BASIC FACTORS UNDERLYING OUR NATIONAL STRATEGY

(a series of lectures)

ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
Norfolk, Virginia

7 November 1952
11 March 1953
18 January 1954

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, Rhode Island

11 June 1952
3 September 1954

The basic outline was (by request) the same, but illustrations varied from year to year.
BASIC FACTORS INFLUENCING OUR STRATEGY

Basic strategy must be determined by a perpetual remembrance that the world is round. Like most other important observations this may be considered obvious, but its realization in the abstract and its application in the concrete are two different things. One has only to observe political behavior over the years to appreciate the fact that there is a sharp difference between those two points of view—the abstract and the concrete. Many who say it is round do not act as though it were.

If anything were needed to teach us that lesson, Korea would demonstrate it. Though it was explicitly left outside our defensive perimeter, once aggression started we made a very heavy commitment after only a few hours of consideration. Despite the absence of a smashing victory and in the presence of a virtual stalemate, no presidential candidate suggested we should pull out. That is a very persuasive index of public support of the decision, even though the war is far from "popular."

We are also well aware that the French effort in Indo-China is essential to the containment of aggression. What General Bradley has called "war by satellite" has done much to make clear the idea that all points are vital, and that security in one region cannot be bought be neglect of another. We must ever bear in mind Stalin's aphorism to the effect that the road to victory in the West is through Asia. Clearly that does not mean that we should concentrate on countering aggression in Asia alone; it does mean we cannot neglect Asia (Far, Middle, or Near), nor yet Africa or Latin America, if Europe—and ourselves—are to be saved.
The second basic principle is that change is the rule in international relations. The essential reality of diplomatic history is the fluidity of coalitions; shifts from one side to another are often rapid and decisive. "A sharp observer has commented that one of the charms of power politics is that no one has time to become tired of his friends." The history of international relations is full of victorious allies who fell upon each other after the moment of victory. Our own times have manifested this: from the war-time alliance with Russia in the First World War, to our support of the White Russians and the invasion of Russian territory and the cordon sanitaire; through to the admission of Russia into the League of Nations and a period of collaboration; the decision of Russia to ally with Hitler and the reversal by which it allied with the enemies of Hitler, and now becomes our potential enemy. All this should be fresh in our minds; it is less extraordinary than one might suppose.

The behavior of Italy toward the Triple Alliance as the first world war of the 20th century developed provides a further illustration. It came to the Paris peace conference as a victor and one of the Big Four, but after disillusionment it turned to Fascism and to a new alliance with Germany. Following its defeat as an enemy in the Second World War, it became first a collaborator, now an ally.

The position of Vichy France and of French North Africa after the collapse of May and June 1940 is another example. China before and after the triumph of Mao and the collapse of the Nationalist power on the mainland is still another. There is the change from the Morgenthau Plan for Germany to the Bonn contractual agreement. We should also list the position of Japan: its relatively long alliance with Britain, one of our
associates in the First World War, and then the reversal to become one of our enemies (some think our principal enemy), its surrender on the deck of the "Missouri," and now again its restoration under our leadership to the family of nations with a status of semi-alliance. Tito was lately an implacable enemy shooting down our planes. Now he is an active collaborator in some phases, but still cannot come to an agreement with Italy over Trieste.

These are all illustrations that change is the order of diplomacy. The idea that there will be no more such dramatic shifts is illusory. Consider what would happen if the Communists were to win an election in Italy or if DeGaulle were to take over France or if extreme nationalists were to master Western Germany or if there was another break in the Soviet-controlled area by which a satellite left the Russian orbit.

We must not think that the United States is unique and has escaped this changeability. In the effort to stay clear of the wars that dogged Europe after the French Revolution we succeeded in fighting both sides. Our long habit of regarding Britain as the enemy disappeared with the diplomatic revolution at the end of the 19th century. Even so, we were not ready to accept the obvious conclusion and, when world war broke out in 1914, Wilson urged us to be neutral in thought and word as well as deed. In the effort at neutrality we developed dangerous tensions with Britain, from the consequences of which we were both saved by the colossal errors of the German government.

Still unwilling to accept the clear inferences to be drawn, we became an "associated power" rather than an ally. After taking the lead in establishing the League of Nations, we eschewed it. In 1939 we again attempted neutrality, and only after a direct assault upon us did we become allies in word as well as deed.
Perhaps it is in remembrance of this record, of which we are often blissfully unconscious, that present allies so often show nervousness as to the stability of our policy. I would not have it thought for a moment that United States policy is in any degree more unstable than that of other nations. It must be clear, however, that we should not look upon others with lofty scorn, neglecting to recall our own record of change.

Moreover, it is essential to emphasize the fact that dictatorships are neither more constant in political orientation nor more successful in diplomatic strategy than other forms of government. In order to make the point it is necessary only to think of the marriage of convenience between Hitler and Stalin just before the opening of the Second World War of the 20th century; and then of Stalin's reversal after Hitler's reversal. We have also the illustration of Tito. One could go on indefinitely showing that the tendency to reverse alliances, the rule of change, is just as applicable to dictatorships as to democracies. We have, therefore, no reason to regard this tendency in international relations as attached to any particular form of government.

