The Functional Approach to Peace

Address by

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I am to discuss the possible structure of peace. The war approaches a crisis, both in its military phase and even more nearly in its political aspect. As time goes on, however, neither war objectives nor outlines of the peace become clearer.

In a recent nation-wide broadcast, two people, one a conservative and the other a radical, agreed that the United States is not doing well on the diplomatic front. Both felt that the policy of expediency had brought a state of confusion, that fluidity of policy had led us seriously to compromise principle. They expressed public opinion generally. The transition from military to political control of reconquered areas and plans for further reconquest have made the American people feel that our program is not well defined, and that, in so far as it has been revealed in action, it has not been a success. We do not seem to be getting diplomatic benefits commensurate with strategic success.

Relations with Darlan and Peyrouton, the rivalry between General Giraud and General de Gaulle, the questions regarding recognition of the Free French Regime, all have had a depressing effect upon public enthusiasm for participating in post-war political action in Europe. Similarly the relationship with Badoglio, the status of King Victor Emanuel, the sharp criticisms of Count Carlo Sforza and Benedetto Croce in Italy and Professor Salvemini in America have shaken public confidence that our government has handled the political aspects of the invasion of Italy with skill.

The switch from support of Mikhailovitch, the Chetniks, and King Peter to Marshal Tito has given the impression that the United States bet on the wrong horse. Many feel that American policy with regard to Greece has been unduly monarchist. The proposed army corps of Otto, Prince of Hapsburg, produced no military results, but left residues of suspicion that we did not know precisely what we were doing politically. The Polish question has encouraged that same opinion. These effects have been augmented by the decline in prestige of other governments-in-exile who signed the United Nations Declaration and with whom we have maintained formal diplomatic connections. Relations with Spain have accentuated doubts regarding the clarity and consistency of our foreign policies.

In the midst of these confusions, we must seek general principles to guide us. Broadly speaking, there are three basic theories
regarding the peace program; they reflect three fundamental points of view. Also, as it happens, they correspond roughly, and with much overlapping, to three periods of time.

The first proposes peace through a world organization. This is an attempt to solve the problem by political means and belongs primarily to the earliest period of discussion. The second seeks the preservation of peace through a grand alliance. It is a military solution to the problem of peace; politics is subordinated to power. This proposal belonged to the defensive period; faith in it has waned since we assumed the initiative and the difficulties of alliance, even in war time, have become acute. The third proposal looks to the maintenance of peace by functional agencies. It depends upon an economic solution of world problems, reflecting a sense of frustration with regard to world organization and the feeling that a grand alliance is likely to disintegrate.

At the beginning of the war, when men looked forward to the peace, world organization was accepted as necessary, and proposals varied from a super-state to a feeble federation. As time has gone on, however, the likelihood of the early establishment of any powerful, over-all political structure has diminished. The elaborate constructs of Mr. Culbertson, like the proposals of Mr. Streit, have not gained wide support. Similarly, various suggestions to reform and rehabilitate the League of Nations have failed to attract interest.

The League of Nations was rejected by the Senate of the United States in 1919 and 1920 because it was regarded as dangerous to our national sovereignty. There was fear that it might control our actions without our full and free participation in the decisions. Now, however, the “old” League is rejected as a post-war organization on exactly opposite grounds. It is condemned because it did not do enough, because it lacked the strength to make its economic sanctions effective barriers to aggressive powers. Nevertheless, when the possibility of international organization after this war is discussed, the old question of sovereignty reappears, and there is an uneasy feeling in the public mind that any instrumentality strong enough to keep the peace will unduly limit our freedom of action.

