The German Colonial Empire

Germany was a relative latecomer to overseas empire and administered some of its colonies quite harshly. Its colonial empire was seized after the loss in World War I. Unlike other European states, Germany played no direct role in the expansion of European influence abroad beginning in the early sixteenth century. Fragmented by dynastic and confessional divisions into the feudal petty states of the Holy Roman Empire, suffering relative economic decline since the fall of Constantinople and the rise of Atlantic trade routes, and then ravaged by the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648), Germany did not emerge as a modern unified state until 1871. By that time the lion’s share of colonial territory in the Americas, Africa, Asia, and Australasia had been divided among the English, Dutch, French, Portuguese, and Spanish. Minor exceptions to this narrative were a number of short-lived mercantilist initiatives by German princes, of which only the exploits of Frederick William, Elector of Brandenburg (called the Great Elector; 1620–1688), in securing the trading post Gross-Friedrichsburg on the coast of present-day Ghana and outposts on St. Thomas in the Antilles for triangular trade, are worth mentioning. Even these minor possessions were sold to the Dutch in 1717. That is not to say that individuals from various German states did not contribute to European imperialism; quite the contrary. German sailors, cartographers, naturalists, missionaries, physicians, merchants, bankers, and mercenaries took an active part in various imperial enterprises. Likewise German farmers and craftspeople were a significant profile in a number of colonial populations, notably in British North America (for example, the Pennsylvania “Dutch”). Indeed, by the nineteenth century the flow of German immigrant settlers to the Americas in particular would assume massive dimensions and spark efforts within German aristocratic and bourgeois circles to create autonomous German settler colonies in the United States (Texas) and Brazil in order to secure this population for Germany. Such proposals were explored in some detail by the liberal 1848 revolutionaries under Heinrich von Gagern (1799–1880) as part of plans for a unified German state. In the absence of a navy, however, these plans remained speculative at best, and the subsequent collapse of the Frankfurt National Assembly in May of 1849 put a definitive end not only to the dream of a German colonial presence but to a liberal-democratic German state. The failure of the 1848 revolution and continued strong population growth would in turn accelerate this German emigration, which led to no fewer than 6 million settling in the United States before 1914.

The Origins of German Colonial Expansion. Following the wars of German unification of 1864, 1866, and 1870–1871, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck was very sensitive to the fact that the new German Empire had disrupted the traditional European balance of power and that maintaining this unstable status quo required careful diplomacy to prevent a hostile bloc of states from forming against the Reich. Of those European states, France was least likely to be accommodated given its loss in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, which resulted in a high punitive indemnity and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. The isolation of France and the maintenance of an alliance with Russia became cornerstones of German foreign policy under Bismarck to which all other ambitions were subordinated. To this end Bismarck took pains to emphasize that Germany was territorially satiated and devoted to stability in central Europe. The precarious fiscal structure of the imperial government—the Reich could not levy direct taxes—also put strict bounds on German foreign policy. Despite this unpromising start, the late 1870s and early 1880s witnessed the effervescence of German procolonial interests and organizations. These began to articulate a complex of ambitions that reflected a peculiar set of anxieties about Germany at a time of economic change and societal flux. Among the most prominent and influential publicists and organizers of this movement were Friedrich Fabri (1824–1891), a Lutheran pastor and missionary, Wilhelm Hübbe-Schleiden (1846–1916), a Hamburg lawyer and former diplomat, the theoretician Ernst von Weber (1830–1902), the journalist Hugo Zöller (1852–1933), and the explorer, writer, and radical nationalist Carl Peters (1856–1918). These men shared an acute awareness of Germany as a belated nation-state and of the danger of missing what few opportunities remained to establish a presence overseas. Explicit or implicit in this was the ambition of establishing a colonial empire that could rival Great Britain’s. Colonial ambitions were thus perceived as a “school of the nation” that would help fulfill a great national destiny and bring Germans the prestige and status of their British cousins. Like their predecessors during the 1848 revolution, they were also concerned about the social implications of rapid population growth and the need to capture the vast stream of emigrants heading to the Americas in German settler colonies. Indeed, colonial expansion was perceived as a way of defusing domestic German political tensions stoked by the rise of a large industrial working class and revolutionary Social
"Colonial Powers." Drawing by Thomas Theodor Heine from the German satirical magazine Simplicissimus, 3 May 1904: "Here's how the German colonizes / Here's how the Englishman colonizes / and so the Frenchman / and so the Belgian."
Democratic Party. Another theme uniting some of these colonial advocates was the perceived need to secure colonies as sources of tropical products, raw materials and, especially, as a sales market for German industry, which at the time was suffering from heightened competition, overcapacity, and falling prices. That is, emphasis was placed on creating trading colonies, but this did not preclude a settler presence per se.