These and dozens of other less conspicuous evidences of the essential fluidity of politics under every form of government from democracy through totalitarianism must be constantly borne in mind. Our security can be menaced by a mental fixation which regards the whole of the Communist world as a closely and rigidly controlled Moscow axis. This mistaken concept can keep us from making the constant adjustment which is essential if peace is to be preserved, and is even more essential if we are to have allies should war come.

Obsessive thinking is rigid and leads to false assumptions. In every approach we should maintain the highest degree of flexibility of mind. Su
a phrase as the Iron Curtain is useful up to a point, but then it becomes something of a shutter over our own eyes. If you hold a penny close enough to your eye, it will blot out the world—a copper curtain. Back of the so-called Iron Curtain are fault lines; there are tensions and strains within the Soviet hegemony which can be exploited and should be exploited.

It is said that within Russia itself there are 20 million prisoners in forced labor camps. This is to say, according to John Foster Dulles, there are at least twice as many prisoners at forced labor as there are members of the Communist party within the Soviet. There could be no clearer evidence of tension and strain.

Incorporated within the U.S.S.R. are many peoples—Lithuanians, Estonians, Latvians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, and many others. Despite intense efforts at consolidation there remain cultural, religious, and political traditions which are greatly prized. Recent anti-Semitism is an illustration of the persistence of traditions. Police action can to some extent suppress their manifestation, but it cannot destroy folk memory or hope. So long as tradition and hope survive there is potential instability.

Moreover, there is constant resort to purges in satellite countries: in Bulgaria, in Rumania, in Czechoslovakia, and most recently in Hungary. The purge of Ana Pauker, Rudolf Slansky, and Vladimir Clementis was typical of what has happened in one satellite after another. Even discounting the validity of the charges made in any specific case, it is perfectly clear that the forces of nationalism within the satellites are extremely powerful. Though their manifestations may be suppressed by purges and by the dominance of the secret police, beneath the surface there run deep and powerful currents.
Furthermore, in every dictatorship the struggle for power is perpetual, as well as intense. Since it cannot be waged upon the urbane level of bitter words and bland ballots, it must be carried forward by the deeper methods of political assassination, even though that action sometimes follows legal forms. None of this discounts the fact of Russian hegemony, but we made a mistake when we help consolidate that hegemony by assuming it to be more complete, more successful, and more stable than it really is. To fail to widen the rifts by neglecting to take advantage of tensions is a major error of judgment.

It should be clear that the right attitude of mind towards its problems is an important foundation for American strategy. This involves among other things, and fundamentally, the avoidance of a mind set which establishes a specific power group as the solid, and perpetual, enemy. Over concentration upon one situation distorts perspective on others and destroys flexibility in dealing with the principal problem. Many people in Britain fear that we have fallen into the fallacy which George Washington protested against, namely "permanent, inveterate antipathies." The British are as suspicious of Russia as are we and have long been so. Russian-British hostility might almost be called one of the fixed points in 19th century diplomacy and would probably have remained so in the 20th, if the Germany of the Kaiser had not tried to take advantage of it. Then, the alliance of Britain and Russia in the First World War relaxed tensions which were renewed by the Russian Revolution; again Britain became in Soviet eyes the number one enemy. This mutual distrust was among the circumstances that left the door open for Hitler and accounts to some extent for the Munich agreements; it was exploited through the German-Soviet period of cooperation while the Germans were fighting Britain between 1939 and 1941. In the
light of this long history it is not to be wondered that there are occasional qualms of uneasiness in Britain lest overconcentration upon the Russian menace may again pave the way for a new effort at German hegemony over Europe.

The dangers of mental fixation are becoming rather painfully clear in our relationship with our allies. Queen Juliana on her visit last spring spoke with a voice of calm sanity when she said that the world cannot be dominated by nervous wrecks. She said with a good deal of bluntness which was made more palatable by her personality, that the United States in its overconcentration upon the Russian menace was pressing Europe too hard and forcing the pace to such a degree that our allies are often irritated. The clear inference was that we were building up emotional resistance which we would be well advised to soften by more alert sensiveness to the views of other nations.

Queen Juliana was perhaps the most tactful person to call these things to our attention. You will remember that over a year ago the President of the United Nations General Assembly, Canada's Minister for External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, expressed the irritation of our nearest neighbor: "The days of relatively easy and automatic political relations with our neighbor are, I think, over."  "We are not willing to be merely an echo...The only time the American people seem to be aware of our existence is when we do something they do not like." And he went on to say that Canada has "more outstanding problems with the United States this year than in any year of our history."

As evidence that this was not a passing show of irritation we had an official protest against the use of a detachment of Canadian troops at Koj, separated from the Canadian command. This should remind us of our own attitude at an earlier time when the French tried to incorporate some of
General Pershing's troops into a unified command without giving our commanding officer adequate control. More recently there was a sharp reaction in Canada to a sudden change in our practice of permitting transit of strategic materials across our borders in bond.