So far there has been little official leadership in resolving public confusion regarding a world organization. Our highest officials have offered no clear indications of intention. The Atlantic Charter contained only an incidental reference to “the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security,” and the subject was not directly mentioned in the United Nations Declaration.
The Four-Nation Declaration at Moscow was more explicit: "They recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security." The statement at Cairo and the declaration of Teheran, however, did not further develop this thought. Indeed, it became less definite and appears only dimly in the remark: "We shall seek the co-operation and active participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome them as they may choose to come into a world family of democratic nations." Whether "family" and "organization" mean the same thing is not self-evident. If that is the intention, the Teheran statement nevertheless limits the "general" international organization of Moscow to a much less inclusive "democratic" category.

The more closely one examines these sentences, the plainer it becomes that there has been little progress toward shaping an international organization during the interval between the Atlantic Charter and the Teheran Conference. The first and the last express the idea in very vague terms. Neither supplies any outline, nor has the United Nations concept been crystallized into a working instrumentality.

It is fair to say, indeed, that the United Nations idea has less vitality today than when the Declaration was signed over two years ago, on January 1, 1942, at the White House. Specifically the relationships between the great nations upon the one hand and the lesser powers upon the other have moved not toward clarification but toward ever greater obscurity. Either the exigency of war or lack of skill in the conduct of political relations has thrust this problem into the background. Meanwhile the diplomatic contacts tend to deteriorate; the bases for full and free co-operation between large and small powers after the war are not being well laid.

Instead of using the war to gain experience with an international organization, lack of official leadership has allowed the concept to wither. What the nature of any eventual organization is to be, what its structure, functions, powers, and responsibilities are no more apparent now than before the United States became a belligerent.

The failure to develop a working program for world organization led to the suggestion of a grand alliance; Britain and America,
with Russia and China were to lead the world. The argument was based upon power. This proposal sought to escape the thorny question of the relationships with smaller nations by vague dependence upon “leadership.” It had more official support, and more persuasive unofficial discussion. Essentially the idea was the product of the period of military defeat; it did not face realistically the problem of holding an alliance together for positive purposes, rather than merely for self-defense. The transition from defensive to offensive warfare revealed the inherent flaws in the argument, and reminded us that power cannot offer a satisfactory solution; there must be an adequate political program. A positive Allied political policy is still lacking, however. Until such a policy and an implementing program are developed, hope for a stable grand alliance is as wishful and unrealistic as the dream of a world state.

The third set of proposals grew out of the imperative necessity for action. “Getting on with the war” required international agencies to utilize shipping effectively, to facilitate financial exchanges, to establish military government, to achieve strategic co-ordination, and for many other things. These matters could not wait for an orderly scheme to be developed. It is now suggested that peace will require activity just as exigently, and it is proposed that, without any effort to frame a general pattern, existing agencies should continue and be supplemented by others of like kind to perform many functions.

The arguments for continuing functional instrumentalities and making them the basis of peacetime operation come from many sources. In America those who regard planning as the key to a better life initiated the suggestion. In Britain many businessmen and organizations feel that world trade must be cartelized under government leadership. Socialists and other leftist groups naturally support such ideas. The proposition has been systematized in a booklet published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The author is David Mitrany, and the title “A Working Peace System: an Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization.” The quotations I shall use are from that booklet, which is the ablest exposition of the thesis.

Existing instrumentalities of inter-Allied action are highly irregular in structure. “None of these agencies was conceived in advance, but each was set up in answer to a proved need; no form was prescribed in advance, to conform to some habitual pattern, but each task was given an appropriate organization, and the organization was allowed to adapt and reform itself in the light of expe-
rience. The same pragmatic approach was allowed to rule the measures for the co-ordination of various activities and agencies.”

All these agencies are partial in composition, for the United Nations council, the only body that might include every party at interest, has never been organized for effective operation. Indeed, there are almost as many types of membership as there are agencies, commissions, and authorities. Some are Anglo-American, some include Canada, some take cognizance of China, some of Russia, others of smaller nations. The Anglo-American Raw Materials Board, though comprised of only two nations, settles questions for several. The Middle East Supply Center, first British, then Anglo-American, is able to exercise a strong, and sometimes decisive, influence upon policies of independent nations in that region through “leverage.”

