearisome procession of cabinets, a seemingly endless shuffling of personnel.

If we were to run through the whole list of governments attached to "Western" ideology, the sharp differences in philosophy, the marked contrasts in procedure, the extraordinary variants in rhythm would become ever more bewildering. Action, as such shows no outward consistency. When one seeks, therefore, to describe the ideology of the West, it becomes clear that some common denominator must be discovered which underlies all this surface confusion. It must lie at the very center; it must be an inner quality. Moreover it must have a vital relationship to ends, rather than to means. It is obvious, since the means are so different, that unity must arise from ends, not from instrumentalities for their attainment.

There is a key to the fundamental contrasts between Communism and the West. This is our third explicit point: Communist ideology is center-
in things, the West finds reality in men. The Communists refer to the logical structure of their system as "dialectical materialism." We do not often think of Communists as candid; deception is, indeed, part of their political technique. But at the core of their theory are both candor and a fair measure of consistency. At that focal point their doctrine is unequivocal materialism, and it is relied upon to explain the significant elements in human experience.

Karl Marx based all his argument upon his characteristic philosophy of history. Anyone who writes or talks of past events must have some philosophical point of view. Places, names, dates constitute chronology, not history. History consists in the interpretation of what happened in terms which are meaningful. The account must somehow fit—or reflect—a system of values. Marx interpreted past events in materialistic terms; conditions, he asserted, are the determining bases of the history of society; the state and all ideological conceptions are shaped by material production. The application of this philosophy to the discussion of political, social, and economic life he called dialectical materialism. The motives of men, the springs of action were material, rather than moral, ethical, ideal, or spiritual. From that central Marxian hypothesis the Communists have never wavered. Without fixing that fact in our minds we make nonsense of what seems to them like wisdom.

In one of those definitive expository interpretations of which I have spoken, Stalin reduced this philosophic concept to a compact and easily remembered dogma. "The material life of society...is primary, and its spiritual life secondary, derivative," i.e. "one must look for the source of social ideas, social theories, political views and political institutions in the conditions of the material life of society," of which the ideas and institutions are a "reflection."
Nothing could exceed that in candor or, for that matter, in clarity. And nothing could highlight more sharply the contrast with basic Western ideology. For the core of Western thought has to do with persons; its dominant philosophy of history turns about the influence, aims, hopes, and deeds of men. Whether you go back to Magna Charta, or read the writings of the most influential political philosophers of France and Britain, or turn to documents like the French Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789 or our Declaration of Independence and our Bill of Rights, all have one quality in common: the human factor is central; material considerations are secondary.

The mind and spirit of man are held to be the dominant force in history. There is no denial of the importance of economic forces, of geographical and climatological influences. But the emphasis is upon man's mastery of his environment, his power to shape institutions to his own ends, his will to freedom.

I wish it were possible to assert that there is no cloud whatever upon that statement of Western ideology, that it could stand as naked, explicit, and clear as Stalin's materialistic dictum. But it is one of the prices of freedom that contrary voices can be raised. It is an undeniable fact that many non-Marxists have nonetheless leaned toward, if they have not fully accepted, economic determinism, the idea that among all the forces which play upon human history the economic motive is dominant.

Economic determinism, it is true, is not just the same as dialectical materialism, but it bears a close affinity. Forty years ago there was a spate of books, such as E. R. A. Seligman's *Economic Interpretation of His* and Charles A. Beard's *Economic Interpretation of the Constitution and Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy*. These books are now out of fashion, bu
they were illustrations of a line of thinking and they and other such works have left residues of thought which have entered into the views of many others, sometimes unconsciously. It should be noted that, while this development was not unconnected with the Marxian philosophy of history, it antedated the Russian Revolution by many years and had no connection with Soviet Communism.

An even more serious factor which introduces confusion about the focal personal tenet of Western ideology is to be found in the views of politicians and businessmen. In these instances the economic determinism is not as reasoned as among academic thinkers. Indeed, it is often an unanalyzed—even an unconscious—attitude. As long ago as 1896 a presidential campaign had the "full dinner pail" as a slogan. The inference was clear enough—that people would vote as their stomachs suggested. Since that time there have been many other manifestations of a temptation to accept, unconsciously, Stalin's dictum as a truthful expression. If you read the analyses of the recent special election in Wisconsin to fill a vacancy in the House of Representatives, you will find economic determinism dominant in most. That represents a subtle, but very dangerous, erosion of our ideology.

