CHAPTER I
NATURE, SCOPE, AND ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN GENERAL EDUCATION

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BROAD CHARACTERISTICS

The topic is general education; manifestly there is an assumption involved in the subject itself. It is assumed that there is and can be such a thing as a general education.

The word "general" seems to have a double meaning when used in this phrase. It appears to refer, upon the one hand, to an education made available to all—or to as nearly all as possible—of our citizenship. It is general in the sense that we speak of "compulsory education," as though there could be such a thing. At least it is our conception of what must be supplied to meet a universal need of children and adults.

The second meaning implied in the word has to do with the nature of the education provided. It seems manifest that, in this connection, the word "general" identifies a quality inherent in the education under discussion; it does not and cannot give any measure expressed either in time or in quantity. Whatever measures in either one of those two respects we may adopt are arbitrary; they are dictated by prejudice, or interest, or finance, or some other practical consideration. Whatever their character, they are essentially irrelevant to the basic concept of general education.

What, then, is the quality we seek to identify by this phrase? It is universal validity—an education useful to all who possess it, at all times, and under all circumstances. There must be common elements or qualities sufficiently significant, intrinsically, so that we may properly segregate them from elements or qualities which have specific values only, or particular validities. These basic elements must be so vital in character, so unchallengeable in validity, that we may fairly insist that everyone should have the opportunity for general
education, and that whoever has a general education, properly so
described, is effectively equipped for living in a sense in which he
would not be equipped without it.

Manifestly, also, the values expressed in general education cannot
be ephemeral. They must possess the element of permanence. Per-
manence means continuing value, but does not mean fixation, for
that is the antithesis of education itself. A great many people, suffer-
ing from hysteria, or from democratic fatigue, or from cynicism, are
talking about the necessity for indoctrination. That is the mode in
Germany, Italy, Russia, and elsewhere. The fixations involved in
such methods of mental regimentation are the precise opposite of the
concept of general education of which we are speaking. Their perma-
nence is the permanence of shackles forged about the mind, inhibit-
ing it rather than releasing it for free and creative thought and ex-
pression.

If general education must be something which gives the mind free-
dom, whence arises its quality of permanence? This characteristic
cannot be said to be inherent in the facts which constitute the body
of instruction, for the facts themselves, except in an extraordinarily
limited field, and upon a very elementary level, are not themselves
stable. Whether there be place names in geography, or theories of the
atom, or historical movements toward successive frontiers, or the
growth of political parties, or even good usage in English, verily they
shall pass away. The man with flawless memory who learned the
theory of the atom thirty years ago would today be ranked as igno-
rant, rather than educated. Permanence is not to be found in the
facts. Even the limited and elementary group of facts which are in-
herently stable achieve instability in memory. However permanent
they may be, they are dimmed, distorted, or erased by the nature of
memory. The quality of permanence which we seek, therefore, must
lie beneath and behind these manifestations. I suggest that the es-
sence of permanence must be found in disciplines.

Again, the values expressed in this term should be not only univer-
sal and permanent, but also dynamic in quality. General education
has sometimes been described as the adjustment of the individual to
himself and to society. The weakness of that description, in my
judgment, is that it lacks dynamic quality. Too often adjustment
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has been used to mean placement, which is simply another means of fixation. Vocational guidance and training have been the worst offenders in this respect, but general education also has offended. We should be interested not so much in adjustment as in capacity for continuous readjustment and vigorous adaptation. Knowledge of one's environment is inadequate because environment changes. Ever since the overthrow of the formal discipline concept we have suffered for want of a generally accepted organized concept which might give a dynamic quality to general education.

SUBJECT MATTER

I do not see how it is possible to achieve these ends by any system of prescribed subject matter. Historically, general education on the intellectual side consisted of reading, writing, and arithmetic—the fundamental tools of communication and exchange. They constituted the least possible educational equipment likely to permit a person to deal effectually with his fellow-men. If one were to cling to the idea that only essential subjects should be taught, general education would still be confined to the three "R's." Beyond those we could not go.

