A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

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ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Anglo-American relations since the war cannot be discussed in a vacuum. Primary consideration must be given to the terrible dislocations in Britain compared with the relatively better situation of the United States.

The United States was physically untouched. It had opportunity to retool and rearm during the period of its neutrality by reason of the enormous orders which had been placed in this country by Britain. The duration of its participation was relatively brief and the dislocation of its economy never approached that of total war. It came into the post-war world with a greatly enlarged, modernized industrial plant and in the full vigor of its economic and social life.

Britain, on the contrary, lost allies during the early phase of the war until it stood alone. In that desperate interim before Hitler attacked Russia and before we entered, Britain expended physical, moral, and economic energies which could not be quickly recovered or reconstituted even after it again had potent allies. A bombed, hungry, economically dislocated country, bone-tired from long-continued exertions does not come to an era of international reconstruction with starry-eyed expectation of creating a brave new world. One may have visions among the rubble, but the first thing is to clear away the debris. When, therefore, the British are accused of dragging their feet, there may be a certain amount of truth in it, for men who have walked long on hard, rough roads do not step as briskly as those whose energies have not been sapped.
France also has to be taken into account whenever we talk about relations between the United States and Britain because it has interests which are deeply affected by our special relationships to Britain. Indeed failure to take France into account would weaken the alliance. It is essential that Britain and the United States work together; it is equally essential that the association shall not be, and shall not appear to be, at the expense of other nations. Strategically and otherwise France is requisite to the maintenance of a free Europe, and if there is any hint of Anglo-American exclusiveness, the French reaction reduces the value of Anglo-American cooperation.

During the war France suffered physical destruction as much from its friends as its enemies. Paris, however, was untouched and the German occupation was, if not benevolent, at least not savage. Nevertheless there was a profound psychological change. The French have no desire to be occupied and liberated again. They may make bolder plans than the British, because physically they were not so brutally tossed about, but they will be equally cautious of precipitating new strife.

**Uniqueness**

Basic to understanding the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom is an appreciation of its uniqueness in history. No other two leading nations in all the experience of mankind have been in such intimate contact over so long a period on so wide a range of topics.

The United States and Britain--politically, socially, strategically, economically--are intertwined not alone in Europe and in Asia, but upon the seven seas and the islands thereof. This unique range and intensity

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of contacts is, I repeat, new in history. Until everyone understands and appreciates that fact at every level, frictions at greater or lesser points are inevitable.

Furthermore the problem is made more serious because of a feeling on both sides that our alliance should be not only strong but perfect. Human nature being what it is, such a perfectionist attitude becomes in itself a contributory factor in producing irritations.

The late King George, when he held a diplomatic reception, was astounded at the number of officers with which the American ambassador was surrounded, and Churchill once referred to the "American occupation of Grosvenor Square" because our embassy overflowed into buildings throughout the whole area.

We have not only the intimate cooperation of the army, the navy, and the air force over vast ranges of strategic, tactical, and psychological questions; there are also the contacts of the treasuries and central banking organizations; the cooperation in the United Nations and its many specialized agencies; and NATO with all its complex activities.

It must be clear that every contact point is a potential point of friction. Friction can arise not only from a contrariety of interests but from mere contrariness of some individual. We have to condition ourselves to think about the problem of our interrelationship in those terms. We cannot afford to describe every pin prick as a stab in the back.

Each of our nations has interests all around the globe, literally. But those interests, while often harmonious, are never uniform. Greece and Turkey illustrate this. Many Americans said a few years ago that we did not have vital concerns in Greece and Turkey. It seemed that way because our interests were effectively served by the British. But when
the British felt that their resources were so depleted that they could no
longer carry the load, America, under the so-called Truman Doctrine,
assumed the burden in Greece and Turkey. In carrying forward that task
the mood and pace, the manners and methods are inevitably somewhat differ-
ent from those of our predecessor.

Similarly, in the Middle East, there are no profound differences
of strategic interest. There are historical differences, however, and
American economic relationships are somewhat different. Consequently
there is a difference in accent, a difference in emphasis which can be-
come the basis for tension.

When one nation moves under the leadership of another, the methods
employed are not those it would employ. When the dangers of precipitating
war unintentionally are great, the back seat driver exhibits a nervousness
which increases the tension of the man at the wheel.