Moreover, every appeal to a "class" interest, every subsidy of a special group is a concession that economic influences are, if not dominant at least singularly persuasive. It would be folly, it seems to me, to deny that these presumptions have been growing stronger. The last presidential campaign was one of the first evidences of any reaction toward a more spiritual interpretation of men's motives. The reaction was not sufficiently violent to still appeals to economic self-interest, and analysts of the results continually made interpretations based primarily upon economic factors.
If politicians have sometimes clouded the issue of the centrality of the human rather than the material factor, businessmen have done so even more. Their labors are in the economic field, and it is not surprising that this induces a tendency to overestimate economic forces in relation to others. Moreover, the forte of the businessman is action; his philosophical presuppositions are often unsystematic, not clearly reasoned; they are felt, rather than thought out. It is not surprising, therefore, that businessmen have frequently seemed to accept a materialistic point of view.

The NRA (National Recovery Act) offers a convenient illustration. It was depression-born; it was launched at a time when men seemed to be victims of economic forces rather than captains of their souls. Nevertheless, the codes, the effort to reduce competition, the quasi-governmental powers assigned economic groups--these and many other characteristics of the NRA--were more akin to Fascist philosophy than to the dominant Western ideal. In short, it would be folly to deny that the great depression was a profound shock to some of the basic beliefs of Western ideology; it gave economic determinism a new lease on life. Only slowly have we recovered from the mental and moral setbacks caused by the depression; they have, indeed, long survived the strictly economic consequences.

It would be possible to pile one illustration upon another, and I call attention to these facts, not in a spirit of criticism, but in order to make clear how difficult it is to be precise about Western ideology. There is no "dialectic," no formal logical structure, close-knit and not to be deviated from. On the contrary, our ideology has many historical and philosophical roots, and cannot have any such rigid logical structure,
every part of which is dependent upon every other, as dialectical materialism has always had since the days of Marx.

Moreover, variety is inherent for quite another reason. If human personality is the key, if the infinite value of the individual is at the center, there are bound to be variations. For individuals are not alike in body, mind, or will. Therefore, if personality is the center, there must be freedom; and if freedom, then dissent (conscious or unconscious) from the values the ideology expresses. And if there is dissent, some expressions of that dissent may accord more or less closely with the central philosophic assumption of Communism. Nevertheless it is clear that economic determinism—the notion that man is governed ultimately by his stomach—weakens the concept of man as an individual of infinite worth, who is master of, or who can master, most of his environment.

There is another factor which has blurred the sharpness of our central article of faith. In the Declaration of Independence Jefferson attributed the fundamental rights of man to an endowment by his Creator. Jefferson was regarded as a free thinker, certainly not a devoutly religious man. Nonetheless, even before the Declaration he had said explicitly, "The God who gave us life, gave us liberty at the same time." By no means all the political philosophers of the eighteenth century were as sure of that provenance as Jefferson seemed to be. The Social Contract a fashionable idea, surely laid more emphasis upon a voluntary human association than upon a divine endowment. And since that time science, biology, anthropology, and sociology have all brought in variant interpretations of the source, the meaning, and the value of freedom.

From the start of modern times, therefore, this core ideal has suffered in authority and in cogency by lack of unanimity regarding its
roots. There were and are advocates and partisans of humanistic as well as religious origins of the rights of man. It seems clear that divine sanctions would be stronger than mere agreements arising from convenience, but it is equally clear that in a "scientific" age agreement upon a divine origin of freedom is not to be expected. That being so, we might as well concede that so far as clarity and logical structure are concerned the Communists are in the stronger position.

That conclusion relates to the form of the ideology, not to its substance. It is still true that life is more than logic, and the ideology of the West is full of vitality. Despite all the deviations I have been forced to note, the central fact remains that Communism makes materialism the determining factor, the West makes personality the cornerstone of its somewhat rambling ideological structure.

The statement in the Declaration of Independence that all men are created equal leads to the next--the fourth--central fact in Western ideology: its democratic character.

You cannot have a person-centered philosophy without being driven to the assertion of equality. Heaven knows the ineluctable logic of that conclusion has been resisted long enough and tenaciously enough so that its ultimate triumph was hard won.