No one, however, is willing to confine general education within those limits. A mere subsistence level is inadequate; there must be enrichment so that life may have freedom also. Instantly the clash of opinion as to content of the subject matter of instruction becomes strident. Having for purposes of convenience classified fields of learning, we tend to make those arbitrary categories rigid and endow them with an utterly false significance. Is chemistry or physics the more significant? Is economics or sociology? If, for purposes of peace, one lumps the subjects into groups and speaks of the natural sciences and the social studies, some headway may have been made. But not enough, for in many fields there is no consensus of opinion about fundamental questions. The doctors disagree. The public just now is disturbed and concerned because it has awakened to the realization that persons who call themselves economists (how else is one to identify an economist!) are not in accord on basic issues. In sociology there is no standardized body of material, and no common opinion or attitude. If one were to discuss political science the same
comments could be made. It does not advance us very far in the
discussion to say that one's attitude should be scientific, because,
though we speak of social science, it is doubtful that there is such a
thing. Science consists of the symbolic record of observed phenome-
na. The essence of its method is to be found in isolation of phenome-
na, standardization of technique, precision of measurement, and rep-
etitions which check one another. In the social studies no such iso-
lation is possible, no such standardization, no such precision, and no
repetition that checks results. There can be doctrine, but no dogma.
Even if it were possible, therefore, to list desirable subjects, there
would be no uniformity of teaching or of results.

Even beyond this difficulty lies another—the purpose of the in-
struction. Shall its objective be vocational or cultural? Recently I
heard a discussion among a group of college administrative officers as
to whether there was any difference. One man stoutly affirmed that
elementary agriculture was "better" than algebra. Any familiarity
with curricula designed for purposes of general education will con-
vince one that this confusion regarding the fundamental aim is quite
the rule rather than the exception. The nature of a general educa-
tion as I have sought to define it excludes the vocational aim—but
this does not express any disapproval of vocational training. It is
only an insistence that between personal development (the objective
of general education) and training in a gainful skill (the objective of
vocational training) there is a genuine difference. General and spe-
cific are equal and opposite terms. I am not insisting that it is im-
possible (or even undesirable) to have vocational training concur-
rently with general education, but I am insisting that they are not the
same and should not be confused. It is a commonplace that the same
field of study may be either vocational or cultural in objective, de-
pending upon the method of approach and upon the emphasis placed
upon various phases of it.

All these considerations reinforce the point that the general educa-
tion of which we speak cannot be defined in terms of a standardized
body of subject matter. There could be no agreement upon subjects,
or upon point of view or temper. Thus far practically every discus-
sion of the relative importance of various fields of study has been
subjective. The time and emphasis proper for the natural sciences,
and the social sciences, upon mathematics, logic, and philosophy has been merely the projection of individual tastes or skills. That is inevitable. The total effect of this subject or that, in combination with other school subjects or other experiences, is unpredictable before the student begins to study it, and not capable of being measured when he has finished. Each observer will make up his own mind as to the effect, and no two will agree.

BASIC DISCIPLINES

We are seeking something of universal validity, designed for personal development, which cannot, save to a very limited degree, be defined in terms of specific content. I suggest that a general education consist in acquaintance with and facility in basic disciplines. I propose to discuss certain of those basic disciplines with a view to clarifying this broad statement.

A great deal of misapprehension arises out of the misinterpretation of terms. The word "discipline" has been a football of educational discussion for many years. It is used in many different contexts and with many separate connotations. To Methodists, the "discipline" is the law of the church, codified and printed in a book. In colleges, quite generally, there is a discipline committee which deals not with academic matters but with moral delinquencies, and offenses against the peace and good order of the institution. In armies it represents the regimentation of behavior, rapid and uniform responses to orders. One speaks of "an iron discipline" as explicit and implicit obedience to orders under the sanction of severe penalty for error or disobedience. Fascism and Nazism exemplify the use of the word in the political field, with something of the same connotation. One might list many other uses of the word. All have one quality in common—they express relationship to some basic order thought to be inherent in the situation.

It is in that broad and fundamental sense that the word is used in this discussion. Discipline, as I define it in this connection, is the essential mode of thought in a field of study, the inherently characteristic mental method of attacking that kind of problem. The discipline is a type or category of intellectual experience involved in a successful or fruitful approach to a problem of knowledge. Note that the
word does not imply merely the techniques of the subject; it refers not to the forms only, but to fundamentals, to essential qualities without which the subject may not be successfully mastered. Those essential elements, those intellectual ultimates, are the disciplines.