Over the course of the 1870s colonial ambitions shifted from more traditional sites of German colonial aspiration in the Americas, Asia, and the Near East to the African continent. Increasingly expansive and utopian dreams were projected upon West Africa by men like Hübbschleiden and others who imagined creating a “German India.” Colonial associations were also founded to promote these aims. Friedrich Fabri, Wilhelm Hübbscheideen, and Hugo Zöller were active in the West German Association for Colonization and Export (co-founded by Fabri in 1879). Prominent members of Germany’s business establishment, including industrialists, bankers, shipping magnates, and trading company owners founded the German Colonial Association in 1882, while Carl Peters created the Society for German Colonization in 1884. The latter two organizations were amalgamated into the German Colonial Society in 1887, which became the most important of the German procolonial organizations. Even so, the colonial cause was never the exclusive purview of these and other colonial societies. An extraordinary variety of nationalist organizations were created over the course of the 1880s and 1890s that made German colonies a cause of their own and distanced themselves from the established colonial bodies by their even more strident expansionist aims, shrill language, and broader middle class base. One of the most prominent of these was the Pan-German League founded in 1894. These groups and others expressed grave concerns about rapid German industrialization and urbanization and the threats they posed to rural life and thus also to German identity and political culture. Settler colonies came to figure centrally as a panacea to these and other ills of modern life, and as importantly, as a means to spread German influence to all corners of the earth.

Given what is known about Bismarck’s consistent rejection of colonial ambitions, his entry on the colonial stage in the spring of 1884 has presented something of a puzzle that historians have been trying to piece together for more than a century. Most agree that a German colonial gambit was enabled by the very favorable foreign circumstances in 1884, notably the existing tensions between Russia and Britain over Afghanistan as well as French and British disputes over Egypt. German involvement in Africa thus worked to further distract the European Great Powers, particularly France, from central Europe. Some have suggested that Bismarck’s strategy was calculated to lead to some kind of accommodation or even alliance with France. Evidence also points to the fact that Bismarck was increasingly concerned about securing German export markets and commercial interests in the periphery in a climate of economic depression, increasing protectionism and possible exclusion from colonial markets. The Anglo-French Sierra Leone Agreement of 1882, which granted French and English traders reciprocal rights within their respective colonial spheres, as well as the expansion of French and Belgian interests along the Congo River, made such fears credible. There was particular concern about access to West Africa, and to a lesser extent Southwest Africa, New Guinea, and Samoa, where North German merchants and traders were active. Even so, Bismarck’s initial ambitions were modest: at most he envisioned self-financed and self-administered trading colonies in various overseas outposts turned into Reich protectorates along a laissez-faire model of the flag following trade. No grand colonial strategy informed Bismarck’s perspective—least of all did he envision settler colonies—and only the most minimal financial commitments were envisioned.