Last year the Foreign Minister of Brazil made a complaint similar to that of our northern neighbor. He asserted that the United States could no longer take the support of the Brazilian people for granted and urged that Brazil be treated as an equal if her assistance was really desired.

None of these instances leads to the conclusion that we need lose momentum merely by being considerate of the views and feelings of other nations. On the contrary, more alert regard for the sensitivities of our allies and friends may well strengthen our position vis-à-vis our potential enemy.

It would be disastrous if the view that we are pursuing a national vendetta against Russia were to gain ground. The existence of that suspicion is indubitable; it should be allayed. In this connection it is well to remember one sacrifice we are pressing on our Western European allies which we are unwilling to share. Only in Europe are negotiations proceeding that restrict sovereign rights over vital economic resources and over military forces. That is a severe emotional wrench which must be treated with patience and sympathy, whereas some roving congressmen have shown neither. We must not ask sacrifices of other nations which would prevent their governments from remaining in office.

Tact, however, need not reduce energy in the pursuit of agreed programs. Because international relations exhibit constant change, we must pursue policies which are dynamic. Mere hesitation or stopping will not
prevent change; even if we were to remain static, others would continue to move. Since change will be forced upon us, it is better to retain the initiative.

We have to base our plans for Europe on a series of assumptions, remembering, however, that all are subject to alteration. One assumption is that the contract of settlement with Germany will be approved by the several parliaments and will go into full effect. Another is that despite the basis on which Mayer was chosen as premier and the replacement of Schuman by Bidault, so that there is a more nationalistic orientation, the European army will be realized. Still another assumption is that Germany will supply its share of the troops who will remain subject to the unified command. These hazardous assumptions must be made in the hope and for the purpose of creating such a formidable barrier that Russia will not precipitate a war.

We also have to take into account that war by satellite might precipitate a German civil war of far greater magnitude than the Korean War. Otto Grotewahl, the premier of East Germany, has plainly hinted that, if the contract of settlement goes into effect, Germany will become another Korea. He has spoken openly of civil war and there are many evidences that the rearming of the East has been stepped up since it became clear that Russia’s offer of union, neutrality, and the right to have its own armies was not going to prevent the signature of the contract. Progressive attempts at the isolation of western Berlin are clear evidence of this.

Another possibility is that the Social Democratic Party may defeat the contract in Germany or that it may be defeated in the parliaments of some of the nations involved. Under such circumstances the army would never be organized upon the contemplated basis. The death of Chancellor
Adenauer for whom no adequate successor seems in sight might have the same result. That would leave us with an expenditure of vast sums of money and very great commitments without the gains in security which our present plans contemplate.

On the other side of the world we have to rely upon Japan in the light of our commitments under the San Francisco treaty. But if bad faith develops or nationalism sweeps the country or economic pressure leads to a reapproachment with Red China, we must be prepared for those eventualities.

One other observation is required to conclude this section of the argument. Diplomatic changes are often functions of a dynamic balance. Sometimes they are essential to the maintenance of such a balance. Sometimes they are only thought to be, and are the result of miscalculation of the forces involved. Sometimes an imperialist urge sets change in motion to destroy the balance— that is our present estimate of the Russian design. In so far as change is an effort to restore balance it does not involve new national objectives, but only new means of attaining them.

The third absolutely fundamental factor influencing our strategy is seldom, if ever, referred to: it is ideological consistency. It has become fashionable to say that democracy has no ideology, that the contrast between democracy and communism in this respect is absolute. Nothing could be further from the truth. In the formal sense of not having a party line deviation from which is tantamount to political suicide, there is some color of truth in the remark. Substantively, however, democracy has an ideology as explicit and dominant as anything in the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist dialectic.

The Declaration of Independence asserted that "all men are created equal." That is not a vague phrase, although it is easy to mock it and
make it seem absurd by pointing out that men are not equal in stature, equal in strength, equal in abilities. What is meant is made clear by the next phrase: namely, "that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and pursuit of Happiness."

The word "Life" is important. We are so accustomed to taking man's right to life for granted that it is hard to realize in how many places in the world the right to life is not regarded seriously. We are willing to take a man's life only when he is a menace to the lives of others. Many states do not permit capital punishment even under those circumstances. Communists take a man's life for deviationism, which can mean anything and the evidence for which can be manufactured. In Maoist China man's right to life is not recognized. Mass executions are staged for the apparent purpose of terrorizing people into subjection. Justice has no relevancy to the proceedings.

The second word "Liberty" is in one sense an even more vital concept. It represents an antithesis of Soviet ideology so fundamental that it is the nearest justification to be found for the division of the world into two spheres. "Liberty" means explicitly that each man may establish his own standards of value, his own strategy of living; he can set his own pattern so long as it does not impair the rights of others to establish theirs. It guarantees fluidity in society; a man's position is determined by his own effort, his own capacity, his own personality, and by nothing else whatever. In the communist ideology none of those things is acceptable; its society does indeed attain a sort of fluidity, for neit Stalin nor Malenkov nor any of their politburo associates came to power by reason of birth or rank or privilege. It is, however, fluidity only withi
rigidly designed channels established by the party; it is not the fluidity that comes from the self-directed self-choices of free men.