The Greeks had great philosophers who wrestled with this problem. They never mastered it; always their democratic thesis had a fundamental flaw. The free men who constituted the democratic state lived in a superstructure; its foundation was a faceless population of slaves. Sometimes this was explicitly conceded; sometimes it was concealed like the letter in Poe's story--left in a conspicuous place so that no one would notice it in a search for something hidden; it was made inconspicuous by its very obviousness.
Christian doctrine destroyed even that place of concealment. The equality of men before God--scribes, pharisees, publicans, sinners, tax gatherers, and saints--could lead only to their equality before the law. This inescapable conclusion was denied for centuries. Every conceivable argument was brought forward. The manifest differences in physical endowments was stressed. The clear contrasts in mental ability were used to reinforce the thesis.

The long persistence of slavery, treating people as chattels, was an explicit defiance of the Christian inference. Serfdom, the bondage of man to the land, was another, slightly milder, refusal to admit the inescapable character of the logic. On a still higher level was orders of nobility, social classes with special privilege, the caste system of India.

Every kind of casuistry, every refusal to surrender privilege, every brand of ignorance, every failure of will has served, historically, to retard the acceptance of equality as a fundamental fact. Progress has been far from steady; setbacks have been many, and some of them have been serious. Fascism and Nazism were two such, and though they have been defeated and suppressed in the countries which supplied their names, the spirit lives on in Spain and Argentina, for example.

Nor is acceptance of the implications of equality complete anywhere. The existence of racial, religious, and other forms of prejudice is a clear enough manifestation of the fact that even when there is equality in law there may be no equality in fact. Extra-legal social sanctions may be as frustrating to modern individuals as legal disabilities used to be.

I am bound, in fairness, to concede all that. Nonetheless progress toward the goal is great. The Ghetto is gone; disability statutes against Catholics are gone; indentured servants have disappeared, serfdom is gone.
along with slavery, peonage is in its twilight, hundreds of forms of eco-
nomic exploitation have been rooted out. Viewed in historical perspective
the progress is enormous, and, despite occasional setbacks, is proceeding
apace even now.

We should recall that the American version of the phrase "All men
are created equal" bears the date 1776. Its utterance at that time was
certainly more in the nature of prophecy than assertion of historical
reality. That is clear enough from the fact that the author of the death-
less phrase himself owned human beings as chattel slaves. In that respect,
and at that moment, he had not advanced beyond the thinking of the Greek
philosophers who accepted a sub-human status for some in order to achieve
real equality for others. Time and struggle (of which the Civil War was
one phase) have cured us of that moral blindness. When we say today that
all men are equal there are no such wholesale intellectual reservations
as the existence of slavery required. As we progress toward attainment
of Jefferson's prophetic phrase, we refine the ideal still more and face
the challenge to yet higher and higher human goals.

It was in the course of that simultaneous advance toward and polish-
ing of the ideal of equality that we established universal free public
education. Similarly programs of welfare have multiplied more rapidly
in the last half-century than in the ten previous centuries.

Before following the logic of our ideology in its relationship to
democracy and welfare, however, we should make at least one comparison
with Communism. It also proclaims equality of a sort; it speaks, as do
we, of a classless society. But the common phrase denotes very different
things. With followers of the Western ideology it means the absence of
rigid, stratified barriers which hold man in established places and deny
them outlets for talent, will, and energy as their individual skill, inclination, and ambition may suggest. Every man may seek his own level. The farmer's son may become a chemist; the tenant's son may become a capitalist; no barrier prohibits equality of opportunity. The dramatic symbol of this in American history has been the progress of men from the log cabin to the presidency.

The Soviet starts from a different premise, taken directly from Karl Marx. He saw society as already stratified into two groups, the laborers and the exploiters. Progress consisted in the class struggle in which the proletariat triumphed and the exploiters were liquidated. Classlessness was to be attained by elimination, not by social fluidity. We know that this process has been pursued, as a matter of history. The murder of the Czars' family, the liquidation of the nobility, the war on the kulaks—all these are fresh in memory.

We observe, too, the Russian version of progress from obscure poverty to leadership of the state. Lenin, Stalin, Malenkov, each in turn displays that phenomenon. They rose on the strength of ability and struggle—and by the process of liquidating their rivals who could always be denounced for bourgeois, imperialist, or other "tendencies" which made them the "enemies of the people." This has reduced balloting to the status of a farce; it has centered power in the party, a minuscule portion of the whole people. It has created an aristocracy of office, and new social stratifications.