The irregularities in structure are accentuated by the fundamental fact that the agencies now have to deal not with one war, but two or more wars. The Pacific Council, for example, includes neither India nor Russia though both have vital interests in the region. Rhetoric cannot conceal the reality that Russia is at peace with Japan or that it is not “purely coincidental” that the United States did not declare war on Finland.

Those who advocate the “functional” approach to peace accept as permanent not only most wartime instrumentalities but also their irregularities. They would project the method into the future and establish each agency separately with its own set of participating nations “on the basis of their special interest in the particular function.” Thus the pattern would be so varied and the organizations would exhibit so little uniformity that they would not fit readily into any over-all political structure. By conscious design, it would be impossible to make perfectly explicit the relationship of one to the other, or the precise effect which each or all might have upon domestic institutions. It is well known that the wartime agencies in their exercise of executive power intermingle domestic and international business. It is proposed to proceed by this conglomerate method in peace time. The procedure would constitute international encroachment upon domestic matters at once so irregular and so difficult of definition that it would be hard to restrict and control.

The application of the word, “planning,” to this process is obviously a euphemism. Planning necessitates the exercise of foresight; it is an effort to estimate future requirements and make a commitment regarding them. When one plans a building, for example, he must decide how large an area it will occupy, how
many stories can be utilized, and how they should be divided; he
makes a profit or loss in accordance as his judgment is sound or
faulty. The practice here proposed is the reverse of that. It moves
upon the basis of expediency, which is the antithesis of planning.
It puts its faith in improvisations which, almost by definition, are
the denial of foresight. There is no system, but only a method;
no design, but primarily a process; no planning, but a procedure.
However necessary improvisation may be in the hectic exigencies
of war, it does not need elaborate argument to prove that such a
course, if pursued in peace time, invites carelessness and waste.
Nor does it require more than historical evidence to demonstrate
that such organizations establish a right to exist by “adverse pos-
session” and linger after their essential duties have been discharged.
The result is a steady accretion of offices, authorities, commissions,
and activities which it is virtually impossible to limit or control.

Lack of public information, partially occasioned by necessary
secrecy but to some extent by inadequate concern for the public’s
interest in their operation, makes it impossible fairly to assess how
competently the wartime agencies of the Allies are being conducted.
Since the tide of war has turned, and the problems of shipping,
supplies, and the like have moved from an acute phase toward a
state of adequacy, there is an inevitable tendency to assume that
they have functioned well. Human nature being what it is, how-
ever, it is obvious that there is the widest variation in the skill with
which different problems have been handled, in the effectiveness
of co-ordination among the agencies, and in the approach to opti-
mum working relationships. Some instrumentalities have as yet
scarcely functioned at all, some have not operated vigorously. Still
others succeed by main strength and awkwardness, and yet others
by good management, effective co-operation, wise judgment, and
foresight. Some have been conducted with economy, and others
with an extravagance which time will expose.

Many of these international war agencies are not instruments
of policy delineation alone or of mere regulation; they engage in
management. They are, in the fullest sense of the word, “func-
tional.” For example, one decides which ships shall sail to what
ports, and with what cargoes. The system goes far beyond seeing
that private organizations perform their normal duties within the
orbit of the public interest.

The exercise of managerial functions is justifiable in war time.
Projecting this kind of activity into peace time is one way to limit
national sovereignty, though well described by its advocate as
"seemingly underhand" in nature. The boast that "people have gladly accepted the service when they might have questioned the theory" sounds far too much like claiming ability to fool all the people all the time. The proposal is to "overlay political divisions with a spreading web of international activities and agencies" in time of peace. The exponents of functionalism specifically assert that the new approach shall not be motivated by American concepts of the state. They insist we must recognize the state or international bodies as the managers of a planned economy. "Security, economic and social development, all require . . . centralized planning and control."