Domestic political calculations also seem to have played a significant role in Bismarck’s decision. While he was no doubt responsive to the rise of procolonial sentiments in Germany, he saw a chance to exploit these for his own purposes in the 1884 autumn Reichstag elections, which afforded the opportunity to isolate the Progressive Liberals and Social Democrats by appealing to middle and lower middle class sentiments supportive of colonies, something both parties opposed on principle. At the same time he sought the cooperation of the National Liberals, many of whom were colonial supporters. Whether this is evidence of “social imperialism”—colonial empire as a deliberate ploy to diffuse domestic tensions and shore up middle class support for conservative policies serving the Junker elite—is a matter of dispute. Bismarck’s own conflicting statements about what ends the colonies served add little clarity to this issue. Like much else Bismarckian, the colonies presented a political opportunity to address several problems simultaneously, ones not necessarily related. The picture presented by the “social imperialism” thesis, while suggestive, is too monolithic a picture that does not adequately account for multiplicity of forces and interests in evidence in the creation of the colonies.
German Southwest Africa. German Southwest Africa, declared a German protectorate in April 1884, would turn out to be Germany’s most important colony in terms of economic value, as a destination for settlers and because of its border impact on German society. This was in what today constitutes the territory of Namibia, one of the driest countries of sub-Saharan Africa and one that had attracted little interest from the European powers before 1875. A German missionary presence had been active along Angra Pequena (Lüderitz Bay) and Walvis Bay on the coast and in Windhoek in the interior for some decades, but it was not until the ventures of Adolf Lüderitz (1834–1886) that this region gained official attention. A Bremen tobacco merchant and gun trader who managed to amass vast territory in the region through self-financed expeditions and questionable treaties, Lüderitz was after gold and diamonds but strained his personal resources and successfully lobbied for Reich protection over these lands in 1884. A year later he sold the territories to the newly founded Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft für Südwest-Afrika (German Colonial Society for Southwest Africa, DKGSWA), As a concession company, it was entrusted with administering the colony, raising investment capital and, it was hoped, making profits, while the Reich provided a commissioner, a few civil administrators, and, despite initial reluctance, a small defensive force (Schutztruppe). The initial hopes for Southwest Africa were, however, quickly dashed by the realities of this sprawling, arid territory, of which only about 1 percent was suitable for arable farming and that required heavy port and railway investments before any of its anticipated mineral bounty could be exploited. The DKGSWA quickly revealed that it was incapable of shouldering these costs alone and the Reich was forced to fill the financial breach.

While sparsely populated, the native people of Southwest Africa numbered about 200,000 in 1884 and included the Oowambo, Herero, Nama and Orlam (Hottentots), and San (Bushmen), of which the pastoralist Herero and Nama in the central and southern part of the country, respectively, were the largest groups. In classic imperial fashion tensions between the Herero and Nama were exploited in consolidating rule, with the Germans playing the Herero off against the Nama yet aiming to preserve tribal self-governance. This was greatly complicated by the migration of German settlers to the colony in the 1890s, something neither planned when the protectorate was created nor encouraged by the Colonial Section of the Foreign Office. This highlights both the unpredictable dynamic of colonies and the relative autonomy of the colonial movement within Germany, which found increasing support from radical nationalist and conservative circles in 1890s. Between 1891 and 1904, for example, the white population of Southwest Africa grew from 539 to 4,500. This influx of settlers produced many tensions with natives over cattle and grazing and undermined the administration’s aim of preserving tribal integrity and self-governance. Railway investments added to these tensions by accelerating the dispossession of land while undermining the traditional structures of Herero and Nama society through the use of native labor. A catastrophic rinderpest epidemic in 1897 then destroyed about half of all native cattle and forced many more Herero to work for wages or depend on credit extended by German settlers. This in turn led to yet more losses of land and the creation of reservations. Legal insecurity and abusive colonial justice added much to these woes.

The tensions with the German population over land and the resulting loss of autonomy led to an organized uprising by the chief of the Herero, Samuel Mahererero (1854–1923), and the slaughter of some 123 white farmers in January 1904. The rebellion caught the colonial administration flat-footed and precipitated the replacement of Governor Theodor Leutwein (1849–1921) by the uncompromising Friedrich von Lindequist (1862–1945) and the mustering of military reinforcements from Germany. The commander of the reinforced Schutztruppe, General Lothar von Trotha (1848–1920), a veteran of other colonial wars, conducted the campaign against the Herero people with a notorious ruthlessness, defeating the main Herero force at Waterberg in August 1904 and driving the survivors into the arid Omahahe steppe where most died of exposure. The war waged against the Herero people culminated in von Trotha’s infamous “Extermination Decree” of October 1904, which put a cash prize on Mahererero’s head, refused peace negotiations, and declared that every Herero man, woman, and child was to be driven into exile or shot on sight. Around this time the Nama under Hendrik Witbooi (c. 1830–1905) also went to war against the Germans. Better armed and trained than the Herero, they managed to continue their struggle until March 1907.

The consequences of this war of extermination were catastrophic for both peoples. Those Herero who managed to survive landed in a system of camps and forced labor whose conditions killed nearly half of the remaining population. By 1911 they had been reduced by 75–80 percent of their prewar numbers, while the Nama suffered losses of nearly 60 percent. Tribal structures were dissolved, lands
confiscated, and native populations were now subject to draconian legal restrictions and penal transportation. On the German side, the war cost some 1,500 men and 585 million marks. It also exacted a toll on Germany's self-image as a humane, civilized and orderly colonial power. Indeed the brutality of von Trotha's campaign and the long duration and high costs of the war produced fierce criticism from the Social Democrats, Catholic Center, and left liberal parties in the Reichstag. This precipitated a crisis of confidence in the entire colonial endeavor in 1906 and new elections early in 1907.