It is the common experience of us all that, when danger threatens,
the difference between having the wheel and not having the wheel creates
a difference in mood. One resents the nervousness of the other at its
leadership and the other resents any carelessness by which the leader
involves his partner. Yet overcaution is often as dangerous as recklessness

The British have shown many evidences of concern lest our behavior
in Korea precipitate a Far Eastern, and ultimately a world-wide, war which
they do not want. On the other hand, we have felt that in Egypt and Iran
the British management was likely to involve us in episodes which could
produce strife. Neither country, in other words, is the leader of the part
ship in every aspect. In some places the initiative lies with us, in other
with the British.
Perhaps the most conspicuous illustration is the Far East. Certainly Britain has important interests there, as reflected in Hong Kong, and had enormous economic investments in China. Furthermore strategical concern for the security of Australia and New Zealand is significant for Britain. But it has well been said that Britain looks at the Far East through the lens of India while we observe it through the lens of the Pacific. It is like two people whose eyes are somewhat different looking through each other's spectacles, thus distorting vision.

India is a beautiful example of what Americans regard as the confusing illogicality of the British system. It is a republic within a commonwealth, headed by a queen. It is totally independent, but within the sterling area and otherwise attached to Britain. It is fiercely Asian in its outlook, acutely sensitive to interference, advice, or even comment. India looks upon the Korean struggle in a wholly different way from the United States. It sees the revolution in China in completely different terms. Since Britain looks through the lens of India it sees the future of Formosa and the recognition of Mao Tse-tung entirely differently from the way we see them.

We look at them in the light of the fact that the Pacific washes our shores which not long ago were gravely menaced by an Asian power. We do not want now to face a Eurasian combination of vast military potential and unlimited manpower without a screen between us. Fundamentally our interests are not antithetical to Britain's; indeed they are almost identical in character, but they differ in intensity. What is vital to us is desirable to them; what is essential to them may be merely convenient for us. One does not put the same energy into the search for convenience that he does into the defense of vital interests.
It will take much longer experience of working together than we have yet had before there is adequate mutual confidence in following the leadership of one another in various sensitive situations. We might just as well make up our minds that an alliance creates many problems as well as solving some. The problems it creates are less serious, we hope, than those it resolves, but we must be patient and not irritated when co-operation seems imperfect.

**Psychological Differences**

One can understand the British attitude on many points only by appreciating what a psychological shock it is to find oneself being led after having been a leader for well over a century. We are now learning at firsthand how little gratitude is felt for gifts that do not always come from a cheerful giver, how uneasy others feel in the presence of strength which is not always marked by courtesy.

It is essential to remember, further, what a shock it is to change in status from creditor to debtor. There is a vast difference in the psychological aspect of the two situations. When one has occupied the status of creditor over a long period, he has learned the manners of a creditor. Thereafter a gracious acceptance of the status of a debtor comes hard. It is particularly difficult when he cannot meet his obligations on time despite sacrifice, skill, and energy. It is worse when his capacity to meet those obligations is impaired by barriers unwittingly erected by his creditors.

We must also remember that Britain was long the greatest trading nation of the world. The "tight little island" by itself never had the resources, either physical or otherwise, to occupy a premier world position. It was its relationship to sea lanes, to the markets of the world,
and to its far-flung empire and dominions which gave it economic pre-eminence. During the war concentration upon survival was so great that it could not maintain its markets. Furthermore, preoccupation with solvency led it to liquidate many foreign investments which had helped maintain those markets and which brought into its economy those "invisibles" which were essential to its balance of payments.

Vital markets went by default to Americans and other nations not so absorbed in the struggle for survival. Britain's effort to recover markets absolutely essential to its position is extremely difficult when the fiscal situation is so tight and numerous favorable historical factors have disappeared. Moreover it has been thrust into this competition not alone with strained financial resources, but with industrial equipment which has become obsolete or obsolescent and which must be reconstructed.

Hitler once said that Germany must export or die. It is clear that Britain must export or go bankrupt. Many Americans are likely to forget Britain's massive achievements in recent years; its exports today greatly exceed those of the pre-war era, but relative to its dire necessity they still fall short.

Communication

The great cry today in many circles is "communication." A decade ago men were worrying about semantics; it reflected the fact that talking to one another is difficult because words mean one thing to one person and something quite different to another. The same term has one meaning in one context and something else in another. The same words can be offensive or gay, depending upon a tone of voice, a gesture, a glance.
Difficulties in exchanges between those with whom one is familiar and in constant contact becomes intensified when one is dealing with people from abroad.