Despite superficial similarities to Western ideology the Communist idea is, in substance and reality, quite different. Marx and his successors raised class consciousness to levels which it never in fact attained. They assumed that class was more important than nationality. The Communist
Manifesto declared, "Modern industrial labor, modern subjection to capital, the same in England as in France, in America as in Germany, has stripped him (the worker) of every trace of national character." This was the foundation for the slogan, "Workers of the world unite, you have nothing to lose but your chains."

Historically this dogma has proved to be sheer nonsense. Its economic determinism was smashed to bits by the nationalism the workers displayed when war broke out in 1914, and there is no evidence that Humpty Dumpty has ever been put together or can ever be put together again.

It should not need elaborate argument to prove that a dialectical system based upon so radically false a premise is bound to have a fatal flaw in its whole structure. It is a house built upon sand, and every great crisis since its proclamation has shown that it will not stand.

In the West there are, indeed, group interests, which at times approximate class interests. However there are not two classes, sharply divided; instead there are a vast number of groups, the divisions between which are blurred and indistinct. Moreover, the groups do not coalesce along economic lines alone, or even dominantly; they form about all sorts of common interests, traditions, and ideals. They may well be in tension, but they need not be in conflict. The resolution of the issues between them and among them does not call for violence; on the contrary, peaceful solutions are more profitable to all concerned, and more permanent.

A Marxian political philosophy based upon conflict, struggle, liquidation cannot halt those destructive drives at their theoretical optimum point; violence becomes a built-in characteristic of the polity and cannot be outgrown. The conclusion must be, therefore, that our phrase
"all men are created equal" embodies inferences and overtones wholly different, in producing a classless society, from the consequences of Marxian dogma.

There is a kind of footnote which deserves a word of attention. A political philosophy based upon a theory of fundamental conflicts of interest which are resolvable only by force does not lend itself any better to peaceful solutions internationally than it does domestically. Soviet politics can aptly and accurately be described as power politics. Surely the record of the USSR in international affairs bears the same stamp. The free world is not wholly innocent of power politics, by any means. But when it occurs it is a violation of the basic postulates of Western ideology, rather than their fulfillment.

The only conceivable government for citizens born equal into a classless society is democracy. It may be objected that the founders of this nation did not think so; they spoke of a republic. But they had, as we have noted, a more limited notion of equality. Moreover, the revolution in education by which nearly all citizens became literate had not gotten under way. Nor had steam and electricity, the telegraph, the telephone, radio, television, and airplanes linked the nation together so tightly that at a given moment all the people can hear one voice, and a majority of the public can watch the speaker.

In the beginning, therefore, there were two barriers to democracy: first, a deficiency in the meaning of equality; and second, lack of ready communication. Once indentured servants disappeared, slavery was abolished; literacy triumphed, and discrimination and prejudice became unfashionable these barriers fell. Historically we can watch this progress. Jefferson became the head of one of the political parties that took shape during
Washington's presidency. It was called "democratic"; the word was no longer associated with mobocracy, it began to bear its more modern connotations.

Andrew Jackson gave it further impetus; intellectual and aristocratic overtones gave way to the rough-hewn doctrine that any man was good enough for any job he could get. Abraham Lincoln kept the homely character, but gave it a lofty tone. His logic was so forthright, his speech so clear, and his mood so elevated that he successfully identified the common man with self-government more effectively than any one before him had been able to do. He even hinted strongly at broader implications when he asserted that the Declaration of Independence "gave liberty not alone to the people of this country, but hope to all the world, for all future time."

It remained, however, for Woodrow Wilson to expound and emphasize the world-wide significance of democracy, already suggested by Lincoln, but now made explicit. His eloquent words more readily gained attention because they came from the head, by this time, of the most powerful nation in the world. Finally Franklin D. Roosevelt applied the energies of democratic government to vast areas which had theretofore been left untouched.

We are too close to some of these matters to give them fair, final appraisal. Large questions remain as to whether the functions of government were expanded, if not too far, at least too fast for the democratic process to adapt itself to the new situation. The wisdom or unwisdom of specific measures will be debated for many years and for the correct verdict we must depend on future history.
Nevertheless, however controversial may be our opinions regarding specific measures, there would be, I believe, a genuine consensus upon one point: the program of the second quarter of the 20th century was calculated to broaden the meaning of the word equality, and to give it more depth as well. It came to represent, without distinction of party, a determination that there should be no underprivileged people if it could be avoided; no one should be subjected to needless hazards to his security.