This approach to peace is explicitly predicated upon the assumption that the principal business of the state is economic and social. The normal activities of the state are discounted as merely "negative"; so the maintenance of law and order is described. As Mr. Mitrany expresses it, "the function of the nineteenth century was to restrain the powers of authority; . . . the function of our time is rather to develop and co-ordinate the social scope of authority." The call today is for a state with "more positive active functions—economic, social, cultural—which are varied and ever-changing in structure and purpose," thus requiring unlimited scope.

In short, the functionalists would follow what they regard as a trend: "That trend is to organize government along the lines of specific ends and needs, and according to the conditions of their time and place, in lieu of the traditional organization on the basis of a set constitutional division of jurisdiction of rights and powers." It is recognized explicitly that this type of structure would disregard constitutions and forms, and even formalities. "Not only is there in all this no need for any fixed constitutional division of authority and power, prescribed in advance, but anything beyond the most general formal rules would embarrass the working of these arrangements." "Those who lead in this rush for social change pride themselves indeed on their disregard for forms and formalities."

We can see what is proposed in the words of this author who thinks developments in the United States during the last ten years should supply the model. "Each and every problem was tackled as a practical issue in itself. No attempt was made to relate it to a general theory or system of government. Every function was left to generate others gradually, like the functional subdivision of organic cells; and in every case the appropriate authority was left to grow and develop out of actual performance." "A timid statesman might still have tried to walk in the old constitutional grooves."
Mr. Roosevelt simply stepped over them." The Constitution was "most conveniently left aside." To understand fully the implications of the argument it is necessary to remind oneself that those statements were designed as praise, not as blame.

The incompatibility of "functionalism" with constitutional provisions is blandly accepted not only for war but for peace. The agencies set up to achieve victory have necessarily mingled international and domestic questions, both because they interpenetrated so deeply and because the time element did not allow making nice distinctions. It is true to say that "though in some cases, especially between America and Canada, the arrangements went very far indeed, affecting each country's domestic policy, it was never attempted or suggested that they should be put upon a political-constitutional basis."

Continuing neglect of constitutional questions is predicated in the proposal for a "functional" peace. It is not regarded as necessary to argue the matter; indeed, it is postulated that "in national states . . . the functional development is going ahead without much regard to, and sometimes in spite of, the old constitutional divisions." Consequently the international agencies should not suffer from constitutional inhibitions; there are to be no checks and balances, no legislative controls. As a matter of deliberate purpose, they are to escape all the safeguards which American political experience has heretofore established, following in that respect the New Deal technique.

A functional international structure based upon the experience of the United States in the last decade is not a promising program—at least for peace. In this country the last eleven years are generally recognized as lacking sound governmental organization and orderly processes. Even the most friendly critics have given humorous accounts of this confusion, where four men are said to be appointed to do one job, and simultaneously, one man to do four jobs. One agency has followed another as in a kaleidoscope; few are liquidated, most simply have new agencies piled on top of them. There are no clear lines of responsibility, no adequate definitions of power. There are duplication, overlapping, and then gaps where things fall between. Grasping for power by agencies and competing to determine policy have produced quarrels so bitter as to become a public scandal. In one notable instance the President had to discipline two of the highest officials in the nation for unseemly wrangling.
Besides this well-known situation, many policies and practices are screened from public observation and from Congressional control by being carried on through corporations which exercise the powers of government without its safeguards or its responsibilities. They represent functionalism in the form now desired in the international world.

In addition to moving without the active supervision of public opinion, the new agencies are to have loosely defined powers so that they may expand with every need. "Functional dimensions . . . determine themselves." "No fixed rule is needed." "The function, one might say, determines the executive instrument suitable for its proper activity." This is described as "the elasticity inherent in functional organization," or, a beautiful phrase, "technical self-determination." Nothing could more accurately describe a government of men instead of laws. Though that phrase has been much abused, it still has validity as a warning, for the history of freedom teaches that the only alternative to a government of law is a government of force. The idea that somehow the yearning for official power has been vanquished, that a program of bread and circuses will not debauch both the giver and the receiver, that Greeks bearing gifts are now to be trusted, is just naive.