In discussing the relations between Great Britain and the United States with friends and colleagues from abroad, one immediately realizes anew that words are symbols and that the same words symbolize different things in the two countries. This comes as a shock because we think we speak the same language; however, we speak it not only with a different accent and rhythm but also with nuances of meaning which elicit different responses to identical terms. Such a common expression as "sentiment" carries very different semantic impressions. "Discrimination" is another word commonly used in both countries, but it evokes entirely different responses because the shading is different.

When one gets into the realm of figures of speech (and until one halts to analyze the matter it is hard to realize how much of our language is figurative), the difficulties of communication are even more striking. When we say someone is "mixed up," we mean confused. But when Mr. Churchill used the words he meant our common obligations and enterprises were inextricably intertwined.

Often the same phenomenon is differently described in the two countries. The British look upon the care with which they approach problems and the deliberation which their progress sometimes displays as a result of "keeping their feet on the ground." To Americans it seems like "dragging their feet." Both expressions flow from the same behavior, but seen from a slightly different point of view it is described in one way by a figure which makes it a subject of merit and in the other one of censure. It is extraordinary how significant such relatively trivial thing can be as they are multiplied in daily intercourse.
Britain and much of Europe have been afraid of the American depression which the Russians have so often predicted, and for which they have so ardently hoped. This fear of American instability is a matter of first importance in all our relationships. Americans find it hard to understand, but we must make the effort.

In the post-war period there have been constant references all over Europe to the instability of the American economy. To us it seems an extraordinary expression to apply to the economy which has propped up the Free World for seven years, which has poured out billions in subsidies and payments of one kind or another, whose productive capacity has been astounding, and whose currency is in such demand as to be scarce, so scarce indeed as to constitute one of the major post-war problems.

How can such an economy be described as unstable? It is a matter of perspective. We had a brief economic reaction in some segments of our economy in 1951. From our point of view it was a healthy corrective of an inflationary boom. What seemed to us a beneficial damper upon inflation seemed to others an acute manifestation of instability. How could the same phenomenon appear so differently to two nations?

The explanation is really very simple. A road over which a Cadillac limousine glides smoothly will jounce people in an open jeep with no shock absorbers. The fact is that the British economy has no cushion; it feels every jar. Its gold reserve is below the safety line; its exchange problems are acute. It depends upon the American economy in so many ways that any change here is greatly amplified in its impact upon Britain. What seemed to us, therefore, a kind of technical redress of the
balance of our economy came to them as a rude jolt with sharp effects upon an economy taut, tense, and without resilient qualities.

Economic Ideology

One of the sources of tension is the blanket use of words which do not adequately describe the respective economies. Americans are accustomed to say that we believe in "free enterprise" and are impatient with the British because they are "socialists." We think our business is managed by private concerns, whereas they have turned to nationalization on a large scale.

They look at our situation quite differently. In a land which boasts of free enterprise, they see the Tennessee Valley Authority, a nationalized project probably bigger than all their nationalized railroads. The activities of the Atomic Energy Commission far outstrip any nationalized industry in Britain. They see a program of farm price supports, of crop allocations which, when viewed as an economic matter, represents planned economy upon a scale which they do not even approach. They call attention to the fact that we actually have more government controls of one kind or another than they have.

They also call attention to the fact that we urge everyone to get as close as possible to the gold standard but do not ourselves follow the rules of the gold standard: We sterilize more than half our gold and, by so doing, are in the position of hoarders so that the gold does not perform the function for which it is so well adapted. We tell them to use the gold they do not have, while we fail to use the gold we have.

We have pressed others to drop restrictions on trade and yet maintain
tariffs which, even after the application of the Hull principles in the reciprocal trade agreements, are higher than almost any other country in the world. Although we have urged the repeal of various measures which interfere with freedom of trade and pressed for international trade agreements, we have not ratified the Havana treaties.

In other words, each country has myths about itself and myths concerning the other nation. They would like to see us dispel our myth about free enterprise and abandon our view of their socialist economy.

**Forms of Government**

In an alliance as intimate and far-ranging as that between Britain and the United States the differences in the structure and procedures of the two governments create many problems. The British feel that their government is clear and simple in its lines of authority. There is no division between the executive and the legislative. When the prime minister makes a commitment, unless he totally misjudges the political situation, others may be assured that parliament will support it. Only with great rarity is a foreign minister disavowed as Sir Samuel Hoare was by Stanley Baldwin in the Ethiopian matter when both the policy and foreign secretary were repudiated.

