THE VALIDITY OF LIMITED OBJECTIVES
(An Assigned Topic; Followed by Discussion.)

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The century between Waterloo and Serajevo saw the most promising evidences of progress toward a peaceful world of any period in modern history. It was by no means a quiescent or stagnant era. Indeed it was one of the most energetic in human history; nor was it free from war. On the contrary there were many wars, in many lands, for many objectives. There was hardly a year when there was not a manifestation of the use of force for international purposes somewhere in the world. There were at least 30 wars among established states and more than 50 cases of forceful intervention, besides wars of conquest in Asia and Africa. The peaceful character of the era, therefore, did not arise from the absence of strife; rather it came from the fact that wars were not general conflagrations but isolated instances of the employment of force for specific objectives.

The century of relative peace was not achieved at the cost of inaction, nor by clinging to the status quo. Indeed, changes were swifter and more sweeping than in any preceding age. Progress toward the goal of peace consisted in the multiplication of devices to keep wars small, to quarantine strife with a view to preventing its spread. So despite the presence of local, carefully quarantined wars, the ideal of rational peace was dominant.

The idea of limited war for limited objectives gained such headway that it came to seem the normal procedure. The first great war of the 20th century has been called World War I because men had forgotten that before the 19th century general wars were common. They overlooked the fact
the Napoleonic Wars and earlier struggles had been as extensive as the political world. They did not realize that the failure of earlier global struggles to produce global peace was one of the reasons for the reversal of emphasis during the 19th century toward the limitation of war both in space and in objectives.

Along with those two limitations in dimension went a third—the limitation of legal action. The rights of non-combatants were expanded; humane practices regarding prisoners were developed; certain types of arms were banned. In short, the aim was to shrink strife to the least size and scope consistent with the attainment of limited objectives.

World War I, as we commonly call it, represented not only an abandonment of attempts at containment spatially; it was global in its objectives also. Woodrow Wilson, the expositor of its philosophy, spoke of a "war to end war," a "world safe for democracy," and used other phrases to indicate the vast sweep of its objectives. At the Paris peace conference, statesmen sought not only to solve all the territorial, economic, and political issues, they wrote a constitution for a world government to perpetuate their work.

Their grandiose concept of global war for global settlements involved the overthrow of most of the old limitations and restraints. Non-combatants lost much of their privileged status; poison gas and other inhumane weapons were used. Rights which neutrals had gained in the previous century were whittled to a sliver; nearly every restraint was denounced or evaded. In short, all three efforts at containment—in space, in objectives, in methods—were virtually abandoned.

Everything was done to bring more nations into the struggle, to expand objectives to the dimension of a new world order, and almost any means
were held justified by the ends. Wilson elevated the use of force to a degree that prepared the way for "total war" when he spoke of "Force, Force to the utmost, Force without stint or limit."

Moreover a false assumption of absolute moral superiority was developed. The Treaty of Versailles was regarded not alone as an expression of the will of the victor; it assumed the guise of a moral judgment upon a criminal. As it would be absurd for a judge to negotiate with a culprit, so the treaty was, as the Germans called it, a "diktat." The defeated were not consulted as to its form or substance.

One might suppose that, when peace was not achieved at the end of the First World War it would have persuaded men that those assumptions were incorrect. Yet despite the breakdown of the League of Nations, the collapse of the structure of reparations, and the failure of the prohibitions of Versailles to survive experience, the basic notions regarding war and peace were retained; they have dominated international life ever since. The idea that the 19th century could teach the Atomic Age anything has been rejected. Everything has been "globalized"--health, welfare, nutrition, culture, economics, finance, and politics. World-embracing institutions have been established to unify all problems under one aegis. Not only is it assumed that everything that happens anywhere affects everyone else in some measure, the assumption is made that anything that happens anywhere affects everyone vitally.

A new set of terms has been tailored to fit the new structure of ideas. They match the sweeping inclusiveness of the concepts which the 20th century has substituted for 19th century experience. They lack the qualifying adjectives of earlier expressions and are usually stated as stark absolutes.
One such phrase is "total war." It is characteristic of the new pattern of speech; the slogan leaves no room for any different or competing idea. Yet even a few moments of serious reflection make it clear that the term is imprecise; history shows no instance, ancient or modern, of "total" war. The nearest approximations certainly would not be found in the 20th century—or at any time after the Red Cross, for instance, was established.