An illustration entitled "Kolonialmächte" (Colonial powers) by Thomas Theodor Heine offers an admittedly satirical but nonetheless revealing image of German self-perceptions of its style of colonial rule at this time. In the top image, entitled “This is how the German colonizes,” the giraffes are numbered consecutively and march in lockstep before a colonial official. A palm to the right bears a sign that reads, “Dumping rubbish and snow here is prohibited.” The crocodile in the foreground wears a tax collar and is being fitted with a muzzle by a colonial soldier. Like all stereotypes, there is a grain of truth here about German colonial rule, yet the colonial experience in German Southwest Africa and elsewhere also showed how the German taste for law and order was repeatedly warped to serve the aim of dominating native populations by local interventions into the rule of law. Examples of this included the extraordinary escalation in the use of corporal punishment as well as arbitrary restrictions on intermarriage, movement, the disposal of property, and not least, the suspension of the rules of war in dealing with native uprisings. It is very ironic, although not any less true, that despite the coercion of the colonial regime—indeed, perhaps because of the regime's uncompromising subordination of the natives—many German settlers, including many women, came to view Southwest Africa as a place of freedom, opportunity, social mobility, and emancipation. But this was hardly the first or last time in African history that the freedom of a white minority was secured at the expense of the native population.

For obvious reasons, it has been tempting to see in the genocidal war waged against the Herero and Nama and the system of camps developed to control and exploit their remnant populations an important precedent for the murderous policies of the Nazi regime less than forty years later. As suggestive are the continuities in German military thinking that enabled this first of three “wars without mercy” in the twentieth century. At the same time, comparative studies reveal an unsettling pattern of “frontier genocide” with much in common between the Herero experience and, for example, the destruction of the Tasmanians in Australia and the Yuki Indians of California. With this in mind, it may be most accurate to interpret the Herero and Nama war as both fitting prior historical patterns and, through its scale and brutality, setting a disturbing precedent for twentieth-century genocide.

Following the 1907 Reichstag elections, a reform course was begun by the director of the newly created Colonial Office, Bernhard Dernburg (1865–1937), which aimed at better treatment of native populations, fostering indigenous farming and a more scientific and economically rational approach to developing the colonies. The expansion of railways figured centrally in this new thinking. Numerous railway lines were completed in Southwest Africa in 1907–1909 and enabled much expanded copper and diamond mining. By 1913 these two commodities alone comprised well over 90 percent of the value of Southwest Africa’s exports, and the colony’s economy accounted for no less than 65 to 75 percent of all colonial trade with Germany. But measured against the enormous administrative and military outlays and heavy state investments in railways, the colony remained a net liability for the Reich until its loss in World War I. Thereafter it was administered by South Africa as a League of Nations mandate.

**German East Africa.** Next in importance as a German colony was East Africa, which comprised the present-day territories of Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi. German Hanseatic traders had been active in Zanzibar and its adjacent African coast for some time, but Reich protection over what came to be German East Africa was not extended until the independent exploits of the adventurer Carl Peters. A man of pathological ambition animated by the reports of the explorer David Livingstone (1813–1873), Peters managed to acquire a vast coastal hinterland through dubious treaties in February of 1885. These were then offered Reich protection with some reluctance by Bismarck. Later that month, Peters founded the Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft (German East Africa Company, DOAG), which subsequently gained sovereign rights to operate and administer the territory. In years following Peters continued his exploits to expand the territory under delusions of creating a “German India” that would extend from Somaliland to Mozambique, much to the chagrin of Bismarck, who saw German relations with Britain threatened by such reckless moves and reacind Peters' letter of safe conduct. As it turned out, Peters' DOAG conducted it affairs quite heavy-handedly and generated frictions with
Arab coastal traders, which led to a major uprising in 1888–1889 that the DOAG was in no position to suppress. Troops had to be dispatched from Germany, and by 1891 the territory came under direct control of its first German colonial governor, Julius von Soden (1846–1921).