The argument in favor of this extraordinary doctrine is even more extraordinary. "In times of stress the nations always adopt certain types of government, the shape and working of which are dictated by the task and by the conditions in which it is performed. Already in the last war the two groups of belligerents, though they had no intercourse with one another and varied greatly in political structure and outlook, were found afterwards to have used strikingly similar administrative devices to deal with the unforeseen problems of the new war of resources. That is largely true in this war also, and the conclusion can only be that in such emergencies government has to be allowed to take a natural course, . . . whereas in normal times, when we face no great risk, we tend to force it into shapes set by dogma and tradition." (Italics supplied.)

That seems to me one of the most astounding arguments of modern times. The notion that safeguards built by experience represent nothing but "dogma and tradition" seems incredible in the face of modern tyrannies which have exploited uncontrolled state power in Italy, Germany, Japan, Russia, and elsewhere. The
idea that government has a "natural" method which war brings to the foreground, and which must, therefore, be the best, is in itself as revealing as it is amazing. In this self-consciously "scientific" age, I never expected to hear a claim (from a sophisticated source) that there was a "natural" form of government.

The statement involves, among other things, the tacit assumption of an identity between a war economy and a peace economy. From the standpoint of the historic American ideal, however, that is a fatal assumption. Nonetheless, it is increasingly common not only among the ardent advocates of a functional approach to peace, but among many others whose minds are simply confused. It is persuasive to all who scorn historical perspective and the restraints of political theory. To them it seems "natural" to erect expediency into a principle.

They would move upon a crude empirical level. Controls—such as price control, wage control, production control—"work" in war time and, since they "work," they should be continued. This is described as a pragmatic test, and therefore characteristically American. Actually it is nothing of the kind. The argument leaves out two essential questions. The first is: "They work, but under what environment?" The answer is: "Under the environment of war; that is, under abnormal conditions." The second question is: "They work, but to what ends?" They work to the ends of war. Neither the environment of peace nor the ends of peace are the same as the environment or objectives of war. Therefore the current operational success of these various controls constitutes no argument for their desirability or even their effectiveness in time of peace. The American people have been willing to suspend their liberties in order to win the war; it is a sacrifice they foresaw and were ready to make. But the complete recovery of those liberties is the very definition of victory.

In insisting upon this point I am not setting up a straw man to knock down, for these all-too-common assumptions regarding the identity of method in war and peace reveal a dangerous habit of mind. The misuse of the pragmatic argument involves serious distortion of logic, yet the functionalists are not alone in employing this false method of reasoning. For example, in thinking of the coming peace men quite often say that force must be its principal ingredient, merely because force is the principal instrument of war, yet nothing could be further from the truth.
Actually the fundamental difference between war and peace is a distinction in the use of instruments. Peace consists in the utilization of reason and the constructive exploitation of our common cultural heritage, our joint productive energies, and our feelings of friendship. War is the substitution of force for reason, of economic warfare for improved standards of living; it assaults cultural objects and stirs the emotions to hate. In war, therefore, government has a set of controls and instrumentalities appropriate to mobilize destructive activities; the fact that they operate successfully to those ends is no argument in favor of their perpetuation into the days of peace.

This dogma that war reveals the “natural” method of government is in reality an unconscious surrender to the Fascist doctrine which regards war as normal and peace abnormal. It was precisely the program of Fascism and Nazism to abandon the restraints of law; it was their explicit determination to be “positive” in their approach to economic, social, and cultural ideas. It was that very program which led them to degenerate step by step into the crude imperialism that produced war.