Not only is the phrase not justified by experience; to Americans the idea is incredible, for if ever there were such a thing as total war, peace would become an impossibility. If every thought, word, and deed were completely engrossed in war, there would be no room for even thoughts of peace; war could never end.

The origin of the expression shows this to be true. It was a German creation, and reflected both the ideal of the totalitarian state and the belief expressed by Ludendorf that "War is everything." "War is the highest expression of the racial will to life, and politics must be subservient to conduct of war." It assumes that war is normal and that peace is abnormal. It goes so far as to say that war is not only a common occurrence, but is a desirable experience.

There is a long history behind the development of this martial philosophy. For our purposes it is enough to point out that it is antithetical to the tradition, thought, and action of Americans. Even in Germany the dogma was expressed as an ideal rather than an achieved reality. In the United States the phrase never has corresponded to action nor does it have any compatibility with democracy.

How, then, could it gain such currency? To begin with it shares with all other absolutes the quality of being a half-truth, and half-truths are
often easier to believe than the whole truth. It reflects part of reality—namely the undoubted reversal of emphasis from war limited in space, scope, and objectives to global strife for grandiose ends, using means beyond those permitted in recent times.

Furthermore, the expression "total war" has a deceptive clarity. It can be quickly grasped and is easy to remember. Constant iteration has a kind of hypnotic effect; it inhibits the reflection which would reveal the other half of the truth which the phrase suppresses. Public opinion is blinded to other significant realities; that makes the slogan dangerous as a guide to policy. Unreal thinking is no safe path toward any desirable goal. The problems before us are serious enough without having them complicated unnecessarily by confusing expressions and by dealing in absolutes where relativity is the reality.

"Unconditional surrender" was another verbal absolute which misled even those who gave it currency. It is the proper goal of the military to reduce the enemy to a condition where he will yield with a minimum of bargaining. To do more than that is to waste life and treasure without achieving any enduring goal. Political leaders, however, should never employ as a political concept an idea appropriate only to the military; to do so is to lose touch with reality.

The reason for the difference in military and political expression is simple: when the armed forces have overcome the enemy, they have fulfilled their mission; the principal emphasis must then shift from the use of force to the employment of reason. If a great power is really rendered politically impotent, the politician faces an impossible task. The scientific truism that nature abhors a vacuum applies to politics. When a power vacuum or a political vacuum is created, new forces will
rush in to fill it. Unconditional surrender, instead of making peace causes of attainment, makes it more difficult.

A third absolute captured the public mind. It also arose from the abandonment of the 19th century proposals for the limitation of war in the interests of peace. With advertising fanfare we were given the phrase "One World." As we look back across intervening events it seems hardly credible that so obvious a political fantasy could so long have dominated public opinion. That result was achieved by inflating one aspect of reality until it looked like the whole. An admitted physical reality is the globe--one world, indeed. Another aspect of reality is the interplay of forces around the world--undoubted and deeply significant. But the neglect of racial, religious, cultural, economic, and a thousand other differences, the suppression of all inconvenient aspects of reality, made the "one-world" dogma only a mirage. Now that the hypnotic effect of the sl has evaporated, the irrationality of this absolute expression is starkly revealed even to the most obtuse, though a short while ago it was difficult of discernment even by the normally astute.

As a kind of reaction from one extreme we are likely to run to another. There is danger that the one-world concept will give way to a two-world dogma. Biaxiality is as false an absolute as its predecessor. Because the United States and Russia are the principal protagonists, there is a strong tendency in the United States to forget that neither power dominates large sections of the world, and that they influence other sections in varying degrees.

Biaxiality leads to the cognate belief that Stalin is behind whatever goes wrong--whether it is the Asianism of Nehru, the nationalism of Iran, the obstreperousness of Egypt, or any other uncomfortable attitude.
or episode anywhere about the globe. Discussion about the Far East, for example, often oversimplifies the problem by assuming that Mao is only a puppet, that all the strings of Chinese policy are manipulated in Moscow.

On the Communist side there is an equal and opposite fallacy which attributes the Korean crisis to "aggressive American capitalism." We are well aware of the absurdity of any such contention. Knowing its untrue character, we assume that those who use the phrase do not believe it themselves, that they consciously lie about us. We should not reach that conclusion unless we, for our part, take adequately into account the other forces besides Russian imperialism which make trouble in the world today.

The "two-world" fallacy is as dangerous as the "one-world" fantasy so far as rational, competent estimates of the international situation are concerned. It makes any understanding of Nehru impossible.