The American ideal represents so sharp a contrast with what had previously existed that an acute observer well remarked that the Declaration of Independence "blew Europe off its moral base." If the document was correct in calling liberty a God-given endowment, it cannot be limited, in its validity, to Americans. Lincoln, as usual, summed up the fundamental idea when he asserted that the Declaration involved "liberty not alone to the people of this country, but hope to all the world, for all future time."

That ideology shaped our history. It is that which made this a land of opportunity for the oppressed for more than a century. It is that which made the United States a revolutionary force and the opponent of tyranny. Under its impulse we were consistently the first to recognize revolutionary governments. Every opportunity was exploited to encourage liberal and nationalist revolutionaries. American agents were active in promoting revolution in South America; others eagerly watched the revolutions of 1848 in Europe; indeed, one went so far as to draft a constitution for a confederation of German states.

When the Austrian charge d'affaires protested secret instructions for a mission to revolutionary Hungary, Daniel Webster replied: "Certainly, the United States may be pardoned, even by those who profess adherence to the principles of absolute government, if they entertain an ardent affection for those popular forms of political organization which have so rapidly advanced their own prosperity and happiness, and enabled them... to bring their country...to the notice and respectful regard, not to say admiration, of the civilized world." It was that same spirit which made Woodrow Wilson become the hero of Europe at the close of the First World
War of this century. It was that which led to his declaration, "The World must be made safe for democracy."

Wendell Willkie spoke of this tradition as having provided a vast "reservoir of good will." It was to this tradition also that President Eisenhower referred when, toward the close of his State of the Union Message, he said: "We must be strong, above all, in the spiritual resources upon which all else depends. We must be devoted with all our heart to the values we defend. We must know that each of these values and virtues applies with equal force at the ends of the earth and in our relations with our neighbor next door."

I have lingered on this theme because it is absolutely fundamental. It is necessary to point out that we cannot impose freedom on people who do not value it. We tried it in parts of Latin America--specifically Cuba. It is an exportable commodity only to places where there is an active market, either natural or stimulated, for it. We are committed by our history to the promotion of human liberty in every place where it is ardently desired; whenever our policy seems to waver from that orientation, difficulties become acute.

Today, in developing our strategy, we are faced with some exceedingly hard choices. Historically we have been opposed to imperialism, even though we have occasionally been infected with it for brief times in our own history, as when we took the Philippines, or when we set out to make the Caribbean an American lake and put our marines in several of the Central American and Caribbean republics.

Now with strategic bases in North Africa we find ourselves involved in tension between France and that area. We have been faced with the awkward choice between fidelity to an ancient principle and the necessi
of maintaining vital allies. In Egypt we are confronted with a dilemma of maintaining vital allies. In Egypt we are confronted with a dilemma of our fundamental principles in tension with a strategically vital link. In the Near East our passionate attachment to the Jewish homeland on ideological grounds has led to tension with the Arab world. In the Middle East the flow of oil and the flow of politics run in contrary directions.

In dealing with India we fail to see the similarities between the Indian position today and that which we took during the Napoleonic wars when France stood in the position of Russia and Britain in a position analogous to ours and we wished to pursue a policy of neutrality.

In Korea our ideology proved the stumbling block to a truce. We had only to say that our non-communist captives have no right to life or to liberty and turn them over to their communist masters who drove them into battle; by that denial of their right to life and liberty we could probably have had an armistice and released ourselves from vast pressures. To have yielded the point would have plagued us forever after; whenever men sought to flee tyranny and oppression, they would fear lest we would send them back to concentration camps, slave labor, or death.

In a world where force plays so great a part, it is hard indeed to maintain anything like ideological consistency. But if we waver, we will lose our moral position. That would be disastrous abroad, draining the last drop from that "reservoir of good will" which leads nations to trust our word and to accept it in good faith. Even worse it would disintegrate our domestic front. Those who are old enough to remember the storm which was let loose by our temptations toward imperialism at the turn of the century do not want to have such another debate precipitated in the midcentury. Beside it the so-called "Great Debate" of a year or
two ago, which is already fading from memory, would be as nothing.

This ideological commitment is so profound that it transcends parties. That is why it is a mistake to speak of a bipartisan foreign policy. We must have a non-partisan or, more accurately, an unpartisan foreign policy. Tactical moves on the diplomatic chessboard are a matter of party management and rightly a matter of party debate; but the strategic concepts to which we are deeply committed rest upon the basic ideology of the United States. They run so deeply through the course of our history, through the fabric of our thought, that they are beneath, above, and around parties.

Only by holding the firm ground upon which our feet have been planted--namely that all men, without distinction of race, creed, color, are created equal, that all men by the fact of their manhood are entitled to life and liberty--only by ideological consistency in the pursuit of those aims which distinguish us so sharply from the communists, can we hope to preserve a public opinion within the United which will make possible the maintenance of adequate armed forces. Only so can we count upon the confidence of allies in our integrity and fixity of purpose.