The fact that they are ultimate essentials does not mean that they are necessarily obvious. The French have an aphorism, "no dates, no history"; that is obviously true, since history is meaningless without sequence. Yet one could not state that aphorism positively, "dates — history"; dates while essential are not ultimate essentials. One might memorize the names of places, dates, and the events of history without getting anything from them by way of a genuine intellectual experience of value. A feat of memory may be an utterly meaningless trick.

It is clear, therefore, that mastery of the discipline of a subject involves, first of all, recognition. One may hit a target without aiming at it, but the event is to be classed as an accident, not a feat of skill. It is so in this instance. If the objectives of one's thought and study are clearly perceived one may make intelligent efforts to attain them. In proportion as they are less consciously observed, groping increases. Basic to all general education, therefore, is identification of the essential disciplines.

It may be pointed out that this first step, elementary as it is, differentiates everything I have to say from any dependence upon, or relationship to, the formal discipline, now so thoroughly abhorred. That theory depended upon unperceived and unidentified (and, many would say, absent) intellectual vitamins thought to be inherent in specific subject matters. Those strengthened and fortified the mind for use in other fields as well. Specific subjects, as such, were thought to stimulate, exercise, and train certain functions of the mind. The theory of disciplines I am attempting to expound accords with the modern position of educational psychologists. Transfer occurs only if the teaching is directed toward that end. This is done by stressing relationships and identical elements, among which are those basic disciplines which I would put at the center of a general education. I am seeking to differentiate and describe roughly certain characteristics available in subject matter which the mind must recognize and identify if the learning process is to be deeply significant. The
formal discipline depended upon inherent but unidentified properties of a subject matter. This proposal depends upon clearly perceived and earnestly sought for identical elements, and upon the manner and method of approach to them.

The second requisite is some skill in using the disciplines. One may have perfect eyesight and perceive a target ever so clearly, but if he does not know how to hold a gun or sight along it, or how to discharge it, he will never hit the bull's eye. If he knows all those things but has inadequate muscular co-ordination, his perception of the target will not insure accuracy of fire. One must, therefore, experience the disciplines. The word "experience" is used to differentiate the process from drill. Drill is repetitious and uniform response to external command; it may be essentially mechanical and can go as far as to become virtually automatic, almost unconscious. That is the antithesis of experience. Experience is subjective; it is realization for one's self. It cannot be mechanical, and can never be precisely repeated. Genuine experience alters the personality, and after that subtle change one cannot have precisely the same experience again. In that sense experience is permanent. Even when memory of the experience has faded, the results are still part of one's total personality. Depending upon the person and the nature of the event, repetitions may bring greater depth and richness to subsequent experiences, or repetition may so blunt the conscious perceptions that the freshness of experience disappears, and the sterility inherent in drill takes its place. If one has clear perceptions and manipulative skill he will engage in target practice, in hunting, in competitive shooting, and find zest and satisfaction in hitting the target. But if he does nothing but eat and sleep and shoot, hitting the target will be all in a deadly day's work.

In the third place, evaluation is essential to effective education through disciplines. It is perfectly obvious that there is not one discipline only to a subject, one found in that subject and no others. On the contrary, it is demonstrable that in many subjects all the disciplines I shall mention are to be found. But they are not equally present, and are not equally significant for experience in that subject. Emphasis upon one or the other produces wholly different types of intellectual and emotional experience.
If one approaches art as an artist one type of result will follow; but if one approaches it as a critic or as a historian, wholly different sorts of experience will result. General education reaches its higher and more distinctive levels only when identification and skill in use of the basic disciplines are made personally meaningful through the conscious and wise selection for especial emphasis of those which contribute most to the student as an individual, not only apart from but different from all other individuals. The process of evaluation is part of general education, but it is a distinctively individual part. Manipulation and evaluation are purely relative terms. In golf the degree of skill in manipulation may range from the duffer to Bobby Jones; there is the same range in intellectual and emotional life. The scale of evaluation may range from that of a common laborer to an Aristotle. Therefore, the “end” of general education will always be an arbitrary matter, determined by administrative, fiscal, or other necessities, but not by inherently logical requirements.

If experience of the basic disciplines passes through these three stages we need have no concern for the permanence of the general education. It may be that dates will be forgotten, it may be that vocabularies will drop out of memory. The enrichment which is the significant element of general education may be tarnished. But resort to the basic disciplines will restore its freshness. Once you have heard music—i.e., once the discipline of appreciation has replaced passive exposure to melody and harmony—music becomes more and more a necessary experience in life. It should be emphasized that the process here suggested facilitates the transition from education in the sense of schooling to education in its larger and sounder connotation. If one has some mastery of the basic disciplines he is in a position to attack a new field independently, as an adult should do.