Writing in the July 1953 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, one author spoke of three kinds of states—laissez-faire, welfare, and unfair; this dictum has both the virtues and defects of oversimplification.

Historically no nation ever pursued a laissez-faire policy. Certainly the mercantilists did not, nor the so-called benevolent despots. The term is useful only in terms of relativity. It indicates the limited functions of government that prevailed in the United States in the 19th century. But Hamilton was arguing for a tariff in Washington's administration. That is symbolic of the fact that the classic expression laissez-faire, must never be used as a complete description, but only as a relative term, the boundaries of which are so imprecise that it will not be used by one speaker as a term of approbation, and be an anathema to the next.

If laissez-faire is imprecise, welfare is much less subject to exact definition. Most people would classify our original government under the Constitution as tending to laissez-faire, but the Constitution contained, in specific terms, a "general welfare" clause. A study of the political campaigns which have marked our history will make it abundantly clear that the people looked to the government for economic and other forms of welfare.
Concern for the public lay behind the Morrill Act of 1862 setting up the land-grant colleges, the free silver agitation, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Of course, in the 20th century, and particularly since the great depression, welfare activities have been immensely broadened.

How far the democratic process can be carried we do not yet know. The growing size and complexity of the world problems we face may outrun not merely the information but the intelligence of the common man. On the other hand, new means and modes of communication, new strides in universal general education tend in the other direction.

Of one thing we may be sure: democracy, the rule of common sense, is better than rule by experts. On any given question the expert in that field is more likely to be right. But outside his limited field he is just a "common man." This is well illustrated by the political nonsense that has been visited upon us by some atomic experts. The conclusion must be that, whatever its faults and limitations, democracy most nearly meets the test of equality of status. I believe it also meets every other test in competition with Communism, or other forms of totalitarianism; but I am not called on to argue that point at this time. For the moment I need only insist upon the ineluctable logic that means democracy the fruit of equality.

Whereas history validates the inner logic of our doctrine, the exact reverse is true of Marxism. History, the logic of events, has run counter to Communist theory, prophecy, and expectation. Marx looked upon the government as the means used by the privileged class for control over the exploited worker. It could not have a function if there were no exploiters to exploit the exploited. That became the basis of the idea that the state would "wither away." The state, therefore, should have no relevance for Communism where exploitation "does not exist."
There is sharp irony in the manner in which history has treated these ideas. Far from withering away, the mechanism of the state in Communist countries has expanded enormously—far beyond its expansion in "welfare" democracies. The bureaucracy has proliferated; every detail of life is controlled. The secret police are on every hand; the armed forces eat up the substance of labor's product. The right of the workers to organize, to bargain collectively, to strike, are all denied under the fiction that they are working for themselves. History has made the state supreme; experience runs precisely counter to the theoretical dogma.

Moreover, there is an inescapable logic in what has happened. The Marxian system had to eventuate in a monopoly of monopolies. All ownership of production, with such exceptions as expedience dictated, are in the hands of the state. There is, therefore, monopoly of ownership to a degree impossible even to imagine under capitalism. Contrary to modern capitalism, where ownership and management are in different hands, under Communism the state has a monopoly of management in addition to its monopoly of ownership. Under capitalism production, though privately owned and managed, is subject to government control. This may be very extensive; it starts with "blue sky" and other laws to protect the investor, it checks monopoly with anti-trust laws, it checks fraud with the Federal Trade Commission, it provides for fair employment practices, it promotes the organization of workers and gives the unions great privileges. These are only a sample of governmental checks and balances upon the abuse of ownership and the misbehavior of management under capitalism.

In the Communist state, on the contrary, this is all part of the same bureaucratic structure, which also controls quantities, qualities, prices, profits, distribution—and all else. There are none of the
dispersions of authority and power, none of the checks and balances of
the democratic state, no way for public opinion to gain control of the
juggernaut.

There are some implications which are relevant to our topic, but
not central to it. One is that under the Soviet system the level of profit
the rate of capital formation can be kept very high. It is not checked by
competition, by an independent interest such as that of the investor or
the consumer, nor is it (short of near-revolt and sabotage) subject to
public opinion. As a consequence the rate of capital formation is higher
in Russia than in the United States, and the rate of production is ad-
vancing more rapidly there than it is here. It will be observed that
these statements do not deal with current volume of production, but only
to the rate of advance. Nonetheless it is clear that unless the rates
of increase draw more closely together, in due course the Soviet will
outproduce us. It is to some of these fundamental economic matters--
production, profit, capital formation--that I referred earlier when I
remarked that in practice they followed some of the economic concepts
we hold. That does not make their system capitalism, nor ours Communism.