The habit of thinking in political absolutes culminates in the incapacity to make wise political decisions. It is an established fact of political mathematics that no number of half-truths will ever add up to the whole truth.

Under these absolutist principles there is no way to deal with Russia except by total war. That is a simple, direct conclusion; yet analysis proves it to be self-defeating, for after force to the ultimate has been employed, politics must supervene. From this there is no conceivable escape.

The absolutist would deny that assertion and say that there is one way out: occupy the country, remain in possession, and continue to rule it for many years. That is an incredible program. No nation would be willing to pay the cost in life and treasure of such a project. No nation
alert to the consequences would be willing to pay the cost in moral decay; for the exercise of absolute power over another people for a long period of time eventuates in the moral collapse of the conqueror. But even if the price in life, treasure, and integrity were paid, the project would still prove futile; for at some time in the future, however far, the occupation would have to come to an end in substance if not in form also; political action would supervene. The effort to substitute force for reason can be successful only in a transient sense; ultimately reason must be the principal implement of political action.

I am not so naive as to suggest we could now negotiate a settlement with Russia. Recent experience shows that view to be totally unrealistic. One has only to recall the sterile futility of the deputy foreign ministers' conference which met at Paris in the Pink Palace for four months last spring and summer. It proved unable to agree even upon the heads of consideration for an agenda of a proposed meeting of the foreign ministers. When you cannot write the preamble to the preface, it does not make getting the book written look very hopeful.

But again we must beware of absolutes. Because we cannot settle all our problems with Russia, it does not follow that we can settle none of them. That notion is just as dangerous to sound policy making as its opposite. It has proved possible, even during the last five years, to relieve some tensions. The Russians withdrew their threat to Iran; they were stymied in Greece, they lost control of Yugoslavia; they modified their stand in the face of the Berlin air lift. None of those problems is permanently settled; there is no such thing in politics. But a relief in tension is welcome.
We are confused by the assumption that there is one true absolute—peace. But peace is never an absolute; it is always relative, it does not consist in the absence of tension, but only in its adequate compensation. We are at peace with the British; more than that, we are joined with them as allies, committed to work together militarily, politically, economically, over a vast range of territory—the "North Atlantic" has been extended to the Bosporus. Nonetheless there are differences with Britain which have proved as intractable as our differences with Russia—the recognition of Mao, for instance, or the future of Formosa. If one listed all the areas of tension with our principal ally, and omitted to take adequate account of the asset side of the ledger, he could easily conclude that the alliance was bankrupt. Some people take that view, and seek to make it the dominant one.

The difference between our relations with Britain and those with Russia is that in one case the tensions are at least partly compensated; in the other case compensations are wholly inadequate.

Merely to state the proposition that because we cannot do everything, we can do nothing, is to reveal its absurdity. Yet the current mood of public opinion borders upon that attitude. In fact, there is grave danger that the sentiment is so strong that real efforts at negotiation will be damned as "appeasement" and so doomed to failure at home even if they should succeed abroad. Even the word "peace" has become tainted. The phrase "peace offensive" is current. It tends to make anyone who seeks any accommodation at any point seem like the dupe (or agent) of Russia. Few want war, but fear of the accusation of being tricked by the "peace offensive" leads many people to seem more afraid of political negotiation than of all-out fighting.
The sound immediate program is to abandon the ideal of global settlement and substitute specific efforts to achieve limited goals. I am happy to see that Anthony Eden has accepted the thesis that limited objectives are valid. With restraint and good temper, but with firmness and clarity, he has dedicated himself to the solution of as many problems as possible, leaving to time and better fortune the resolution of other problems that can be dealt with successfully only when the Russians are ready. Even progress along that modest line requires action of two sorts. First, we must negotiate where negotiation is possible. Until better times the objective of policy should be to nibble away at any problem for which a solution seems attainable. It may not produce dramatic headway toward a general settlement, but the useful is often not dramatic. It may be only a short step with long intervals before another step can be taken; yet every advance is worth while.

Simultaneously another sort of action is essential. The free world should be strengthened to such an extent that the area of negotiation can be extended. There is ample historical evidence that negotiation from a position of strength is easier than from a condition of weakness.