It is clear from this that putting the basic disciplines in the center of our program of general education supplies the permanence we sought. Likewise it supplies the dynamic quality. The identification, the manipulation, and the evaluation of these disciplines is an intensely personal matter. It involves active experience, not merely passive exposure; it involves the exercise of intellectual resolution, the will to learn. It provides the method for continuous experience. The materials of subject matter are organized and learned with the
precise object of inducing a determined form of experience. As one of my colleagues expressed it, "a subject comes to play its part in the economy of intellectual life precisely through being apprehended in terms of, and mastered as an instance of, an intellectual process." The inevitable result is a dynamic relationship to learning.

With this background I shall suggest, in a tentative way, a rough classification of some of these basic disciplines.

THE DISCIPLINE OF PRECISION

The first is the discipline of precision. This is the simplest and most elementary concept among the basic disciplines. It lies at the root of elementary mathematics. In that field approximations are valueless. If the decimal point slips a cog the results are worthless. There are relatively small reaches of learning wherein an individual not only may but must be certain of his facts; where things are black or white, but never gray. Though the areas be relatively small, it is exceedingly important that in those areas absolute precision should prevail. In higher studies it is clear that the physical sciences require this basic discipline to an extraordinary degree. Grammar and vocabulary, both in English and in foreign languages, have something of the same inflexible and precise quality.

Chronologically this discipline appears among the first in school experience, and, as I have said, it is an elementary concept. On the other hand, it is of fundamental significance within its relatively restricted sphere. Therefore, throughout the period of general education, however long it may be, it is essential for the teacher to identify this discipline and give the students as much and as diverse experience with it as possible. Much of history teaching is flabby and useless, because in the reaction against the memorization of dates it is often overlooked that precision of sequence is essential to any judgment regarding cause and effect. If the substitution of approximation for precision, which is so much the fad today, puts the effect before the cause, there is no history. The most characteristic disciplines of economics and philosophy are certainly not precision. Yet both are utterly dependent in many respects upon logical processes, where the discipline of precision is the very essence of the whole matter.
THE DISCIPLINE OF APPRECIATION

The second basic discipline is appreciation or emotional response. It is an assertion of the validity of emotional experience as worthy of recognition on a parity with the intellectual life. It is founded upon the fact that emotion has the quality of cultivability. Through this discipline the emotional life may be enlarged, enriched, and made a more and more profound and significant element in one's total experience.

Like the discipline of precision, this appears in the very earliest school years. It is a response to beauty in art, music, nature, or wherever it may be found. Without appreciation, indeed, there is no art, no music, no literature; for the person without emotional response they simply do not exist. What is art to one, therefore, may be utterly meaningless to another. The nature and quality of the response determine what shall enter any individual life. The discipline of appreciation continues to function through all of life. No one will dispute the statement that this phase of educational life has been grossly neglected, but particularly at the higher levels. We know less about measuring emotional responses than about how to measure intellectual achievement; we know less about how to stimulate rich emotional responses than an active intellectual interest. The hideously bad taste of so much of our school architecture; the barren artificial deserts in which most schools are located; the wretched equipment for art and music—all these testify that the emotional life has customarily been regarded with some suspicion in educational circles.

Poetry that is picked to pieces in a discussion of its provenance, the meter, the versification, the rhyming or want of it, is often rendered intellectually intelligible but emotionally worthless. Literature is essentially an effort to convey significant truth in a form dependent upon emotional response for its effectiveness. All too often the scholarly, the critical, or the historical approach to literature drains out all its emotional appeal and leaves it sterile and didactic. The discipline of precision has long been understood; the discipline of appreciation still awaits adequate recognition.
THE DISCIPLINE OF HYPOTHESIS

The third basic discipline is opinionation. The word is unfortunate, not because it is inaccurate but because it evokes an unfavorable emotional response—a kind of resentment. As I use the word it has none of the slur involved in the adjective “opinionated”; it means, simply, the construction of coherent patterns of thought from available data. Essentially, it is the mode of the social studies.