The British feel that they never know whether our Secretary of State or even our President, will be supported in the Senate. The experience of Woodrow Wilson left an indelible impression which time has done little to overcome. The relatively tight discipline of the British parties, which makes for such a high degree of stability, contrasts with the almost total absence of discipline in the American Senate. The cabinet minister
who does not speak in the same voice as the prime minister disappears, whereas in the United States there seems to be a battle of voices among officials, many giving opinions on policy which are out of harmony with those of others.

To Americans the difference between the form and the substance, so characteristic of British government, seems utterly baffling. Recently I heard a discussion of the meaning and substance of the Commonwealth wherein one exhausted scholar, who has labored mightily and with intelligence on this matter, said, at the end, he was more confused than ever. When it came to a discussion of the sterling area not only could the Americans not understand the British explanation, but the British could not agree among themselves.

The art of government is full of subtlety. Subtleties are expressions of national psychology and of traditions which have grown around episodes long since forgotten. They are like slang or idioms, and familiar acquaintance with them is even more difficult to attain than is American appreciation of the fine points of cricket or British understanding of the complexities and speed of baseball. It becomes impressive how relatively easy (and I must stress the word "relatively") it is for, let us say, naval authorities to agree upon some issue as compared with those who move in the political realm. Despite all differences the professionals speak a common language. So, to some extent, do civil servants. But the politicians of one nation have no like common basis for understanding politics abroad. The differences in the tone and temper, the manners and the methods of governmental organizations have marked effects upon our relationships.
Timing

If one reflects upon the tensions between our two countries, he will be struck by the fact that they do not always spring up about issues where we have a contrariety of interest or even a sharp difference in fundamental points of view. They sometimes arise over the timing with which expressions occur, over a kind of rhythm of life which is different in the two nations. Changes in the world situation sometimes bring reversals of policy; because of this difference in timing there occasionally seem to be sharp divergencies between the two countries.

Let us take as an illustration the attitude on German rearmament. What we know as the Morgenthau Plan, what the British call the "pastoralization" of Germany, went to the extreme not only in dismantling German industry, but in rendering it militarily impotent. The British never went so far as did the United States in contemplating the creation of an economic, strategic, and political vacuum in the heart of Europe. Yet they accepted it in part and proceeded to dismantle industries within their own zone of occupation. On the other hand, they were not ready to move with much speed toward the reversal of that policy and agree to German rearmament.

It is not true that our Secretary of State called for German rearmament without prior notice to the British. Nevertheless his statement was regarded by them as at least premature; moreover it went further than they were ready to go. Parenthetically, it may be said it was even more displeasing to the French who felt (and events proved them to be correct) that it impaired the prospects for and postponed the realization of the Schuman Plan. Yet, within a year after this episode by which American
'headlong' action caused so much unhappiness and diplomatic tension, it was the British high commissioner who made the strongest and most vigorous statement calling for haste in German rearmament. It is a clear case of difference in pace, making for apparent disharmony of policy and for real irritation.

What is illustrated by this instance is likewise true of many of the sharp differences of opinion in the economic field. The United States argues for the free convertibility of the currencies of the world. We have pressed for a whole series of proposals, instrumentalities, devices, and institutions looking toward that goal. In these matters, as in so many others, the Americans have accused the British of dragging their feet. The reality is that there appears to be no fundamental difference in goal or in ideas; the British simply do not believe the objective of convertibility can be achieved at the pace which the Americans demand. There is no way of resolving these differences, for it cannot be determined with any precision how much it is the British mood which retards progress toward convertibility. Equally it cannot be proved how much American impulsiveness creates problems which, instead of forwarding us toward the goal, actually serve as barriers to its attainment.

These are but two out of a great many instances that could be cited showing irritations arising from the difference in pace. They would be of little significance if the two countries were not yoked together as a team.
Morality

Among the several American and British common characteristics is a tendency of each to regard its own attitudes as approximations of the highest morality. But there is a difference of degree in this also. There is less cynicism, less realism, and more idealism—or some would say, more moral arrogance—in the American attitude. The British tend to be pretty hard-headed and realistic, ready to temper their morality to circumstance—or at least to be aware of the occasions when they do so.

Americans professed to see a manifestation of some moral weakness in British recognition of Mao Tse-tung. It was regarded as truckling with evil, or at least appeasement of wickedness. The British, on the other hand, saw no moral issue involved. They regarded it as merely recognizing the facts of life as they exist: Mao was in firm control; they felt they might as well adjust to the world as it is with a minimum of fuss.