Here we must be aware of a normal tension between the military and the political branches of the government. The military must be ready for any eventuality: that requires more preparedness than the political arm is usually willing to undertake. Partly this unwillingness arises from the necessity to sacrifice constructive programs of production and social welfare, calculated to raise the standard of living. It is hard to promote a program when the standard of living is pitifully low, as in much of Europe, that is a serious matter; it even imperils the stability of the Government.

10.
There is, however, a deeper reason for the tendency of the political branch to go more slowly with rearmament than the military. It is the danger that instead of producing a situation of strength as a basis for effective negotiation, too large a program may eventuate in an arms race, the effect of which is to postpone negotiation until after war has come and has been completed.

Thirty years ago nothing seemed clearer than that the race to arm was the short cut to war. From the point of view of the military there is always need for enough superiority to produce a margin of safety in any eventuality. By definition, both sides cannot have that margin. The most effective spy system in the world cannot discover all that the opponent is doing. By temperament, both assign the margin to the opponent; and tension mounts.

Today one group of honest and well-informed people will say (on the one hand) that Russia is ridden by fear and that fear leads to irrational action—war; others assert that Russia is driven by dreams of world dominion. Though there is a great difference between the motives which control policy in those opposite states of mind, the two ideas may produce similar results in action. The Monroe Doctrine was defensive in purpose; nevertheless it led to the hegemony of the United States in this hemisphere, crudely but clearly expounded by the Secretary of State, Richard Olney, when he said, "Its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition." Clearly defensive measures can lead to expansionism, to imperialism.

The British hold Gibraltar, Malta, Singapore, Hong Kong, and other stations along the "life line" of empire. But in the 19th century this defensive chain involved the rule of the seven seas and produced war with the United States.
Woodrow Wilson's "world safe for democracy" was clearly a defensive phrase, spoken in response to the threat of German dominance. But Wilson directed the occupation of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, sent troops to Mexico, and did other things that seemed imperialistic to many.

The necessity of cleaning up a mess on our doorstep led us into the Spanish War. That speeded the annexation of Hawaii, and eventuated in possession of Guam, Wake, and the Philippines and mastery of most of the Pacific. If an American president had proposed any such program of expansion, it would have been angrily rejected by an aroused public opinion. That episode in our history illustrates a profound truth: imperialism is not always intentional; often it is the outcome of a defensive mood. When Nehru rejects the Japanese treaty because it does not deliver Formosa to Mao and Okinawa to Japan, we tend to interpret his act as the expression of a hostile stance, perhaps Russian in origin. He may see our new arrangements with New Zealand and Australia, and with the Philippines, and our continuation of troops in Japan, our possession of Okinawa, and our denial of Formosa to Mao as unconscious American imperialism.

Any nation with a unique political ideal and a distinctive economic system is always in danger. Such differences are never understood by strangers who tend to view them with suspicion and dislike. The situation may develop to such a state of fear and tension that the "threatened" nation feels "surrounded" and turns to a tendency toward expansion as essential to survival.

The description applies both to the United States and to Russia. Though we have expanded enormously there are still Americans who feel that we are surrounded, and that there is no way out but war; they are the advocates of the so-called "preventive war." They have no official spokesma
but their number is large and some incident might supply the leadership that would make the movement dangerous.

If the idea of preventive war is dangerous in the United States, with its diffused form of government which prevents the ready crystallization of such an idea, how much more dangerous could it be in Russia with its centrally dominated system. Russia has vivid memories of the "cordon sanitaire," a deliberate attempt at encirclement after the First World War; they recall the aid to the "whites" and the expeditionary forces in Russian territory. Once they concluded that "peaceful coexistence" was impossible, the Politburo could launch a "preventive war" whenever the occasion seemed most propitious. Fear, a defensive condition, easily leads to aggression, an offensive action.

That explains why it is the inescapable function of political authority to determine how much preparedness is essential to make possible negotiation from situations of strength, and how much more preparedness would eventuate in so sharp an arms race as to precipitate war. No rule of thumb has the least utility in deciding how much is too much. The practical course is to combine rearmament with alert seizure of every opportunity for useful negotiation. If those negotiations are handled with deftness and skill, their success will be an indication that the situation of strength is being attained. If more and more irritations are ameliorated, the evidence of adequacy in armament becomes cumulative.

The utter sterility of recent negotiations offers clear enough proof that the situation of strength has not yet been attained—or else that negotiations are inhibited by fear of accusations of "appeasement," or have failed for want of adroit and shrewd management.