The fourth basic element in our strategy is a clear perception about such phrases as "total war" and "total peace." There never yet was a time of total war and there never was a time of total peace. The idea that either of those conditions ever existed is unreal and vitiates our capacity to form sound judgments on the great problems that are before us.

In the long view, for the basic factors that shape our strategy there is no sharp difference between peace and war. That distinction is one rather of law and of tactics. The legal distinction is great within the limited area of its significance, but war as such does not directly
affect the basic national aims which it is the business of strategy to achieve. The strategical objective remains relatively constant; the change from peace to war is a change in emphasis upon the instrumentalities employed. As war approaches, force moves from a background threat to the post of action. But force is never an end in itself; therefore tactics should never dominate strategy lest it result in surrender of long-run objectives to short-run advantages.

If we are to take a long view, I repeat, we must blunt the edge of two sharp words—war and peace. If we continue to deal with those two concepts as mutually exclusive, we confuse both the defense effort and the attempt to achieve peaceful objectives. We can gain some quick realization of the fundamental problem by pointing out that determining the start of war is like inquiring when a fire began. There were first of all the materials and conditions to produce fire, there were smoke and smoldering, then a flicker of flame. When in that train of events did fire actually begin? It is so with war, and history is full of arguments about its real onset.

We are faced with a kind of political theory of relativity: absolutes are manifestations of error; only relatives are trustworthy. To express this in the simplest terms possible, let us say peace is the pursuit of strategic objectives by the most economical employment of all the means at our disposal; war is the prosecution of those same objectives by an extravagance of method. That is the essential fact. The basic purposes of war and of peace are the same—the promotion of the national interest; the means are also the same in war and peace. The difference is in the intensity with which the various means are employed.
Since economy and extravagance are not absolute but only relative terms, the distinction between peace and war is never absolute, except in a narrowly legal sense. We had an illustration of this fact during the steel strike. In arguing the government case for the seizure of the steel industry before the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General spoke of "war" in Korea, and Justice Jackson asked if the President had not explicitly denied that it was "war." The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania which ruled that the fighting in Korea was not technically and in the legal sense war is another illustration. In the narrowly legal sense, fighting, even costly fighting, long continued, does not constitute "war." In a broader contest, therefore, it is clear that war and peace are relative, not mutually exclusive, terms.

The transition from peace to war, therefore, lies in the transfer of emphasis from the economical instrument of reason to the extravagant means of economic pressure and of force. The ends remain reasonably constant.

Let us take a historical example familiar to all. After the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 Canada had a special strategic relationship to the United States. If we were to have a long, virtually undefended border, we must see that Canada never became a base of attack upon us. To guard against such an eventuality Seward, who had reason to regard Britain as the most probably enemy, wished to outflank Canada; he purchased Alaska and desired Greenland. One was to keep Russia from occupying Canada, the other to checkmate Britain. After the diplomatic revolution at the turn of the century by which we drew closer to Britain, Canada still remained within our defensive perimeter, and we utilized Greenland and Iceland for its protection against Germany. For 136 years the end has been the same,
to prevent its use as a base to attack us. This objective has survived a triple change in our potential enemy—from Britain to Germany to Russia.

Take another example: one would have to go far to find greater consistency of strategic conceptions than those which we followed for nearly half a century in the Far East. We announced the policy of the Integrity of China and the Open Door. That basic strategy did not alter at least until the triumph of Mao and the collapse of the nationalists on the mainland. In action the concepts have seen tremendous vicissitudes, but our intent was expressed repeatedly and it remained a steady strategic objective.

Moreover, we refused to recognize changes produced by force: that was fundamental in the Stimson doctrine, which simply made explicit what had long been implicit in our attitude. That position may seem unrealistic if looked at in short perspective. Its possible validity, in longer perspective, rests upon the historical reality that the effects of force are transient. That is evidenced by the fact that peace treaties, which are almost always expressed in terms of perpetuity, have singularly short lives. A recent article quotes a French author to the effect that over a period of three and a half centuries the average life of "permanent" treaties of peace was only two years.

Without endorsing the accuracy of the computation, the fact of the transiency of peace agreements must be conceded. Their lives are not always so brief as that of the Treaty of Sevres between the allies and Turkey at the close of the First World War; it was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne at the end of three years. The Treaty of Versailles lasted less than a generation, and many another treaty of "perpetual peace" has shown the same life history. Consequently the idea expressed in its most
extravagant terms by Hitler, who told his men that on their arms rested "the fate of the German nation for the next one thousand years," is absurd. There have been many similar expressions, not quite so extravagant, but nonetheless ridiculous. Even the triumph of Mao, therefore, does not prove that our Chinese policy, long tenaciously pursued by administrations of both parties, has suffered permanent defeat.