German East Africa had a complex ethnic composition that included Arab and Indian traders, Swahili, and a variety of Bantu and Tutsi peoples that made imperial submission, much less effective economic exploitation, a challenging endeavor. Indeed, extensive military campaigns had to be waged between 1891 and 1897 just to pacify the territory, with much of the eastern parts of the country remaining under indirect rule or ungoverned. The region around Mount Kilimanjaro was particularly troublesome in this respect because of the influx of white settlers into this area in the 1890s. The DOAG and the colonial government had sought to develop large-scale plantation cash-crop production and to systematically exploit the human and natural resources of the colony to this end. Village cotton production was made compulsory by the administration and traditional hunting was prohibited or restricted. Lands were expropriated and native labor was recruited, often forcibly, to work the plantations. Crushing hut and head taxes were imposed and collected with great brutality by the Askari mercenary forces employed by the Germans. More often than not, these taxes were paid in the form of extensive labor services sold to plantation owners. Large railway projects connecting the coast to the Kilimanjaro region and the banks of Lake Tanganyika were also undertaken. Native social structure changed dramatically as a consequence of the labor recruitment policies that were part of the plantation economy and railway construction, a process that eventually undermined peasant agriculture and led to the abandonment of many villages. At the same time the activities of missionaries threatened traditional customs and sources of authority.

Under these circumstances, it was not altogether surprising that German East Africa witnessed a major native revolt in 1905. The Maji Maji uprising spearheaded by the Ngoni, Pangwa, and other Bantu peoples of the south and articulated through the idiom of traditional religious cults sought to restore the older order being destroyed by the colonial presence. The uprising was met with a harsh response that cost the lives of some 75,000 and nearly annihilated the Pangwa. Punitive measures after the war killed many more. But the uprising, coinciding as it did with the Herero and Nama wars, shook the colonial administration to its core and reverberated all the way back to Berlin. Under Bernhard Dernburg in the Imperial Colonial Office and the new governor of East Africa, Albrecht von Rechenberg (1861–1935), a dramatic change in policy was ushered in which aimed at restricting settler and plantation activities in the interest of fostering native peasant agriculture. To this end Rechenberg prohibited whites from purchasing native lands, reformed taxes, ended compulsory village cultivation of cotton, restricted corporal punishment, and reformed local government to include native interests. These progressive reforms did defuse tensions and resulted in considerable increases in native cash crop production, especially of copra, coffee, and rubber. In reality, however, there were limits to how much could be done to restore native agriculture given the wrenching changes witnessed in the colony as well as deep white settler hostility to Rechenberg's policies. Despite the inroads made by planters and cash crops in the colony, it is worth mentioning that before World War I German East Africa ran consistent trade deficits with Germany and, like nearly all of the Reich's other colonies save Togo, could not pay its own keep. Following the war, German East Africa was divided between Britain, Belgium, and Portugal.

**Togo and Cameroon.** Both Togo and Cameroon were seized for Germany in an extraordinary bit of gunboat diplomacy in July of 1884. Bremen and Hamburg merchants and traders and German missionaries had established a presence in both West African territories, but given the pace of Belgian, British, and French annexations along the Congo, Niger, and Volta rivers, concern grew about eventual German exclusion. Togo was brought under Reich protection by treaties of 4–6 July 1884 to secure the interests of the pious Bremen merchant family Vietor, involved in the lucrative palm product trade, as well as to protect the North German Mission. Togo's coastal Ewe people had been in touch with European missionaries and traders for generations and did not violently oppose the German presence. Bringing the northern peoples—the Dagomba, Kabre, Konkomba, and Tykossi, among others—under German administration proved more difficult and led to an indirect form of rule.

In marked contrast to the other African colonies, Togo's colonial history was not punctuated by major uprisings or marked by severe mistreatment of its native populations, although the Togolese, like other people under German colonial rule, were subject to rigid colonial justice that made much use of corporeal punishment. Vietor and the missionaries opposed the alcohol and gun trade on principle (albeit unsuccessfully), and along with Governor Julius...
von Zech (1868–1914), successfully resisted the encroachment of large-scale plantations by land reforms that secured native title, intent as they were to protect and foster traditional indigenous farming. Togo also had a very high concentration of mission schools and the highest rate of school attendance and literacy in West Africa. Nevertheless, its economy was dominated by exports of palm nuts and oil (76 percent of exports in 1911), which only accounted for less than 8 percent of German colonial trade before World War I. Quite remarkably, Togo was the only German colony that was able to bear its own administrative costs. Following World War I, Togo was divided between France and Britain.