Meanwhile the Russian use of the veto, the abstention of the Soviet
Union from many world agencies, its neglect to abide by the agreements it has made, its aggressive acts (or, as Aneurin Bevan would call them, its "adventures") have eventuated in the Korean imbroglio. That has all but dissipated the myth of genuine global collective action. It raises anew the validity of the concept of a limited war for limited objectives. For some months we have observed the tussle between those who would deal with one issue at a time, and those who have fully accepted the theses of the world wars--force without stint or limit to the point of "total war," involvement of as many nations as possible rather than as few as possible, anticipation of a general settlement rather than a modestly specific agreement on a few subjects.

The issue has not been sharply defined and the dilemma has not been clearly stated. Clarity seldom occurs in politics. Indeed there is evidence that people are utterly confused. The key to the confusion is that Korea epitomizes the tension between competing concepts--the global theory on the one hand and the limited specific objective upon the other. Unhappily almost no one has been wholly consistent in supporting one view or the other. Minds have wavered between the two basic ideas as the tide of battle swayed.

Nonetheless there are definite evidences of the competition of the opposing concepts. The horror of the British when President Truman in an offhand moment said "there has been active consideration" of the use of the atomic bomb, their resistance to advances beyond the narrow waist of North Korea to the Yalu, their refusal to sanction the "hot pursuit" of enemy planes into Manchuria--all are evidences of at least a foggy concept of a limited war for limited objectives. On the other hand the participation of several nations as active combatants or by
token forces, the pleas for more men and materiel from more nations, the Kem Amendment, and other evidences of an effort to expand the economic as well as the military phase of the war tend toward the global idea.

Angry discussion of what may properly be regarded as a "satisfactory" settlement shows that many, whose general philosophy of international relations normally comes close to isolationism, nonetheless feel no confidence whatever in the validity of limited operations or limited objectives once strife has begun. Indeed they denounce those who make any such approach as though they were not in error, but deliberately treasonous. Their view is that any departure from "all-out" tactics has nothing whatever to be said for it.

If Korea is one manifestation of the competition between two fundamental ideas as to proper procedure in the search for peace, we have other evidences of a tendency to revive some of the 19th century concepts. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, despite its vast sweep in territory nonetheless is a limited organization. It is an attempt to handle a limited range of problems in a specific area with which the United Nations could not cope effectively. In the same way the new mutual defense agreements with Australia and New Zealand, the proposed agreement with Japan, the Schuman Plan, and even the Marshall Plan make limited approaches to defined objectives.

All are evidences that there is a dawning realization that many of the world's problems are like food: they cannot be taken in too large amounts. While, like the items in a well-balanced diet, they all have an interrelationship, it is necessary to take one bite at a time. Perhaps a chess game offers an even better metaphor. Each move must be made with reference to the whole strategy, but the next move is dependent
upon the counter move of the opponent, which, except in some highly formalized situations, cannot be predicated.

The plain fact is that there is so much diversity of interest that the attempt to deal with everything at once must break down. Even when we use the words "national interest," the phrase conceals the fact that the interest of a nation is a very complex structure.

Mr. George Kennan, in his recently published book, does not define the national interest closely but appears to accept material, economic, and tangible factors as the test and measure of national interest. Unless I misunderstand him, he is accepting an idea which overlooks the most significant changes of the last decade.

National interest and economic welfare are not synonymous. The day of the economic determinists is over. If there had been any need for a coup de grâce Gandhi certainly delivered it. If it is asserted that India was a special case, it is necessary only to look at Iran today; surely it is defying its economic interest.

Many nations are pursuing interests which are not only non-economic, they are intangible. There are all kinds of variations upon emotional, spiritual, political, economic, and cultural themes, which dominate the idea of national interest from time to time, and place to place. The assumption, therefore, that nations follow their interest has validity only when interest itself is specifically defined for each nation, and often it is differently defined for the same nation at various times. Under these circumstances the experience of the world in more than a generation of attempts at global solutions illustrates the folly of excluding limited objectives by limited means merely because those concepts have not been fashionable.
Bismarck offers the classic example of a statesman who followed the doctrine of limited objectives. It is important to lay emphasis upon that fact, because it demonstrates a point of first-class significance: namely, that the theory of limitation upon action and objective is not the sole property of the peace-loving, or the neutrals, or the weak.