If we are to think clearly about the future, we should emphasize the relativity of two of the words which are customary in public discussion: security and peace. Fashionable as the word has become, "security" is nonetheless a mirage. Perhaps it would be better to call it a semantic tent—it covers so much it can mean much, or nothing. It is used in Wall Street to describe certain pieces of paper; it is employed to indicate poise or personal self-confidence; it sometimes means secrecy; it has relationship to financial well-being; it denotes presumed immunity to attack or ability to repulse it successfully. These are only a random handful from its barrel of meanings. All have one thing in common—they are relative. None is absolute. We have never had national security and never was it in greater danger than when we thought it was virtually attained—in the early 20th century, after two Hague peace conferences. Likewise "peace" has never been perfectly attained and, historically defined, is one of the most unstable conditions in human experience.

The normal condition is neither peace nor war. Certainly our lives are cast in that type of normality. Whether we tend toward peace or toward war, there are five instruments of strategy; and all are potent under every circumstance. They are reason, culture, emotion, economic activity, and force.

At least at the extremes these five are arranged in order from
positive to negative. When the emphasis is upon positive and constructive means, we have what is called "peace"; when negative or destructive action is dominant, we have what is called "war." They are also arranged from the least costly to the most costly—in money, in goods, in effort, and in life. Reason costs nothing but mental effort; force is extravagant in every kind of cost including even life itself. When we can attain strategic ends by reason, costs are low; when we resort to force, the cost mounts toward infinity.

In other words, these are five means to the accomplishment of national policy, which is the object of strategy; they are the instrumentalities by which we seek to attain the national ends. Stated in these oversimplified terms, it would seem that we should be able to tell at any given moment just where we stand between war and peace. The fact is, however, that there are many national policies, and they are pursued with uneven energy and variant wisdom. Among them there are bound to be confusions, incoherencies, and contradictions. When dealing with allies, as we are today, the sum total of all the national policies of all the countries multiplies incoherencies and contradictions. The upshot is that in some phases of our effort reason is effective; that makes for peace. In some other phases, force is in the process of mobilization for use or in actual employment as in Korea; then the tendency is toward war. Both tendencies exist simultaneously in different sectors of interest and action.

Historically, that is why it has always been so difficult to state with any degree of accuracy the causes of any particular war. When, for example, the Nye committee held that "the armament makers" were responsible, it was, to put it charitably, an oversimplification so great as to constitute a gross error. Whenever any other single factor is used as the key, it
misstates an enormously complicated problem. This much can be said with absolute certainty, reason is always at work. The most frequently quoted dictum of Clausewitz recognizes that fact, and history amply supports his assertion.

Of all the strategic instruments reason is the only one which always has a positive orientation. It has consistent direction; force, also, has a consistent direction, but it is the reverse direction from reason, for it is essentially negative. Reason and force press toward opposite poles. Reason advances peace; force impairs the chance of peace. Reason, though always present, sometimes operates in an atmosphere so laden with fear and other emotions, or so saturated by the sense of power or by the sense of weakness, that it has too little opportunity to function. That is true of our relationship with Russia today. It often seems impossible to reason with the communists; their major premise is different, their minor premise is different, and therefore the two arguments do not meet. Reason has relatively slight scope for effectiveness.

It must be conceded that, even apart from Russia, the present world mood is not conducive to the effective use of reason. No one would ever be tempted to call this the "age of reason." It is the age of many other things, but nearly everywhere reason sells at a disastrous discount. The intransigence of Russia is, in a sense, only a symptom of a world-wide retreat from faith in reason. The economic determinism which dominated much of the first half of this century; many views of sociologists and social psychologists and social philosophers; the vogue of Freud, whose work has been well described as "opposition to rationalism"—these and numerous other factors account for the antirationalism of our day.

We ought to recognize frankly that an age in retreat from reason is not likely to produce diplomats of classical proportions. When one reads
recent books on American policy, he cannot help but be impressed with the fact that the use of reason is not given a primary position.

It is well to recall that many a war which was lost on the battlefield has been won in the conference room; the most brilliant historical illustration was the manner in which Talleyrand saved France from the normal and expected consequences of the defeat of Napoleon. If we are ever to gain even an approximation of peace, the importance of reason as an instrument of strategy must be more fully appreciated.

The second of the five instruments of strategy is culture. Every nation has a culture of its own, which at once reflects and shapes its dominant characteristics. It is relatively easy to change political forms and develop new economic activities, but culture is deeply embedded in the life of a people. It is almost impossible to make fundamental changes rapidly in that area of life. Therefore when you think of dealing with people, you have to think in terms not alone of force and economic activity but of their emotional setting and cultural pattern. To be irritated when they do not respond to a stimulus in the same way we do is folly.

Culture is an instrument available for use both positively and negatively. It does not have a fixed direction as do reason and force. Our cultural history and its relationship to Britain have now a powerful effect in holding the two countries in alignment. Common language, traditions, and literature are extraordinarily strong unifying influences. Similarly, the basic differences between Russian culture and that of the West made understanding difficult long before the Bolsheviks gained control. Kipling's admonition; "Make ye no truce with Adam-zad--the Bear that walks like a Man!" long antedates the Revolution. In like manner, it takes a vast effort of imagination to see in Chinese culture any resemblance to a structure of values coherent with our own.
In modern times the negative aspects of culture have been accentuated by propaganda. The cacophony of voices over the international radio is a manifestation of the enormous importance which it has assumed in the grand strategy of war and peace. Nationalism is heightened by cultural self-consciousness and, when nationalistic characteristics become dominant, strained and fantastic distortions appear, such as we have seen in Iran under Mossadegh.