Nothing in historical experience indicates that the social service state, or the positive state as it is currently denominated, makes for peace. It is hard to accept the dogma that “the function of our time is . . . to develop and co-ordinate the social scope of authority,” in the face of tyranny, and the fact of repeated world wars. Freedom and peace are still urgent, even vital, matters. It is perfectly true that “the totalitarian leaders have been playing the strong card of pragmatic socialism against constitutional democracy.” Experience in that process, however, supplies no evidence that the nation which transfers its emphasis from the “negative” ideas of law and order to the positive management of economic, social, and cultural life achieves security—of any kind.

Germany was the first social service state, adopting, long before Britain and America, those forms of social security now so fashionable. Bismarck was an ardent exponent of “positive” measures. He explained that the state should interfere in the basic social relationship of supply and demand. In addition to providing sickness insurance, accident insurance, old age and disability allowances, he reasserted the eighteenth century Prussian concept of the “right to work,” which is now again dusted off for modern consumption. How contemporary is his declaration that “belief
in a harmony of interests has been made bankrupt by history. No doubt the individual can do much good, but the social problem can only be solved by the State." Yet his measures did not give freedom from want, or freedom from fear.

In the staccato phrases of modern demagogy, Hitler, the parvenu, echoed the Junker prince's expressions of contempt for the individual which had set the tone of German policy, two generations before. With the aid of Schacht's legerdemain he appeared to surmount the law of supply and demand. Like his forerunner, Hitler also proclaimed the "right to work"; by his own methods he abolished unemployment. Nonetheless the nation with these admirable objectives produced two world wars. Is there any connection between those facts? I think there is.

"Functionalism," the social service state, the positive state—by whatever term the inherent idea is described—is predicated upon the relative unimportance of political rights, that is, the rights of man against the state. The new humanitarian sentimentalists now have adopted this absolutist doctrine as their own; they would vie with Bismarck in out-Marxing Marx, implicitly accepting the impotence of the individual. They would have the state repeal the law of supply and demand. They would accept the Prussian dogma that material benefits are more vital than political freedom.

Indeed it has been thought safe in arguing for this new approach to peace to sneer at inhibitions upon public power. "The peoples may applaud declarations of rights, but they will call for the satisfaction of needs." In supporting the functional plan for a "working" peace, the author makes the flat assertion that domestically "the constitutional path had to be avoided, for the sake of effective action." (Italics supplied.) The inner meaning of that dogmatic declaration is clear: the Anglo-Saxon victory of the common man over tyranny was won so completely that its necessity has been forgotten, even with the lessons of Nazism plain before our eyes. "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty" has lost meaning for the "modern" mind. To give direct material benefits, functionalists would so enlarge the activities of the state that tyranny would again be possible. All historical evidence shows that when it is possible, it is inevitable.

One point no advocate of functionalism has faced with either candor or clarity. How will the positive state dovetail its planning with the managed economy of its neighbors? As its apologist admits, "even so relatively mild a step as the Ottawa preferential arrangement helped to divide the British Empire from the rest of
the world." But, surely, that was functionalism at its lowest level. The advocates of this structure for peace want to go much further. They look to the "functional co-ordination of production, trade and distribution"; they deprecate competition and argue that international cartels supply the model relevant to future methods of procedure. Do Americans want to cartelize our international trade? Would it make for peace? If the Ottawa agreement was divisive, would not drastic planning and control help divide one nation from another even more sharply? They would set the participating group over against all non-participants.

That is not an imaginary danger, for the "equality of states" has no meaning for the functionalists. They reject the idea as unrealistic. "It is not in the nature of the method that representation on the controlling bodies [of the functional instrumentalities] should be democratic in a political sense." Customer nations would have no share in the management of international agencies with which they must deal. Czechoslovakia and Switzerland, for example, would have no "part in the control of an International Shipping Board, and it is true that as consumers they would run a certain risk, as with such a monopolistic Board they could not drive the bargains that are possible when shipping is run by a number of competing private undertakings." (Italics supplied.) It is to be monopoly, a selling monopoly. Experience does indeed show that the customer under such circumstances runs a risk! (See Note 1.)