Bismarck was an aggressor. He deliberately made war; when a real casus belli was lacking he was not beyond manufacturing one. He was as callous to moral considerations as Machiavelli. His object was the erection of Prussia into a first-class power, and he employed any available means to that end. He was not seeking to serve as midwife to a "brave new world," but to achieve a specific goal. He had no thought of "total" war. To Bismarck such an idea was the height of stupidity, because it would prevent reaping the fruits of victory. His advice to the King of Prussia epitomizes his whole thought on the subject. "War," he said, "should be conducted in such a way as to make peace possible." That may be regarded, perhaps, as a mere paraphrase of the classic dictum of Clausewitz: "War is nothing but a continuation of political activities with other means intermingled...Political activities are not stopped by the war...but are substantially continuous." The passage has been worn so smooth by repetition that it requires some effort to appreciate its fundamental character.

The reality, is that in the long run every peace is a negotiated peace. This has never been expressed any better than by Lloyd George who wrote to President Wilson on March 25, 1919, "You may strip Germany of her colonies, reduce her armaments to a mere police force and her navy to that of a fifth-rate power; all the same in the end if she feels
she has been unjustly treated in the Peace of 1919, she will find means of exacting retribution from her conquerors."

No one has said it more plainly. Never has a prediction been more dramatically justified. Indeed it was not necessary to wait for Germany to fulfill the prophecy. The Treaty of Sevres, imposed upon a completely defeated Turkey by the Paris peace conference, seemed to the Turks so intolerable that they were roused to desperate, and successful, resistance. The Treaty of Lausanne was quite different from that of Sevres.

This reality that a treaty to end a war must be acceptable to the defeated nation is reenforced by the nature—and the cost—of modern warfare. After victory is won the triumphant nation is virtually exhausted. After the First World War Churchill, whom no one could call a defeatist, wrote, "Victory was to be bought so dear as to be almost indistinguishable from defeat. It was not to give security even to the victors." Briand, the almost perpetual foreign minister of France, used words of the same import. In the light of our current situation Churchill could today safely repeat the words he uttered a generation earlier.

For many reasons, of which exhaustion is only one, the moment of victory is brief and the settlements made in that moment are brittle unless they are satisfactory, not superficially but fundamentally, to the defeated. For politics is continuous, while war is episodic. And nothing is writ larger upon the pages of history than the reversal of alliances. Italy, allied with Germany, then warred against it in the First World War as our ally; under Mussolini it returned to the German alliance, was our enemy, was defeated, disarmed, and now returns to the status of a quasi-ally. Ways and means are being sought to modify or nullify the prohibition on rearmament in order that the Mediterranean flank of free Europe may have more strength.

18.
From Japan's surrender on the deck of the Missouri to the terms of the treaty of San Francisco is a far cry. The alteration is not the consequence of a cooling-off period. It is the result of political developments in Russia, China, and Southeast Asia that make Japan more valuable as a solvent friend than as a helpless bankrupt. By deliberate action we are returning that nation to the status of a great power, with all the hazards it implies. Five years ago such a proposal would have received little serious consideration. The mutations of politics are such that Japan as a great power now seems less dangerous to us than a power vacuum.

It is only a few years since Yugoslavia was counted as one of the satellites of Russia and hostile to the West. Yet today Tito has defied Russia and occupies a somewhat distinctive place in the world by reason of that action. No one could have predicted the course of Titoism nor do we know how permanent it will prove.

The Morgenthau plan for reducing Germany to an impotent agricultural economy is already but a dim memory to most of us. Germany is in the process of being wooed away from Russia to provide a buffer—or bastion—for the protection of Western Europe. Even our army of occupation is no longer concerned with holding Germany down but primarily with protecting it until its own strength can supplement ours. The High Commissioner has explicitly admitted that Germany must be treated as an equal.

These are modern illustrations of a point made by George Washington in his Farewell Address. In specific training and background he would not be regarded today as an "expert" on foreign relations. But he had personally studied all the diplomatic correspondence of the Confederation which preceded the Union under the Constitution. He decided that the French alliance of 1778 had become a danger to the interests of the
United States; he established the neutrality policy in 1793, though Madison thought it a "mistake" and Jefferson called it "pusillanimous." He was clear-headed enough to read aright the signs of the times and realize that an alliance which was not only useful, but necessary, at one moment could be not only a burden but a danger in altered circumstances. He was not long out of office before the naval war with France vindicated his opinion and led to the ending of the alliance.