Peace is advanced by the realization of the full potentialities of those aspects of culture which tend to unite men and give them a sense of human brotherhood. This is possible even if the customary expressions are different from our own. We have certain concepts of the tonal scale which are quite different from those of the Far East; we hiss in derision and they in pleasure; we wail in sorrow and they in glee. These are trivial illustrations of the profound reality that cultural habits may differ, and yet the emotional and intellectual realities may be the same. To be put off by things which merely seem to us strange is to be provincial in a world that calls for global strategy. Cultural charity and appreciative mean that, without giving up our own structure of intellectual and esthetic values, we nonetheless do not insist upon imposing them upon others. Negative diversions of the channels of this deep-flowing human intercourse lead to war.

The third available strategic instrument is emotion. We perceive truth, not only logically, but appreciatively. Emotion, properly conceived, is a normal complement of reason; only when one's condition is pathological are emotion and reason set against each other. Employed positively, emotion exhibits amazing powers of attachment; used negatively, it is one of the most divisive forces known to mankind. For many years, because we had fough
Britain in the War for Independence and the War of 1812, the United States continued to look upon it as "the" enemy--long after the substantive basis for tension was largely gone. In other words, historical emotion had the striking effect of perpetuating a sense of hostility though the foundation for that hostility had disappeared.

This should be a reminder that it is naive to suppose that nations always follow their true interests. Emotion often blinds judgment. It was never the true interest of Germany to challenge both the East and the West. It was never the true interest of Japan to pursue the policies which goaded us to war. We have, therefore, to be critical occasionally of our own policy, lest we trespass upon our true interests. We have to face decisions in terms of fundamental interest rather than mere tactical dispositions, which are often suggested by pique, ambition, or emotional misreading of basic interests.

Like culture, emotion has both positive and negative potentialities. Propaganda exploits all that science has learned about the emotions in order to unite one people and to divide them from others. Studies of the uses that Russia has made of propaganda for the consolidation of its monolithic domestic power show countless efforts to play upon emotion, some of them extraordinarily successful. We used an emotional appeal to Latin America with our "good neighbor" policy. Many other illustrations, both positive and negative, will occur to anyone who gives the matter a few moments of reflective thought.

The fourth strategic implement is economic; like culture and emotion it also has potentialities for positive or negative employment. Used positively, economic strength is the support of the free world. It is that which led General Eisenhower on his farewell visit to NATO nations 24.
last spring to say that "economic strength" is second only to "spiritual strength" and one of the "important (factors) for all the others in the free world." "Without economic strength you can neither maintain a real spirit of morale nor preserve military strength."

But economic power can have an equally strong negative effect. After the First World War economic "sanctions" were regarded as the principal instrument for the enforcement of the decisions of the League of Nations. They did not live up to expectations, and fortunately that lack of success dimmed the mistaken faith in economic determinism which had remained dominant for some years.

Nonetheless economic sanctions are a very powerful leverage indeed and one which we are intent upon employing against the Russians. The other day I heard a group of French journalists refer to our pressure against trading with the East as the "American Iron Curtain." Without admitting the fairness of that characterization, we are all well aware that economic leverage can exert great pressure upon both friend and foe.

Congress has been ready to use it with considerable harshness. That tendency heightens some of our present problems. In several Western European nations unemployment causes acute political repercussions, which native communists exploit. To ease unemployment there is a desire for trade with Eastern Europe—an old and "normal" pattern. Russia emphasizes our "inconsistency" in simultaneously calling for lower trade barriers and legislating new ones; it steals our thunder by clamoring for the elimination of trade restrictions and by talking about big East-West barter deals. That was done in dramatic style at the Moscow economic conference last year. Russian propaganda more than hints that American policy has for one of its aims the maintenance of economic hegemony over Western Europe. So tempting are its offers and so galling to European nations is
dependence upon the United States (especially when accompanied by irritating legislative restrictions) that an acute crisis may develop.

In order to exploit our economic strength positively it is essential to remember that leadership must above all else abandon egocentricity. A leader without followers is a contradiction of terms; a leader with reluctant and resentful followers is no real leader at all. To drag nations behind us is a form of unconscious economic imperialism. We cannot simultaneously follow an imperialist and an anti-imperialistic course; we must walk the narrow path between them. Nothing is more evident than that we have not been sufficiently wary or steady in that effort.

Moreover, it is necessary to remember that, unless economic strength and economic stability are maintained, inflation can sap away whatever "situations of strength" might be gained by rearmament. There can be no question that the danger is great. Unbalanced national budgets cannot be compensated by an increase in production alone. Indeed too rapid increase in production with unbalanced budgets could increase the dangers when armaments level off. Nor is taxation a sovereign remedy, for there are limits to taxation; the precise limits are not determined, but it seems likely that Britain has already passed the point of absorbing too much of the national product and we appear to be approaching that practicable limit ourselves. In February President Eisenhower warned, "To amass military power without regard to our economic capacity would be to defend ourselves against one kind of disaster by inviting another."