Functionalism is supposed to be extremely fluid, but by the very definitions which its advocates apply, it is control by the "insiders." Only those nations who have an immediate stake participate, and they participate in proportion to their stake, and admittedly have a monopoly. What chance for entering this closed circle have countries whose resources are not yet developed, or perhaps not even discovered? It is the history of monopoly that it strives to exclude newcomers; that is one of its commonest stigmata. There is nothing in the proposals that have been made thus far which would lead one to suppose that latecomers among nations will fare any better in meeting monopoly. The author of the argument furnishes his own refutation on this point: "Administrative laws and

Note 1. If raw materials were subjected to the "planning and control" of a series of monopolistic cartels, the United States might find itself in numerous instances in the position of Switzerland with regard to shipping: It would be buying from monopolies, in the management of which it had no share, such vital materials as tin, rubber, nickel, manganese, beryllium, graphite, chromite, antimony—and many others.
agencies are now increasingly the means of government action and, it will be found, also the means by which minorities of whatever kind can now be discriminated against in a less blatant way." (Italics supplied.) It is doubtful how long the nations outside the charmed circle of the monopoly would submit even to "less blatant" discrimination. That is an invitation to strife and not to peace.

It is indicated, indeed, that these monopolistic combinations whose "leverage" on the policy of small states has produced tension among large and small Allies even during the war should exercise political functions in peace. It is suggested that they could "be used, very properly and effectively, as a first line of action against threatening aggression, by their withholding services from those who are causing trouble. They could apply such preventive sanctions more effectively than if these were to wait upon the agreement and action of a number of separate governments, and they could do so as part of their established duties." Who would direct them? Perhaps the intention is to furnish other occasions for "technical self-determination." Economic sanctions imposed and enforced by independent agencies offer possibilities of chaos not hitherto envisaged. The scheme is certainly ingenious—but it is not a program for peace.

We are committed to this war; I believe the American people are ready and eager effectively to participate also in the preservation of peace. To achieve that will require simple and well understood structures, carefully defined powers and responsibilities, and full information regarding their activities. Under those conditions an alert public opinion can control them, and the people can make their contribution to peace in the world as well as to prosperity and security.

It would not be possible, however, for the public to watch two boiling kettles of alphabet soup, one domestic, the other international. To turn over the peace program to international functional agencies, premised upon recent American administrative experience, would develop the same disorderly procedures. The public, therefore, should view with alarm the spawning of a vast number of international agencies with strange, ungainly titles, with uncoordinated duties, with undefined responsibilities, and with uncontrolled operations. It should view with profound suspicion resort to international corporations which, like domestic corporate agencies of the government, may become instruments of implied commitments and unrealized responsibilities.
Functionalism in practice often deals with symptoms instead of causes. It concentrates upon "the needs of the moment," and tends to neglect the long view. It escapes from the necessity for defining policy by furious activity. In both these respects it depends upon operations which either can be concealed from the public or are so complicated as to be obscure. Confusion makes possible the transfer of control from the democratic principles of public opinion to the methods of bureaucratic management.

The proliferation of functional agencies has created friction at home; it will produce international friction abroad. The practice has resulted in bitter quarrels between the members of one administration, operating under the immediate supervision of its chief and under party discipline. How much more will sprawling and uncoordinated agencies make trouble in the international world? They are likely to become instrumentalities not of peace, but of strife—not means for the orderly liquidation of the war, but for the perpetuation of some of its most disagreeable characteristics.

Organizing agencies about specific jobs, without relating them to "a general theory or system of government," has had the ultimate effect of making them all dependent upon the President alone. Since they are not structurally co-ordinated, they must be personally co-ordinated; in practice that means one-man control. Consequently too many issues in too critical condition are brought to the President's desk, there to be dealt with by facile improvisation.