It is essential to emphasize that the recognition of Mao Tse-tung was not regarded by the British as something done in opposition to American policy. This is true for two reasons: first, the British regard recognition as a formal matter, "an acknowledgment of fact, not a mark of approbation"; more important, however, the British believed that the United States government had no objection to their act. No one knows today whether the British understanding that our government did not disapprove was correct or due to a misinterpretation. There can be no doubt that the difference in action regarding recognition has had the consequence of irritating Anglo-American relations, particularly at the level of public opinion. It is equally clear that this was neither intended nor anticipated by the British.

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British morality is not so doctrinaire as ours. They sometimes feel that we have more interest in the ideological conflict with Russia than in the basic problems of security, which is the vital issue from their point of view. In short, the American tendency to explain our actions in moral terms of right against wrong is not so common in Britain; it believes that facts--at least stubborn facts--should govern action.

This could readily produce serious differences. If, for example, the current negotiations should eventuate in an armistice in Korea, what would be done about the recognition of Korea as a single nation by the United Nations? Would that goal be abandoned and the country partitioned? It seems clear that acceptance of partitioning would appear to the American public like defeat; it would be regarded as morally reprehensible and those who consented to it would be subjected to bitter censure. In Britain on the other hand, it is altogether likely that policy would be governed by the stubborn fact that while aggression had been repelled, the military effort at unification had failed. Partition would not be regarded as morally wrong.

Another instance has to do with the future of Eastern Europe. Recently in the course of the political campaign General Eisenhower made a statement to the effect that the United States would not be happy until the Iron Curtain had been lifted and freedom had been restored to the peoples of Eastern Europe. This produced a spate of manifestations of alarm in Europe which demanded to know if this was a threat to use force and bring on war. In the heat of the presidential campaign it was not realized that in this statement the General was not departing in the slightest degree from points of view which had been repeatedly expressed by President Truman.
On May 8, 1951, President Truman said: "We must remember that the peoples under the Soviet rule of terror are not only our friends, but our silent allies...As the free nations build their strength and unity, this fact will compel a change in the Soviet drive for power and conquest. The Soviet rulers are faced with the growing strength of the free world, the increasing cost of aggression, and the increasing difficulty of driving their people to greater and greater hardships."

A year later in May 1952, speaking to a delegation of Rumanian exiles, the President said: "Your country and several other free countries that are now behind the iron curtain have suffered oppression before. Poland and Rumania and part of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire were overrun by Genghis Khan and the Turks and yet you survived as free countries. You are going to survive as a free country. You are going to have our whole hearted cooperation in trying to survive. And if I can continue our program which I have inaugurated, you are going to be a free country again before you pass on to the next world."

Without in any way approving the tyranny behind the Iron Curtain, the British look at what the influential journal, The Economist, called "brutal and unpalatable facts" in this manner: "History has shown that it is perfectly possible for Europe to exist for long periods 'half slave and half free.' The fact has to be faced that the governments and peoples of Western Europe are not now willing - nor are they likely to become willing to go to war in order to liberate eastern Europe...It is dishonest to suggest that the west would make the liberation of all eastern Europe a condition of 'peaceful co-existence' with the Soviet Union."

The basic difference in policy, so far as it is expressed in action, is not profound; so far as it is expressed in words, however, there are
marked differences. These are reflected in the broadcasts of the Voice of America on the one hand and British radio propaganda on the other. If there should come a time when negotiations with Russia seem practicable, these differences in emphasis could cause serious tensions between the two nations.

Colonialism

Another of the points of difference between our two nations can be summed up in the word "colonialism." The contrast in view arises from the different historical experience of the two countries in the matter of empire.

Britain, it might almost be said, became an empire by inadvertence. India, for example, came under British rule as a by-product of its trading tradition. World-wide trade made it essential to have secure routes for its ships. So Gibraltar, Malta, Suez, Singapore, and other strong points were established.

Britain found too that chaos was not conducive to production or profits, that it could not procure raw materials like rubber without order. Therefore it attempted to bring peace and order where its trade ran. In that enterprise it made mistakes, of course. A conspicuous error was the misjudgment with regard to what the American colonies would tolerate. But it also learned not to repeat mistakes and developed a civil service which carried "the white man's burden," as Kipling called it, with a minimum of exploitation— at least as the British saw it.

Americans, however, remembered the earlier errors. They were listed in the Declaration of Independence; they were the basis for the first ten amendments of the Constitution; they were deeply embedded in our historical
consciousness. Merely to speak of colonies, therefore, was to evoke an unpleasant image. The fact that the image was out of date did not alter the unfavorable association of the word. So the United States became firmly anti-colonial.