Chronologically it appears later in the process of schooling than the other two. The reason is plain. It is a more difficult concept. Students can early grasp the distinction between a solution of a problem that is right and one that is wrong. Appreciation, being an individual matter, carries a feeling of absoluteness at the beginning which it tends to lose later on, but the young child likes something or he doesn’t. His emotional response is likely to be definite. But the discipline of opinionation involves a pattern of thought which is not demonstrably right, but which seems subjectively coherent. At the same time it may be utterly at variance with another person’s view, equally unprovable, but equally coherent to the person holding it. Dealing with the same objective data, reaching opposite conclusions, yet neither wrong, and neither right; that is a difficult concept.

The fundamental difficulty is due to want of complete data. The lack may be due to scarcity of data or to a plethora so overwhelming as to be unmanageable. If one is dealing with the past he knows that much of the past has left no record; that for other parts the records are scanty, and, the interests of those who kept the record being different from our own, the “wrong” things were recorded, and more valuable data are forever lost. If one is dealing with the present, the mass of material is overwhelming, and most of it cannot be checked as to its accuracy. All the social studies and the humanities labor under this difficulty. They have to labor under a further difficulty. The issues involved in the social studies directly touch what men (including the teachers) conceive to be their interests. If by an analogy with science you take a cold, impassive, dehumanized view, then the problems, being human problems, become utterly unintelligible, or the solutions meaningless. Only a human view can be valid, but
human views are colored or distorted by personal, or class, or national, or race interest.

Under these circumstances we have to do the best we can. This might have been called the discipline of hypothesis. Recognizing all the shortcomings of our method, we take such data as we can gather or can compass and seek by precise logical processes to make tolerable patterns, patterns which "make sense" to us.

Whatever term we employ—opinionation, hypothesis, or what you will—it is certain to imply a tentative quality. This discipline has, as one of its most significant functions, to awaken the students to a recognition of not only the necessity but the genuine validity of tentative conclusions. The discipline of precision shows the relatively limited range of the absolutes. The discipline of opinionation exposes the enormously wide expanse of the relative.

Of course, this discipline of hypothesis is fundamental also to the so-called exact sciences. The prevailing opinion regarding the atom differs fundamentally from atomic hypotheses ten years ago, or a generation ago. We may be certain that the present hypothesis will be modified or abandoned. Yet none of these manifest instabilities affect the validity of the hypothesis as an instrument of current thought. The fact that a hypothesis is altered in the light of additional data, or the rearrangement of the data into a more coherent and consistent pattern, does not mean that earlier arrangements and patterns were not valuable, and to that extent valid, in their day.

Strangely enough this is swallowed with relative ease in connection with the natural sciences, but men gag at it in connection with the so-called social sciences. We gag because we have not recognized or gained skill in the use of the discipline of opinionation. The monograph on Problems of Education accompanying the report on Recent Social Trends in the United States remarks: "There is no more urgent problem confronting the educational system of the United States than that of reorganizing the curriculum of all schools so that the chief contribution of these curriculums to the experiences of young people will be a fuller understanding of society and its institutions."

At the same time the report asserts that "The introduction into secondary schools of social sciences of the more mature type, such as economics, has been inhibited by the fact that there is violent dis-
agreement in present-day society on many social questions.” If that inhibiting influence is to be removed, it can be done in one of only two ways. It may be removed by having an official view, such as that of the Nazis or the Soviets, made universal in the schools. That is a thoroughly practical and workable program. It has behind it not only impressive precedents abroad, but a very substantial and influential body of influence in this country. The adoption of that solution would be uneducational.

The only other way is to set this discipline of opinionation fairly in the center of our social studies, and beside it its corollary, the doctrine of tentativeness. Then any teacher who taught a social study as though it were capable of being approached primarily by the discipline of precision would be dismissed. I am a believer in democracy, but it would be absurd to insist that always and everywhere one form of political organization has ultimate and infallible validity, and that all others are “wrong.” Yet that is substantially what an important section of public opinion demands.

In point of fact, the data of one time and place are different from the data of another time and place. Indeed, the data of any given environment and time are constantly multiplying, and are changing with kaleidoscopic rapidity and complexity. It is inevitable that new political theories, new patterns of social thought, should be developed, just as there are new or revised hypotheses in the physical and biological sciences. We must inspect the data, we must think about them logically under the discipline of precision, but the ultimate pattern will be and must be subjective. That pattern we should use as a working hypothesis, recognizing that between that hypothesis and a competing one there is no way of demonstrating one to be nearer ultimate truth than the other. The hypothesis will, therefore, be tentative. We shall exhibit that tolerance which taught our fathers to substitute ballots for bullets. We shall express our views with clarity and vigor, but remain respectful and not hostile to other views antithetical to our own, but expressed with like lucidity and emphasis.