This brings me to the final point of this argument. I have said
nothing about free enterprise as part of the ideology of the West. If
my topic had been limited to the United States the phrase would have
assumed importance at a much earlier stage of the discussion.

Even in the United States private enterprise is definitely sub-
sidiary to the social goal of equality. In so far as we have private
enterprise it is a permitted means to that end. For what it is worth,
let me make my own position clear: I believe it is the best economic in-
strument to that end, but only so long as by law and regulation it is
protected from abuse.
In this country vast areas are withheld from private enterprise. The postal system, one of the greatest of all businesses, is wholly in the hands of the government. The Tennessee Valley Authority and many other public power and flood control projects supply other examples. So do slum clearance, public housing projects, crop loans, and price supports. If one were systematically to set down a list of the exceptions to the application of the free enterprise principle, it would prove astonishingly long. Indeed, when the task was complete, the lines of demarcation would defy logical analysis.

Decisions as to what should be publicly and what privately owned and managed have been largely empirical. When the project, whatever it was, has been too heavily "infected with the public interest," it has been publicly owned and managed. But you will observe that the phrase "too heavily" is so vague as really to beg the question. Sometimes interstate complications were a vital element in the decision; that was the case, surely, with the Tennessee Valley Authority. But appeals to empiricism and convenience do not lay sound foundations for defining a general principle.

If these things are true in the United States, the situation in many nations that adhere to Western ideology are quite different both in theory and in practice. Britain for five years had a socialist government which nationalized the coal mines, the railroads, road transport, and the steel industry. How far this process would have gone toward public ownership of the principal means of production we do not know. A change in government halted and partially—but only partially—reversed the trend. In Britain the theory of private enterprise is in direct competition with socialist dogma. But the Tories do not intend to
denationalize the railroads, and the socialists, if they had continued in power with narrow majorities, would have been chary of putting their theories to the full test of general practice.

In summary, so far as Britain is concerned, socialist theory is more widely accepted than in the United States; in practice, however, the political balance is such, the political habits are such, and the readiness to subordinate theory to a compromise is so deeply ingrained that the decision in any given case is based more upon convenience and other empirical considerations than upon ideology.

In France the more logical, not to say dogmatic, mind makes socialism the principle. Nationalization has been carried much further, and the consequences to public policy in a democratic state were revealed in the general strike this past summer. The logic of socialism and the logic of democracy are surely in tension, if not in opposition. Yet we have to remember that the Scandinavian countries have long been socialistic in orientation and have, generally speaking, avoided such demoralizing experiences as that of France. That is indicative, at least, that some of the fault lies with imperfect governmental procedures, and with the confusion or incoherence of public opinion rather than the mere clash of theoretical principles.

Such a hasty survey is comprehensive enough to validate the thesis that free enterprise capitalism is not a vital part of Western ideology. However devoted we are in America to its basic postulates, we cannot pretend that all our NATO associates, not to speak of other Western nations, share our commitments. In an analytical and dispassionate review of Western ideology free enterprise cannot be included.
It may well seem that this survey has dealt so largely with empiricisms, compromises, expedients, and exceptions that there is little left. You will remember that the great seal of the United States, adopted so long ago, carries the phrase "novus ordo saeclorum"—a new order for the world. Does our ideology warrant the prophecy, or as some have called it, the boast? To me the answer is perfectly clear: it does warrant both our pride in the past and our faith in the future. Despite all the errors we have made, all our deviations from our own professions, the hard fact remains that we have a citizen-centered democratic republic. We have steadily expanded the idea of equality beyond formal equality before the law to a much wider, more vital concept.

We have insisted on equal access to education, to jobs, to opportunity of all sorts, social, economic, religious, political. Despite glaring shortcomings in performance, we have run far beyond not alone the practice, but even the thoughts, of our fathers. With each new approximation of earlier hopes we have advanced the goal still further.

Liberty is a living ideal, and like other living things, it has a basic metabolism. It is simultaneously burning up energy and creating new energy. That is the drama of history. When the energy of liberty is burned up faster than it is recreated we slide towards despotism and tyranny, such as Fascism or Nazism or Communism. But when the energy of freedom is recreated at a faster rate we have what Lincoln called—and called with precision—a new birth of freedom.