This tendency was heightened by the experiences associated with our own expansion. As we moved to acquire the broad band across the entire continent, the new territory was incorporated into the Union. It was assumed from the start that whatever we possessed would sometime become states of the Union, and not be held in tutelage. This was partly a consequence of contiguity, partly a result of our populating the country, displacing the aborigines; but it was also partly a more or less unconscious reaction against "colonialism." Thus our memories of colonial wrongs were supplemented by experience in expansion.

These moods and experiences early made their impact upon our international relations. To the south of us we saw the colonial empire of Spain as exploitative, a vast region where freedom as we knew it virtually did not exist. We were, therefore, alert to propagandize in that area on behalf of the kind of independence which we ourselves had won. When republics were set up through revolutions we were determined that they should not be forced back into the colonial status.

The words of the Monroe Doctrine expounding this view are memorable: "The political system" of the European "powers is essentially different... from that of America...We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety... but with Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it
and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between those new Governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security."

That classic statement against colonialism determined ultimately our policy toward Asia and lies behind the doctrine, uttered by John Hay, of the Integrity of China and the Open Door.

Even when the United States was briefly drawn into a program of imperialism, it was a political accident. The war with Spain led to fighting in the Far East (the Philippines) as well as in Cuba and the Caribbean. When we subsequently undertook to manage the Philippines, and adopted the Platt Amendment for Cuba, and annexed Puerto Rico, there was a terrific uproar in this country against the imperialism that such actions implied. The idea of imperialism remained repugnant, and we declared our intention to grant full independence to those regions which could not be incorporated into the United States and become full partners in the Union, with the sole exception of small islands held for strategic purposes. As a consequence, also, we later abandoned the hegemony of force in the Caribbean, dropped the Platt Amendment, and made the Philippines independent. Having rid ourselves of colonialism so far as we could, we continued to look upon all colonialism as bad and to press for its abolition by other nations.
This policy led to some tension with Britain. It could not promptly liquidate all its relationships without destroying the fabric of its world. The British stress the fact that in the Commonwealth they have developed absolutely independent nations such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan, and that they have modified their relationships with dependencies and colonies as rapidly as possible. They think the pace at which they have done these things is better than that of the United States. They point out that India, by reason of the slowness with which it was granted independence, has carried itself better than the Philippines, which perhaps became independent with inadequate training and experience. They feel that we do not fully appreciate the way in which the concept of Commonwealth has been substituted for the idea of empire and that we are not adequately aware of the extent to which the independence of the nations within the Commonwealth has been not only respected by cultivated.

Again the real difference is largely a matter of pace, or rhythm. We tend to haste and they to slowness. Yet our fundamental policies run very close together. A continuing source of friction is that the public in neither nation is wholly aware of what the other has done, so discussions of policy are often carried on in terms which are often obsolete.

**Geography**

Sources of friction between the two nations arise from differing concepts of geography. The contrast might be suggested by saying that we are used to looking at the map of the world on the Mercator Projection while the British customarily use a globe. The American schoolroom has flat maps that roll up; it is upon the geographical ideas conveyed by such
a device that the American forms his ideas of the structure of the world, and the interrelationships of its parts. The private libraries of the British people, on the contrary, have long been furnished with large globes, not only for decorative purposes, but in order to survey the empire and appreciate how it could be one upon which the sun never set.

This is an oversimplification, of course. Nevertheless it epitomizes a very important difference in outlook. As America views the world it sees Britain as a peninsula of the European continent with the connective neck submerged. There is a strong tendency, therefore, to regard the British Isles as part of Europe. The corollary expectation is that it should be part of any European union or any combination of European states. Having set out to encourage unification of Europe "in its own interests," we object when the British do not fall in with the project and participate wholeheartedly.

The British look upon their geographical position wholly differently. They admit to being close to Europe; experience with the guided missiles which so wracked London in the last war is never forgotten. Nevertheless they do not conceive themselves as so close to the Continent as to be part of it. The Channel is not so formidable a barrier as once it was; nevertheless Britain has not been successfully invaded since 1066. While the Channel is narrow, it is still there.

Gazing at the globe, Britain looks not to the Continent so much as to the seas which provide the highway to its world-wide Commonwealth. The focus of its attention is not a land mass, but the oceans. Instead of a European union in which Britain would participate, they regard an Atlantic union composed of the nations about the shores of the great ocean as a far more valid concept so far as they are concerned. They
do not deny that there is need to mitigate the fractionalism which plagues Europe, but they see it as a European problem whereas the British need is for a different association centered in the sea.