On the basis of study, reflection, and hard experience, Washington got hold of one of the fundamentals of sensible foreign policy. Aware of the sharp changes that circumstances produce in the policies of states, he realized the impermanence of every political arrangement. As one of the means to flexibility, he sought to drain political decisions of emotional elements in order that a commitment made in good faith at one moment could be modified when circumstances altered. To this end he urged the avoidance of "passionate attachments" and "inveterate antipathies."

The phrases embody two basic concepts. First, emotion is hostile to wisdom. Affectionate sentimentality and bitter hatred both defeat reason, the only sure guide to sound policy. That is being illustrated in Iran. Emotional drives are forcing that nation to decision and action which are inimical to its economic welfare, internal stability, and international security. The passionate quality of its behavior is manifestation enough of its unwisdom. It is not necessary to argue that the status quo was satisfactory, or that change was not only inevitable but was overdue. The folly of policy emotionally oriented finds only its most recent, not its most significant, illustration in the current crisis. Washington was profoundly right on that matter.
The second basic concept embodied in his brief phrase is equally significant: in politics nothing is permanent. Attachments and antipathies alike are, in the broad range of history, transient. It was not until the opening of this century that Americans came to regard Britain without "inveterate antipathy." Twisting the lion's tail was a popular trick of politicians seeking public applause; even so moderate a statesman as Cleveland used startlingly strong language in the Venezuela affair: "It will in my opinion be the duty of the United States to resist by every means in its power as a willful aggression upon its rights and interests the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which after investigation we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela." It would have been difficult at that time to foresee the diplomatic revolution within a very few years by which the English speaking peoples would come to be partners in two world wars and the cold war that was to follow.

Current assumptions that there will never be another shift in this orientation cannot be proved. It is difficult to foresee circumstances which would produce such a startling change. There are many reasons to hope none will occur. But our attachment to our allies should be founded upon reason, not emotion.

Similarly our tension with enemies should be coldly rational, not founded upon "inveterate antipathy." We are dimly aware of this fact, though it seldom finds adequate expression. Recently the Congress passed a resolution, which the President transmitted to the Kremlin, in which it was declared that "the American people deeply regret the artificial barriers which separate them from the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and which keep the Soviet peoples from learning of
the desire of the American people to live in friendship with all other
peoples and to work with them in advancing the ideal of human brotherhood."
There was the implicit, though unspoken, suggestion that, when the Russian
people altered their government, peaceful intercourse could be resumed.

Unhappily the resolution was a tactical maneuver in the cold war.
Nonetheless it is not inconceivable that if war is avoided some accommodation
can be found. We shall never have a viable policy vis-a-vis Russia until
we read, learn, and inwardly digest Washington's parting admonition.

While it seems that the ideals of the two nations are so antithetical
that it is impossible to live together, we must remember that for a long
time Mohammedans and Christians carried on religious wars. Now they man-
age to live on reasonable terms with each other by restricting their
religious enthusiasm, at least they no longer use force for purposes of
proselyting.

There was a time, also, when the principles of monarchism and legi-
timacy were so passionately espoused in Russia and most of Europe that
it seemed it would never be possible to have true peace with the revolutionai
upstart republic in America. Yet the time came when, during the Civil War,
friendly gestures upon the part of Russia were helpful.

Today we tend to regard the Russian state as it now exists under
the Bolsheviks as permanent; but it is scarcely more than thirty years
old. In the course of that thirty years it has gone through different
phases, during some of which it was cooperative. It would be as grave a
mistake to regard the current phase as ultimate and decisive as it would be
to say that it is transient and likely to pass in a brief period of time.

In the light of what has happened, it is almost amusing to go back
to look at the New York Times headlines during the early years of Bolshevik
control. Almost constantly there was the prediction that the Bolsheviks
would soon be driven out. There was no expectation that Russia under their leadership could ever become a dominant force over half mankind. That obviously was a wrong estimate. We are likely now to make an equally wrong estimate by assuming that what has happened is permanent and that there will be no change for the better. Perspective upon the problem should indicate to us that there may well be a marked change. Passionate emotion, inveterate in its depth, can blind us to those mutations which Washington so long ago perceived so clearly.

For the sake of stimulating thought I have been suggesting the thesis that limited operations for limited objectives offer a valid method of achieving steps toward peace. Actually, it is a far more hopeful method than stubborn insistence upon making every incident a global affair. Determination always to use a tank, even when a fly-swatter is a more appropriate instrument, is not a good way to attain a peaceful objective.