No one can be said to have a general education until he has been delivered from dogma on social questions, until he has set about to make a working hypothesis upon which must be predicated his re-
sponsible citizenship. But he must be ready to alter that hypothesis, and view with philosophic calm the momentary triumph of a pattern of thought and action utterly at variance with his own. I submit that the teaching of the social studies in the schools has not aimed at that goal, and I suggest that that is the source of their relative failure.

REFLECTIVE SYNTHESIS

The final discipline which I wish to discuss is the discipline of reflective synthesis. This is the highest of all the disciplines essential to a general education. It looks to the validity of the intellectual experience itself. It has in common with the discipline of opinionation the creation of patterns and hypotheses. Its distinguishing difference is that the data have to do not so much with observed phenomena of an objective, tangible, and external character as with ideas and concepts themselves. It is the synthesis, if one may so speak, of all the patterns built up through opinionation. It is the effort to give reality not merely to observation but to experience itself. It is an effort to find meaning not only in the world about us but in life. Montaigne in one of his essays said: “What he shall learn, make him look at it in a hundred aspects and apply it to as many different subjects, to see if he has fully appreciated it and made it his own.”

In his sparkling little book, Deliver Us from Dogma, Alvin Johnson says:

In earlier ages, we are told, the body of knowledge was so narrow that a single mind could compass it all; now one mind can compass only a specialty or a trifling part of a specialty. By endless repetition we have been brought to accept this contrast unhesitatingly. But the fact is, there never was a time in the history of civilized man when any mind could compass the sum of available knowledge. It has sometimes been possible for any person with a well-trained mind to hold the various items that, grouped organically, made him feel intellectually at home in his world. There is no a priori reason why this is not equally possible today. . . . Specialization . . . . must be the rule of business and professional life, and of the process of training for such life. Synthesis, on the other hand, must be the rule of the intellectual life. As the adult factor becomes more important in education, we shall find the work of intellectual synthesis proceeding quite as successfully as it did in earlier times.¹

One final consideration requires comment. What are the implications of this theory of basic disciplines for the curriculum? The curriculum seems to me the educational jungle. It is constantly under discussion, but no one knows very much about it. I am far from arguing that one can work back from these disciplines to a neat and appropriate arrangement of courses as a kind of five-foot shelf of general education. It is precisely that hopeless quest which this proposal helps eliminate. This theory makes the curriculum less important than it appears under other definitions of a general education. As certain foods are rich in the several vitamins, so many fields of subject matter are rich in the several basic disciplines. It is inconceivable that a general education should include all knowledge, or even all knowledge directly useful for social and personal life. We should choose that which, on whatever evidence, appeals to us as the most vital—but our emphasis should be not only upon the content, but upon its relationships to other fields of study, and upon its most characteristic disciplines.

There is, however, one implication which touches a very sensitive curricular argument. One of the great questions in any curriculum committee is whether the student should be inducted into a field of knowledge by a sample or a survey. Each has its points. The difficulty with the sample is that it tends to draw the subject out of its setting, and to move toward specialization too early. The difficulty with the survey course is that it tends to be a subject-matter approach, moving over large areas with such rapidity that memory plays a larger part than more significant intellectual procedures. This proposal does not entirely resolve the dilemma, but it does give some advantage to the method of sampling. If the sample is so approached as to lay emphasis not only upon subject matter, but also upon its characteristic disciplines, then the student, immediately, or as an adult, can go as far as he likes. This emphasis upon disciplines is manifestly somewhat more difficult in connection with survey courses.

College presidents are administrative officers. They have to approach problems from that point of view. By the same token they are amateurs in the field of educational theory. Today I have made an excursion, as an amateur, into that highly technical professional
field. Maybe I have said in amateur fashion what some professionals have said in their technical jargon, without my understanding it. Maybe I have walked the edge of precipices unconscious of their existence. Maybe I am over the brink and suspended in mid-air by a process of self-hypnotic levitation. The discussion which ensues will probably supply data upon these points.