Cameroon became a Reich protectorate through a treaty with the Duala people on 14 July 1884 just days before it was to be annexed by the British. This move was made in order to secure the interests of the C. Woermann Company, a major alcoholic spirits exporter to West Africa. German colonial activities were confined largely to the coastal region with some forays made into the immediate southern hinterland resulting in fighting with the Bakoko, Bane, and other peoples, who took years to subdue. Indeed, fighting and uprisings of various kinds were a running theme in Cameroon’s colonial history, and eastern Cameroon was only indirectly ruled by the Germans. In fact, many of the colony’s export products such as rubber and ivory were collected by native peoples in the ungoverned hinterland and carried to the coast. In some contrast to Togo, however, large plantations came to figure importantly in Cameroon’s economy with many of the same abuses already enumerated in the discussion of German East Africa. Worth mentioning here is the West African Plantation Company Victoria, the single most important planter company operating in Cameroon and a favorite of the colonial governor Jesko von Puttkamer (1855–1917), who was a shareholder. With the connivance of the colonial government, the company systematically expropriated native lands in the Cameroon highlands, destroying village life and removing the natives to reservations or turning them into plantation laborers subject to much coercion and cruelty. Complaints about Puttkamer’s abusive and corrupt regime reached a chorus during the series of colonial crises that wracked Germany in 1905–1906, and in 1907 he was replaced by Theodor Seitz (1863–1949). Like his counterpart von Rechenberg in East Africa, Seitz tried to accommodate the native population by reforming the administration and improving the working conditions of plantation laborers, albeit with only rather modest success. The primary exports of Cameroon were rubber, cacao, palm oil, and ivory, in that order of significance, but it ran continued trade deficits with Germany and relied heavily on Reich subsidies to finance its administration. Cameroon’s territory was divided between the French and British following World War I.

The Pacific Colonies and Kiaochow. Since the 1860s German Hanseatic traders and merchants had gained a prominent position in the South Pacific. But with British expansion into Fiji in 1874, American dominance of Hawaii beginning in 1875, and Australian influence spreading to New Guinea, concerns were raised about possible German exclusion from this trade, which centered on copra, coconut oil, cotton, tortoise shell, and mother of pearl. Most prominent in this trade was the Hamburg firm Johann Cesar Godeffroy & Son (later Deutsche Handels und Plantagen Gesellschaft [German Trade and Plantation Company, DHPG]), with a sprawling network of coconut and cotton plantations dotted over many islands in the South Pacific and headquartered in Apia, Samoa, where the German navy also had a base. As a result of these interests and the threats posed to them by the warring factions of Samoa, the DHPG, supported by the German consulate, overthrew the Samoan government in 1887, and following a series of negotiations and conferences with the British and Americans, jointly governed the islands until 1900. In that year Samoa was divided between the Americans and Germans, with Western Samoa becoming a German colony. By all accounts the first German governor, Wilhelm Solf (1862–1936), was an outstanding administrator who rarely resorted to violence and did much to bring about reconciliation between Samoa’s opposing factions. Solf worked to foster indigenous cash crop production by encouraging coconut cultivation, restricted the sale of land to white planters, and prohibited forced labor on existing plantations. He also sought to protect Samoan cultural integrity by restricting permanent immigration of foreign laborers to Samoa. Samoa’s main export to Germany was copra, but the Pacific colonies, including Samoa, only accounted for less than 8.5 percent of Germany’s copra imports and as little as 0.15 percent of Germany’s overall trade in 1909. After World War I, New Zealand administered German Samoa as a League of Nations mandate.