Few defend that administrative procedure, yet it is precisely what the functionalists now propose. "It would be out of place to lay down in advance some formal plan for the co-ordination of the several functions. Co-ordination, too, would in that sense have to come about functionally." There is to be no structural relationship. "It is the central view of the functional approach that such an authority is not essential for our greatest and real immediate needs."

What the international result would be, based on the accepted analogy of American experience, is perfectly evident. Lack of co-ordination abroad would have the effect, as bad administration has at home, of concentrating power in the hands of three or four heads of states, who would be forced to make too many decisions on questions unduly complicated by personal friction. Failure to develop an orderly structure concentrates power, and, at the same time, makes its responsible exercise impossible.

I have made no reference to certain practical difficulties. For example, how will such agencies be established and how will they be supported? It seems so obvious as not to call for discussion
that any treaty setting up an international governmental cartel to manage the trade of the world would not be consented to by two-thirds of the Senate of the United States, nor would other functional organizations set up by treaties. If they are established by executive agreements, it will require the most delicate handling not to raise questions with the Senate, which even in the case of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration insisted upon safeguards. If the President were to set up international post-war structures on his own responsibility, as he now sets up war agencies as Commander-in-Chief, they might well find themselves without any appropriations for their peacetime support.

Not many months ago the author of the pamphlet under discussion boasted that "a great constitutional transformation has ... taken place without any changes in the Constitution." But the effort to achieve by indirection what was "too difficult" to do by ordinary processes developed internal tensions and brought the President and the Congress into a noisy brawl, which produced disillusionment in America, confused our Allies, and heartened our enemies. We shall have again to learn the hard lesson of the old copybook maxim: "Less haste, more speed." The "too difficult" pathway of constitutional action will prove the shortest route to the social integration we all want.

If functionalism is not the answer to the problem of peace, what, then, is the solution? Our first dependence must be upon the formulation of moderate, explicit, and firm policies which the United States will pursue with the same fidelity and courtesy with which the Good Neighbor policy has been followed. No complicated functional legerdemain can relieve us of that essential—and sadly neglected—responsibility. One clear-cut, comprehensible statement of policy would be worth any number of departmental reorganizations.

In the second place, the United States should not only join, it should take the lead in establishing, a world organization. This should begin upon a modest basis and let nations gain experience in dealing with the problems and difficulties as well as enjoy the rewards and advantages.

Thirdly, the United States should maintain itself in the friendliest contact with the other great powers without depending upon permanent alliances, which are worthless if fundamental interests are in conflict and needless if they are in harmony. Alliances do not insure harmony. Hard, concentrated, continuous, constructive diplomatic activity is required. There is no substitute.
Finally, there will be need in the organization of the peace for some functional agencies. There have been functional agencies in international relations for many years and some have performed notable service. Some of those will continue and others may be added, but to be successful they must be proper instruments of American democracy and of free peoples everywhere. They will be effective in the interests of peace only if their relationship to the domestic life of the several nations is explicit and sharply defined, only if they are controlled by an over-all world organization, and if their functions and powers are limited.

What I have said, therefore, is not an attack upon appropriate and necessary functional agencies in connection with the peace. The criticism is of the false functionalism now being promoted. It is essentially an escapist attempt to dodge the responsibility of coherent policy; it is a defeatist gesture in the face of difficulties in establishing an international organization. It is an effort to create synthetic confusion, when there is enough of the natural product. It seeks to defeat democratic control of policy in order to achieve goals for the attainment of which democracy is not trusted. The functional approach to peace illustrates again a common experience in history: an idea, valid within modest limits, becomes first absurd, then positively dangerous, by over-exploitation. (See Note 2.)


Inspection of these documents will make it clear that some agencies are temporary, some should end with the war, others should continue only through demobilization, and still others should be reorganized under a general international structure for permanent use. The list is so long, so unclassified, and the relationships among the different instrumentalities so badly organized that it is impossible, without further knowledge than is now publicly available, to say which should fall into each of those several categories.