Despite our wealth and enormous productivity, there are worldwide doubts of our economic stability--among both friend and foe. The sense that our dominant economy is unstable leads our allies to be fearful lest a collapse here carry them all down in ruin. On the other hand, it
is as clear as daylight that the Marshall Plan and the Mutual Security program have been great constructive forces in maintaining the balance of power since the hostility of Russia became an established fact in current international relations.

We have to recognize also that the vast wealth of the United States, while it has accomplished much through the Marshall Plan and Mutual Security, as it did through Lend-Lease during the war, nonetheless makes us objects of envy, one of the most corrosive of all emotions. It also makes us the object of suspicion; there is always a feeling on the part of the "have nots" that the "haves" got their wealth by methods which were shady, if not downright immoral.

This sort of suspicion is heightened because the United States is the only great power that is regarded as a full manifestation of capitalism. Socialism in some degree or other is characteristic of most European economies. As a nation we are intensely suspicious of socialism; the word is often used in this country as an epithet; in the same way capitalism is employed as an epithet by many Europeans. Such facts make mutual understanding all the more difficult.

Under all these circumstances we must walk warily as we employ our potent economic power as an instrument for the attainment of strategic objectives.

The last, and admittedly indispensable, instrument of strategy is force. Strangely enough, it can be fairly judged most successful in advancing the national aims when it is not necessary to use it actively. I have heard that point of view urged more often by members of the Armed Forces than by civilians.

Wisely employed as a potential support of political action, force
though costly is not destructive. Once it becomes necessary to make it the major instrument and to employ it actively, it tends to become an end in itself. It is so dramatic, its effects are so apparent, that it is easy to succumb to the phrase so often heard nowadays in talking about Korea, "nothing counts but force." Once that mood takes possession, force is certain to overreach its strategic objectives. Many a nation has burned a house to roast a pig. When that happens, the means have become more important than the ends. New problems are created which are more difficult to solve than the old.

In addition, the employment of force multiplies almost infinitely the disastrous negative effect of economic power. In the first place, a special type of unemployment is artificially created; many men are taken out of productive employment, their work habits disorganized, their skills blunted, their capacity for normal adjustment dislocated, and the whole rhythm of their lives altered. In the second place, enormous productive capacities are destroyed, impoverishing the producing capacity of the world to a shocking degree. In the third place, many producing plants which survive are retooled to make munitions rather than articles of peace. Retooling takes a long time, even under the urgent pressures of rearmament and with government subsidies and rather negligent treatment of cost. But when the time comes to reverse the process and retool for peace, there is not the same urgency for speed; moreover it has to be done efficiently and economically, else it could lead to bankruptcy. While reconversion proceeds the specter of mass unemployment haunts us.

Furthermore, the use of force inevitably closes the normal lanes of trade and leads to the introduction of synthetics and substitutes. At the close of the forceful episode, the world faces a dilemma: whether to
go back to the original source of supply and let the production of the synthetic go to waste or continue to manufacture the substitute and thus destroy historic trade routes. Whichever program is followed, and usually both are followed in some degree, it proves costly and wasteful. Finally, the land and its resources may be set back as much as 25 years after it has been fought over. In other words, the use of force doubles the disaster of economic warfare.

Force, as I indicated originally, has only one direction: it is always negative; its logic can never be constructive. It is necessary to use force sometimes in order to bring the enemy to the point where he will listen to reason, but force itself contributes nothing to reasonableness at the end of the war. It must be said, therefore, that it is at best a crude instrument with which to fashion and refashion civilization.

The point can be stated even more strongly: the use of force brings a certain irrationality into conclusions; for, when force is applied most violently, it amounts to a reversal of the moral order and tends toward a proclamation that "might makes right." The Russian participation in the victory of the last war has had a baleful effect on the structure of the post-war world. Russia's present influence is all out of scale to its wisdom, its sincerity, or other qualities which normally would have great weight. Reason it eschews, even while using a dialectic that apes the rational process. Culture and emotion it exploits positively at home, negatively abroad. At home it defies the laws of economics, and enslaves its satellites. Force is its dominant method at home and abroad. That is why the danger of war is so great.

By way of review, the basic factors are four. First is the perpetual memory, in action as in word, that the world is round, that pressure applied
at one point is felt at every other. Second, fluidity and change are the rule of international relations and there must be, therefore, flexibility of mind in tactical dispositions—diplomatic as well as military. Third, ideological consistency is even more essential to a democracy than to a dictatorship; the strategy of the United States is basically conditioned by the great affirmation of the Declaration of Independence that "all men are created equal." Finally, the instrumentalities of strategy—reason, culture, emotion, economics, and force—are omnipresent in peace and war and the twilight land between the two wherein we now live. Skill in their effective employment, each in its proper proportion for every given situation, is the measure of proficiency in the achievement of our strategic objectives.