The late Ernest Bevin summed up this view when he said on May 29, 1950: "I understand the urge towards European unity and sympathize with it, and indeed, I did much to bring the Council of Europe into being. But I also understand the new paradox that European unity is no longer possible within Europe but only within the broader Atlantic Community. It is this great conception of an Atlantic Community that we want to build up."

Mr. Churchill expressed virtually the same view in June 1950: "With our position as the centre of the British Empire and Commonwealth and with our fraternal association with the United States in the English-speaking world, we could not accept full membership in a federal system of Europe. We must find our path to world unity through the UN organization, which I hope will be refounded one day upon three or four regional groups, of which a united Europe should certainly be one..."

Foreign Secretary Eden, speaking at Columbia University this year, reemphasized the point: "I am speaking of the frequent suggestions that the United Kingdom should join a Federation on the Continent of Europe. This is something which we know in our bones we cannot do. We know that if we were to attempt it, we should relax the springs of our action in the Western Democratic cause and in the Atlantic Association which is the expression of that cause. For Britain's story and her interests lie far beyond the Continent of Europe. Our thoughts move across the seas to the many communities in which our people play their part, in every corner of the world. That is our life; without it we should be no more than some millions of people living on an island off the coast of Europe."
It must be clear that there is no way to make the American and the British views of geography coincide. Each has its own physical, historical strategic, and commercial validity. It is therefore, essential that each should recognize that fact and not expect the other to adopt its views.

Organization of Western Europe

When it comes to the reorganization of Europe, there is again a difference of approach. The Fulbright resolution of March 21, 1947, stated categorically "that the Congress favors the creation of a United States of Europe within the framework of the United Nations." Secretary Marshall expressed the view of the State Department as "deeply sympathetic towards the general objective."

The American desire takes it for granted that a United States of Europe would be modeled upon our own characteristic form or organization. We have had a brilliantly successful experience with the federal principle and tend to generalize from that and expect others to follow that form. Our federal Constitution sets everything out in plain words; it contains the separation of powers and the distinction between great and small states in the House and equality in the Senate which we tend to think of as perfect, or at least as near perfect as human institutions can be made.

Britain, however, does not regard the federal principle as universally valid. In its own structure it does not follow it; it prefers those indefinable bonds which tie the Commonwealth together, those unwritten and sometimes unspoken conventions which make up the sterling area. It does not have a written constitution, but works for custom which is often the opposite of the language employed as, for example, when a
statute or law is described as the act of the queen, whereas her relationship to it is merely ceremonial.

While Britain does not want to join European union, it nonetheless wants to be associated with it. This is a product of its history. The principle of the balance of power is in a certain sense the very opposite of union. The policy was based upon the danger that one nation in Europe would gain hegemony over the others. That was why Britain fought the Spanish Armada; that was why it fought Napoleon; that was why it constantly tried to keep Russia from dominance; and that was why it fought against Germany twice in this century. In short, its policy was to take care that it would never be threatened by, and have to fight, a great power single-handed. To that end it has consistently sought to prevent any one nation from forcibly dominating Europe. This tradition has left its stamp on British thinking; it cannot see that voluntary union of a formal kind would put an end to rivalries in a search for hegemony which have marked the long history of Europe.

Nor is there assurance that Britain's fear, with its strong historical basis, can now be disregarded. Russian-British hostility might almost be called one of the fixed points in 19th century diplomacy and would probably have remained so in the 20th if the Germany of the Kaiser had not tried to take advantage of it. The Russian Revolution recreated tensions between Britain and Russia which their alliance in the First World War had relaxed; again Britain became in the Soviet eyes the number one enemy. This mutual distrust was among the circumstances that left the door open for Hitler and accounts to some extent for the Munich agreements; it was exploited through the German-Soviet period of cooperation while the Germans were fighting Britain between 1939 and 1941. In the light of this long
history it is not to be wondered that there are occasional qualms of uneasiness in Britain lest overconcentration upon the Russian menace may again pave the way for a new effort at German hegemony over Europe.

Britain does not deny that Europe needs less division, but it is in no mood to prescribe the amount of union or the form which it should take. It certainly is opposed to a United States of Europe on the realistic grounds that differences of language, tradition, and economic organization would put too great a strain on any federal union. It is in favor of a degree of association which the continental European powers find acceptable, but always provided there is no danger of domination by one nation—and the one nation which Britain has most in mind is Germany. Despite Germany's defeat in two world wars and despite its present position Britain sees the danger of union paving the way for a hegemony which it has so long resisted. It therefore wishes to be associated (whatever that word "associated" may mean) with a European federation in order to watch that particular point and it desires the union to be so limited that it does not facilitate yielding in peace what has been bitterly resisted in war.