Around the same time that German influence was growing in Samoa, the New Guinea Consortium (later renamed the New Guinea Company) was formed by the prominent German bankers Adolf von Hansemann (1826–1903) and Gerson von Bleichröder (1822–1893)—the latter Bismarck’s private banker—with the aim of developing
TABLE 1. Colonial territories and their German populations, 1910

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Land Area (thousand km²)</th>
<th>German Inhabitants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southwest Africa</td>
<td>835.1</td>
<td>9,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>2,384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>495.6</td>
<td>986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Guinea</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caroline, Palau, Mariana and</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall Islands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiaochow</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,658.44</td>
<td>15,420</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich, 1910 (Berlin: Puttkammer & Mühlbrecht, 1911), p. 396

In 1883 this territory was claimed and in the autumn of 1884 it gained Reich protection. The company was given a concession to administer New Guinea and the New Britain Archipelago. To this was then added a series of islands in Micronesia including the Marshall Islands, which were administered by the Jaluit Company. Negotiations with the British in 1885 affirmed Germany's claim over northeastern New Guinea (renamed Kaiser Wilhelmsland), the New Britain Archipelago (renamed the Bismarck Archipelago), and the Marshall Islands. In 1899 the Caroline, Mariana, and Palau islands were purchased from Spain and added to this sprawling oceanic empire. However, by then the New Guinea Company had failed to develop viable plantations in New Guinea producing only tensions with the indigenous population over land and the treatment of plantation workers. Thus the Reich was forced to administer these territories as a colony starting in 1899. The first governor, Albert Hahl (1868–1945), addressed these problems by protecting existing native land claims, regulating plantation work, encouraging native cash crop production and improving medical care and schooling. Before 1914 New Guinea showed remarkable increases in exports of copra, rubber, gutta-percha, and phosphates, but the colony was only ever a tiny component of German overall trade. New Guinea was seized by Australia during World War I and was administered as a League of Nations mandate thereafter.

The final part of the German colonial empire was the Chinese treaty port of Kiaochow on the Shantung peninsula. German merchants, traders, and manufacturers had been much lured by the promise of the China market since its opening in the 1840s. By the 1890s German trade with China exceeded trade with its own colonial possessions and it began to greatly overshadow the relatively disappointing African colonies. In 1897 the killing of German missionaries was used as a pretext for seizing a base of operation in the Bay of Kiaochow centered on the small port city of Tsing-tao on the Shantung peninsula. Through negotiation with the Chinese, this territory was then leased to Germany for ninety-nine years. Kiaochow, unlike the other colonies, was administered by the Imperial Navy, and the Naval Secretary Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz (1849–1930) took a special interest in it not only as a naval base but also as a spearhead from which Germany could begin to economically penetrate China. It was also to serve as a model treaty port demonstrating Germany's superiority over Britain and the other imperial powers. To that end enormous sums of money were invested into Kiaochow for such things as modern sewage and water works, port facilities, telegraphs, and roads. The German Shantung Mining Company and the Railway Company were created and granted monopoly concessions to develop railway lines into the interior and open up modern coal mines to supply Kiaochow and export markets in East Asia. By 1913 Kiaochow had received some 200 million marks in investments and subsidies from the Reich making it by far the most expensive single colonial project. However, Shantung Mining remained a loss-making enterprise and the hoped for economic penetration of China by Germany did not materialize. What is more, Germany trailed the Japanese, British, and Americans in terms of their share of exports to the port of Tsing-tao. Shortly after the outbreak of World War I, Japan occupied Kiaochow. It reverted to Chinese rule in 1922.

[See also Cameroon; Herero Revolt; Maji Maji Rebellion; Papua New Guinea; Southwest Africa; and Tanzania.]

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**Erik Grimmer-Solem**

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**East Asia**

Before the nineteenth century, East Asia was dominated by the last of a series of powerful land empires centered on the Chinese mainland. The Manchu rulers of the Qing Empire (1644–1912) not only conquered the territory controlled earlier by the Chinese Ming dynasty (1368–1644) but expanded the borders of the empire to include Manchuria, Mongolia, East Turkestan (now known as Xinjiang), and Tibet. The Qing Empire used a variety of sophisticated ideologies and practices to rule its far-flung domains and to mediate its relations with its neighbors. The court generally required peoples of the East Asian coastal region, including Korea, Liuqiu (Ryukyu), and Annam (Indochina), to adhere to a traditional Sinocentric tribute system, in which the empire’s tributaries declared their acceptance of Qing suzerainty in return for implied security guarantees and some degree of commercial access. It pacified and governed other areas and borders through military colonization, utilization of local elites, adept use of Buddhist symbolism, and deft diplomacy. Inner Asian peoples such as the Mongols and the Zunghars presented significant challenges to Qing rule, but were ultimately co-opted or conquered.

The chief land-based competitor to Qing dominance in Asia was the empire of Tsarist Russia. Russia’s eastward expansion increased the length of its empire’s border...