There is one other aspect of this relationship of Britain to the Continent which must be emphasized. It does not want so close an association that its foreign policy can be determined by a body in which it might be outvoted. That would raise awkward questions with regard to the Commonwealth. Britain must shape its foreign policy in the light of its Commonwealth association with a whole series of independent powers such as India, Canada, Australia; it cannot do that and at the same time shape them with reference to a close tie with Europe.

This, therefore, is one of those situations for which it is not
possible to find a neat and tidy solution, such as was envisaged in the Fulbright resolution. From the American point of view the British seem vague, illogical, and stubborn, whereas the project of a federal union is so neat and clear and understandable.

The United Nations

Divergences in the outlook of the two countries are further illustrated by the difference in their point of view regarding the United Nations Organization. Both shared in one common error of judgment; the effectiveness of the United Nations Organization was predicated upon the unanimity of the great powers.

China was included as a great power at American insistence; it was a fiction which the British accepted grudgingly. That insistence on our part and reluctant acceptance upon theirs have proved a source of difficulty.

Even more serious is the second failure of a basic assumption; it is epitomized by the intransigence of Russia. That has had the effect of hamstringing the Security Council as an agency with effective power to maintain or restore peace and security. This body was to have adequate sea, air, and land forces, but they have not been provided.

When those presuppositions of great power unity were defeated, it was necessary to decide what use, if any, was to be made of the United Nations. Inasmuch as aggression is sponsored, openly or secretly, by Russia, the American position has been that since the United Nations was set up to preserve peace or restore it, it must be used to the extent of its power to oppose the Soviets. It is an instrument, from our point

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of view, of collective security and, since the threats to security have come from the Soviets, the UN is, to that extent, an appropriate instrument of opposition to the Soviets.

The British take a wholly different view. They assume that the basic premise was the cooperation of the great powers and that the mandate for effective action by the organization derives from that cooperation. It was for this reason that the veto power was written into the Charter; the veto power was an explicit recognition that the issues of peace or war could be handled by the United Nations only when and as long as the great power unanimity continued. In their view the United Nations is not the instrument for collective security now that unanimity has been destroyed. Security must be taken care of by NATO and by other such regional defensive arrangements rather than through the United Nations.

The British, therefore, look upon the United Nations primarily as a meeting place where friend and foe are in constant contact. They see it as a forum for opposing, and even hostile, powers. They emphasize the fact that the Soviet Union is still a member "in good standing"; it has not been dismissed as it was from the League of Nations and, consequently, the attempt to develop the United Nations into an anti-Soviet bloc would be a mistake.

The British representative on the Security Council, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, speaking this spring, expressed this view when he said that if the Soviet Union were to be driven out many Arab and Asian countries would leave. Some of them are strongly neutralist on various grounds. They would not continue membership in any organization which might involve them almost automatically in a war between the great powers. The British call attentio to the growing cohesion and influence of the Africa-Asia group during the
past two years; they feel it is the reflection of the fears intensified by United States policy in relation to the Soviet Union, both inside and outside the United Nations.

These differences of view occasion differences in policy. The British were not interested in the "Little Assembly" which was set up in order to adopt measures not friendly to the Soviet. They were not ready to refuse to vote for Byelorussia as a member of the Security Council as successor to Yugoslavia. They felt there had been an agreement virtually assuring a second member of the Soviet bloc, whereas the United States insisted on the election of Greece in order to be sure of having at all times an anti-Soviet majority.

Having recognized Mao Tse-tung's government as the *de jure* government of China, Britain felt that it should represent that country in the various organs of the United Nations, including the Security Council. The fact that it was communist seemed to them no more decisive than the fact that Russia was communist, or that Yugoslavia was communist. China was by definition a great power through American insistence and was, therefore, entitled to be represented by those who were in actual charge of its destiny.

The United States, of course, continues to recognize the Nationalist regime; as a consequence it has supported the right of Chiang's government to represent China in the United Nations agencies. Since the formal resolution condemning Red China as an aggressor in Korea, Britain has not pressed its point of view, but, if ever there were a cessation of fighting under an armistice, this difference in view would come to the fore.

To sum up, only two words are essential. The relations between Britain and the United States are healthy but delicate.